Threat actors are constantly developing new attack schemes — from OAuth token theft to attacks on AI agents — but the classics never quite leave their playbook. On any given day, an employee may receive malware attached directly to an email, or lying in wait behind a link embedded in an email. Making these attacks succeed still requires a degree of creativity, and in recent years attackers have increasingly adopted exotic file formats. Users don’t perceive these formats as dangerous; more importantly, many EDR and email security solutions skip scanning them entirely. Yet they’ve proven highly effective for deploying malware or harvesting credentials.

Below are the file types that may be blind spots in your organization’s detection strategy — despite being observed as used in real-world attacks.

Disk images

This is the broadest and most dangerous attachment category. A disk image can contain a fully prepared, correctly structured set of files tailored to a wide range of attack scenarios. It mounts as a separate volume (standalone virtual disk), and when doing so often uses tools built into the operating system. The victim doesn’t need to extract anything or create suspicious folders on disk.

The most versatile format is ISO, which dates back to the heyday of multimedia CDs. ISO images mount natively on every major OS without additional utilities, whether through simple tools like File Explorer or via the command line interface. This is precisely why threat actors have no hesitation in sending ISO files as email attachments.

Somewhat less common are IMG containers, which also mount without additional tooling on macOS or Linux, but require installing a small, free utility such as OSFMount on Windows, or using WSL2 (Windows Subsystem for Linux), which is built into recent Windows versions. A file with identical content may also carry a DD extension.

Threat actors also make use of VHD, a virtual disk format native to Windows, which generally works on Linux machines as well (via qemu-nbd or guestmount). On macOS, an additional utility — again, qemu-nbd is a common choice — is required to mount it. Note that on unpatched Windows systems, the victim doesn’t need to take any further action after the disk mounts: CVE-2025-24993 — a vulnerability actively exploited in real-world attacks — triggers attacker code execution immediately upon mounting the image.

For completeness’ sake, VMDK, the disk image format used by VMware, is also worth detecting, though it’s largely ineffective in attacks on regular users since every popular OS requires additional software to mount it.

All of these image formats can be viewed and unpacked not only with specialized tools, but with standard archive utilities like 7-Zip or RAR. As a result, the odds that the user will fall for the bait are higher than one might hope.

In addition to not being a well-known potentially dangerous format, image files give attackers one further advantage: files extracted from disk images on Windows frequently lack the Mark of the Web flag, and therefore can be launched without triggering additional system warnings.

There’s one more reason why EPP/EDR solutions must scan virtual machines and disk images: these formats are also used during later stages of an attack. To mask active file-system activity from monitoring tools, ransomware gangs sometimes run the entire encryption process inside a virtual machine deployed on the victim’s computer. The RagnarLocker ransomware strain has used VirtualBox for this purpose, while the CRON#TRAP campaign relied on a QEMU environment.

MS Office files

No, this isn’t about macro-laced DOC files. Microsoft has grown weary enough of this classic attack vector that macros in downloaded documents are now blocked outright, and enabling them requires considerable effort from the user. But Office relies on dozens of file formats, and some of the less common ones still occasionally give attackers an edge.

Less familiar to both users and security solutions are OneNote files (.one). These are essentially simple notes, but they can carry embedded attachments, including not just images and links, but VBS/WSF/BAT scripts as well. Within the note, an attachment normally displays as an icon, but attackers overlay it with a picture showing a message with a “View” button.

Another Office format popular with attackers is the Excel add-in. These files use the .xll extension but are, in effect, full-fledged Windows dynamic-link libraries (DLLs), and therefore may have extensive functionality. Victims receive a malicious email with what looks like an invoice; the icon suggests that the file will open in Excel. Ignoring the security warning may result in an infostealer infection.

SVG “graphics”

The description of the SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) format sounds entirely innocuous. Indeed, 99% of SVG files are logos and interface icons. But unlike PNG or JPG, SVG files are fundamentally XML documents, and beyond points, lines and fills they can contain JavaScript. In terms of malicious potential, SVG is not far behind a full web page. In real-world attacks, SVG files can redirect a user to a phishing page immediately upon opening, or render the phishing page directly by unpacking a Base64-encoded block into full HTML.

SVG files pose a distinct risk to corporate portals that accept user file uploads. If a portal’s Content Security Policy (CSP) isn’t sufficiently restrictive, and lets someone upload a malicious SVG file, the embedded JavaScript can steal cookies from the page, inject unauthorized content, and carry out similar attacks.

Polyglot files

Polyglot file formats are less exotic in and of themselves, but the files carry more than meets the eye. They’re called polyglots because attackers construct a file that can be validly interpreted in multiple ways: for example, it can be a valid ZIP archive and a valid executable at the same time. The purpose is purely to evade detection by security solutions and deceive the user. We’ve covered polyglots in detail in a separate blog post.

The clear standout in our roundup is a malicious campaign distributing the IcedID infostealer. Victims receive emails with a ZIP attachment, which unpacks into an ISO disk image. That further unpacks into a CHM file (the Windows Help format) that’s also correctly processed as an mshta (Microsoft HTML Application host) application, which then downloads the primary malware payload.

Defending against exotic files

These attacks rely on the assumption that security solutions either don’t scan unusual file formats, or scan them only superficially. Preventing the threat starts with not operating on that assumption with regard to your own infrastructure:

• Configure EDR, web, and email filters to scan all of the file formats described above.
• Process archives and disk images with the same rigor as you would apply to executables.
• Detonate potentially dangerous file types in a sandbox, and configure recursive unpacking of nested formats through to the end of the chain: ZIP → ISO → CHM.
• Where feasible, quarantine all file formats anomalous for email — disk images in particular.
• Build detection rules for anomalous usage patterns that involve exotic files. For example, unusually small disk images are rare and are therefore worth investigating.
• Review the technical documentation of your security solutions to confirm that complex formats are detected through deep structural parsing rather than magic-byte checks alone.
• Deploy behavioral detection capable of flagging anomalous execution patterns and legitimate utilities launched from unexpected contexts. The usual suspects here include mshta, git, wscript, hh, and rundll32.
• SVG files warrant a dedicated policy. Treat SVGs as active content at the email and web perimeter. On corporate portals, enforce a strict CSP, and serve user-uploaded files from a separate subdomain so that a malicious script embedded in an SVG can’t access the session on the main portal.