We analyse optimal voting weights in two-tier voting systems. In our model, the overall population (or union) is split in groups (or member states) of different sizes. The individuals comprising the overall population constitute the first tier, and the council is the second tier. Each group has a representative in the council that casts votes on their behalf. By "optimal weights", we mean voting weights in the council which minimise the democracy deficit, i.e. the expected deviation of the council vote from a (hypothetical) popular vote. We assume that the voters within each group interact via what we call a local collective bias or common belief (through tradition, common values, strong religious beliefs, etc.). We allow in addition an interaction across group borders via a global bias. Thus, the voting behaviour of each voter depends on the behaviour of all other voters. This correlation may be stronger between voters in the same group, but is in general not zero for voters in different groups. We call the respective voting measure a Collective Bias Model (CBM). The "simple CBM" introduced in [12] and in particular the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture are special cases of our general model. We compute the optimal weights in the large population limit. Those optimal weights are unique as long as there is no "complete" correlation between the groups. In this case, we obtain optimal weights which are the sum of a common constant equal for all groups and a summand which is proportional to the population of each group. We also analyse the conditions under which the optimal weights are negative, thus making it impossible to reach the theoretical minimum of the democracy deficit. This is a new aspect of the model owed to the correlation between votes belonging to different groups.