惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

S
Security Affairs
S
Schneier on Security
T
Tenable Blog
G
GRAHAM CLULEY
Latest news
Latest news
D
Darknet – Hacking Tools, Hacker News & Cyber Security
A
Arctic Wolf
I
Intezer
Cyberwarzone
Cyberwarzone
T
The Exploit Database - CXSecurity.com
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
K
Kaspersky official blog
Blog — PlanetScale
Blog — PlanetScale
C
Cyber Attacks, Cyber Crime and Cyber Security
T
Threat Research - Cisco Blogs
爱范儿
爱范儿
Exploit-DB.com RSS Feed
Exploit-DB.com RSS Feed
博客园 - 叶小钗
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
P
Palo Alto Networks Blog
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
博客园 - 司徒正美
The Cloudflare Blog
Help Net Security
Help Net Security
罗磊的独立博客
博客园 - 聂微东
Jina AI
Jina AI
Project Zero
Project Zero
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
L
LINUX DO - 最新话题
V
V2EX
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
美团技术团队
博客园 - 【当耐特】
Spread Privacy
Spread Privacy
J
Java Code Geeks
Threat Intelligence Blog | Flashpoint
Threat Intelligence Blog | Flashpoint
Security Latest
Security Latest
The Last Watchdog
The Last Watchdog
Stack Overflow Blog
Stack Overflow Blog
雷峰网
雷峰网
S
Securelist
Forbes - Security
Forbes - Security
博客园 - 三生石上(FineUI控件)
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
P
Privacy International News Feed
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
C
CERT Recently Published Vulnerability Notes

Microsoft Security Blog

Microsoft at Black Hat USA 2026: Defending trust in the age of AI and supply chain attacks | Microsoft Security Blog ACR Stealer: Two observed intrusion chains amid increased threat activity | Microsoft Security Blog Least privilege for AI agents: Identity, access, and tool binding | Microsoft Security Blog Unpacking the AsyncAPI npm supply chain compromise and import-time payload delivery | Microsoft Security Blog Turning threat intelligence into decisive action with Defender Experts | Microsoft Security Blog Defending SaaS-based applications against ShinyHunters OAuth abuse | Microsoft Security Blog Securing our future: July 2026 progress report on Microsoft's Secure Future Initiative | Microsoft Security Blog GigaWiper: Anatomy of a destructive backdoor assembled from multiple malware | Microsoft Security Blog Protecting Microsoft at AI speed: How SFI proactively hardens our cloud   | Microsoft Security Blog 5 insights from Frost & Sullivan’s 2025 Frost Radar™ for Cloud Security Posture Management | Microsoft Security Blog Improving security posture across the Microsoft partner ecosystem | Microsoft Security Blog Microsoft named a leader in the Frost Radar for cloud and application runtime security | Microsoft Security Blog Accelerating the quantum-safe timeline | Microsoft Security Blog ​​What’s new in Microsoft Security: June 2026 | Microsoft Security Blog Securing AI agents: When AI tools move from reading to acting | Microsoft Security Blog Chromium extension uses AI‑related branding to redirect browser search | Microsoft Security Blog Photo ZIP campaign targeting hospitality industry delivers Node.js implant for persistent access | Microsoft Security Blog Microsoft a Leader in The Forrester Wave™ for Endpoint Management Platforms | Microsoft Security Blog CNAPP evolution: How Microsoft aligns with leading cloud risk management platforms | Microsoft Security Blog StealC and Amadey: Breaking down infostealers and the cybercrime services that deliver them | Microsoft Security Blog Guarding AI memory | Microsoft Security Blog One intrusion, two cyberattackers: Uncovering parallel threat activity | Microsoft Security Blog AutoJack: How a single page can RCE the host running your AI agent  | Microsoft Security Blog New Forrester study shows customers who unified with Microsoft Security benefited from 124% ROI | Microsoft Security Blog From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise | Microsoft Security Blog Crypto Clipper uses Tor and worm-like propagation for persistence and control | Microsoft Security Blog Beyond the benchmark: Advancing security at AI speed  | Microsoft Security Blog ​​Forrester names Microsoft a Leader in the 2026 Extended Detection and Response Platforms Wave™ report | Microsoft Security Blog AI is accelerating cyberattacks—here’s how to stay ahead Microsoft Defender email security benchmarking: Key insights from one year of data | Microsoft Security Blog Reconstructing AI activity in investigations AI brands as bait: How threat actors are using the AI hype in social engineering Securing CI/CD in an agentic world: Claude Code Github action case Updating the taxonomy of failure modes in agentic AI systems: What a year of red teaming taught us Preinstall to persistence: Inside the Red Hat npm Miasma credential-stealing campaign Turn specs into evals for any agent with ASSERT Microsoft Build 2026: Securing code, agents, and models across the development lifecycle Malicious npm packages abuse dependency confusion to profile developer environments Microsoft is named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Endpoint Protection Typosquatted npm packages used to steal cloud and CI/CD secrets The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor From poisoned search results to GPU mining: A cryptojacking campaign abusing ScreenConnect and Microsoft .NET utilities Microsoft recognized as a Leader in The Forrester Wave™ for Workforce Identity Security Platforms From edge appliance to enterprise compromise: Multi-stage Linux intrusion via F5 and Confluence Microsoft Security success stories: How St. Luke’s and ManpowerGroup are securing AI foundations What’s new in Microsoft Security: May 2026 Mini Shai Hulud: Compromised @antv npm packages enable CI/CD credential theft Securing the gaming culture of cultures Introducing RAMPART and Clarity: Open source tools to bring safety into Agent development workflow Exposing Fox Tempest: A malware-signing service operation How Storm-2949 turned a compromised identity into a cloud-wide breach How to better protect your growing business in an AI-powered world Defense in depth for autonomous AI agents When configuration becomes a vulnerability: Exploitable misconfigurations in AI apps Accelerating detection engineering using AI-assisted synthetic attack logs generation Defending consumer web properties against modern DDoS attacks Undermining the trust boundary: Investigating a stealthy intrusion through third-party compromise Active attack: Dirty Frag Linux vulnerability expands post-compromise risk When prompts become shells: RCE vulnerabilities in AI agent frameworks World Passkey Day: Advancing passwordless authentication ​​Microsoft named an overall leader in KuppingerCole Analyst’s 2026 Emerging AI Security Operations Center (SOC) report ​​ ClickFix campaign uses fake macOS utilities lures to deliver infostealers Breaking the code: Multi-stage ‘code of conduct’ phishing campaign leads to AiTM token compromise CVE-2026-31431: Copy Fail vulnerability enables Linux root privilege escalation across cloud environments Microsoft Agent 365, now generally available, expands capabilities and integrations What’s new, updated, or recently released in Microsoft Security Email threat landscape: Q1 2026 trends and insights 8 best practices for CISOs conducting risk reviews Simplifying AWS defense with Microsoft Sentinel UEBA AI-powered defense for an AI-accelerated threat landscape Detection strategies across cloud and identities against infiltrating IT workers Making opportunistic cyberattacks harder by design Cross‑tenant helpdesk impersonation to data exfiltration: A human-operated intrusion playbook Containing a domain compromise: How predictive shielding shut down lateral movement Building your cryptographic inventory: A customer strategy for cryptographic posture management Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise Incident response for AI: Same fire, different fuel The agentic SOC—Rethinking SecOps for the next decade Investigating Storm-2755: “Payroll pirate” attacks targeting Canadian employees Intent redirection vulnerability in third-party SDK exposed millions of Android wallets to potential risk Inside an AI‑enabled device code phishing campaign Storm-1175 focuses gaze on vulnerable web-facing assets in high-tempo Medusa ransomware operations Threat actor abuse of AI accelerates from tool to cyberattack surface Cookie-controlled PHP webshells: A stealthy tradecraft in Linux hosting environments Mitigating the Axios npm supply chain compromise Critical Infrastructure at Risk | Security Insider
Microsoft Entra ID security updates: Passkeys are the default authentication method in Entra ID | Microsoft Security Blog
Nadim Abdo · 2026-07-14 · via Microsoft Security Blog

As identity attacks grow more sophisticated in the AI era, organizations need stronger authentication methods that protect users from phishing, credential theft, and social engineering. To address these evolving threats, Microsoft Entra ID is updating its authentication experience by making passkeys the default phishing-resistant authentication method, helping customers reduce reliance on phishable methods such as SMS and voice.

Beginning September 1, 2026, Microsoft will begin rolling out passkeys as the default authentication experience in Microsoft Entra ID. As the rollout reaches each organization, users enabled for SMS or voice authentication will automatically be enabled for passkeys, and the next time they perform multifactor authentication, they’ll be prompted to register a passkey.

Following this transition, on February 1, 2027, Microsoft will retire Microsoft-provided telecom delivery for SMS and voice authentication and will no longer offer SMS and voice as a native Microsoft Entra capability. Organizations that still require SMS or voice authentication methods will have the option to choose one of our telecom partners through the Microsoft Security Store. Customers will be responsible for any associated telecom-related costs charged by the telecom partners.

We strongly recommend moving users to passkeys or another phishing-resistant authentication method as soon as possible.

Why stronger authentication matters in the AI era

Authentication methods that use SMS or voice rely on shared secrets or channels that attackers increasingly intercept, phish, or manipulate. Passkeys use public-key cryptography rather than shared secrets, making them phishing-resistant by design. They also provide a faster, simpler sign-in experience for users.

The case for moving beyond SMS and voice is no longer just that attackers intercept or socially engineer these methods. The threat environment has changed in speed, scale, and sophistication. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed AI-enabled phishing campaigns reaching click-through rates as high as 54%, compared with roughly 12% for more traditional campaigns, making stolen passwords and phishable second factors an urgent risk.1 At the same time, tactics such as SIM swapping and multifactor authentication bypass have become more accessible and repeatable.

An AI-powered cyberattack can use a compromised identity to automate discovery, privilege escalation, and lateral movement much faster than a human attacker working manually. This is why phishing-resistant authentication methods are so important.

By making passkeys the default authentication experience, organizations reduce reliance on phishable authentication methods and strengthen protection against credential theft and phishing.

Today, Microsoft provides the telecom delivery behind SMS and voice authentication natively within Entra ID. As part of this transition, we’ll step back from providing that native telecom delivery to encourage phishing-resistant methods as the standard for everyone.

For most organizations, the recommended path is simple: move users to passkeys at no additional cost.  

If you have a regulatory, technical, or business requirement to keep SMS or voice, you’ll be able to select, configure, and manage a third-party telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store—a partner marketplace where you can contract directly with supported carriers. 

On September 18, 2026, we’ll share information on supported providers, deployment guidance, and technical documentation with pricing and commercial terms available through the Microsoft Security Store.

How to prepare

Start planning your transition now so you can select the deployment approach that best fits your organization and ensure your users are prepared for upcoming changes to their sign-in experience.

  1. Identify users who still use SMS or voice. Review your authentication method policy and identify which users or groups are enabled for SMS or voice authentication.
  2. Plan your passkey rollout. Enable passkeys and select the types that best fit your users’ devices and workflows. Microsoft Entra ID supports:
    • Synced passkeys, such as passkeys stored in platform credential managers like iCloud Keychain and Google Password Manager.
    • Device-bound passkeys, such as Microsoft Authenticator passkeys, Entra passkey on Windows, and FIDO2 security keys.
  3. Use registration campaign to drive adoption. Microsoft Entra ID can help organizations move users at scale by prompting them to register a passkey during multifactor authentication sign-in.
  4. Prepare user communications. Tell affected users what’s changing, when they’ll see a passkey registration prompt, and how to complete registration on their device.

For step-by-step guidance on planning, deploying, and managing passkeys, see our Microsoft Learn documentation and passkey deployment guide. 

If regulated, technical, or operational scenarios still require SMS or voice:

  1. Identify and document affected user segments.
  2. Starting October 30, 2026, select and configure a supported telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store.
  3. Test your configuration with a pilot group before any broad rollout.

Timeline

DateMilestone
September 1, 2026 All users enabled for SMS or voice are auto-enabled and nudged for passkey registration upon multifactor authentication sign-in.

Use the passkey deployment guide to prepare your environment for passkey use. Notify affected users about the upcoming change. Ensure every user has a phishing-resistant authentication method, such as a passkey, Entra passkeys on Windows, or a FIDO2 security key.

September 18, 2026 Pricing, commercial terms, and a list of supported telecom providers will be shared.

If you plan to continue using SMS or voice authentication, review the available provider options and identify affected users.

October 30, 2026 Admins may select and configure a supported telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store. 
February 1, 2027 Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication ends.  

If SMS or voice remains necessary for specific users, configure a supported telecom provider before this date.

After February 1, 2027 Users who use SMS or voice for multifactor authentication will be required to register a passkey before they can sign in. Automatic prompts to register a passkey will be enforced for all users in all tenants. There will be no opt-out option.

Note: The dates outlined in this post apply to Microsoft Entra ID in the public cloud only. Support for other cloud environments will follow on a separate timeline, with additional guidance and dates to be announced in advance.

SMS and voice have served their purpose well, bringing multifactor authentication to billions of users who otherwise would have had none. But the threat environment has evolved beyond their capabilities, and we need to evolve with it.

We’re making passkeys the default in Entra ID because they work better for users and worse for cyberattackers. We’re trying to make this transition as predictable as possible with clear dates, fallback options during migration, and recovery that doesn’t depend on phishable credentials anymore.

Learn more at aka.ms/passkeybydefault 

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.


1Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025.