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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Poisoning-based Backdoor Attacks for Arbitrary Target Lab...
Binxiao Huang, Jason Chun Lok, Chang Liu, Ngai Wong · 2024-05-09 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Poisoning-based backdoor attacks expose vulnerabilities in the data preparation stage of deep neural network (DNN) training. The DNNs trained on the poisoned dataset will be embedded with a backdoor, making them behave well on clean data while outputting malicious predictions whenever a trigger is applied. To exploit the abundant information contained in the input data to output label mapping, our scheme utilizes the network trained from the clean dataset as a trigger generator to produce poisons that significantly raise the success rate of backdoor attacks versus conventional approaches. Specifically, we provide a new categorization of triggers inspired by the adversarial technique and develop a multi-label and multi-payload Poisoning-based backdoor attack with Positive Triggers (PPT), which effectively moves the input closer to the target label on benign classifiers. After the classifier is trained on the poisoned dataset, we can generate an input-label-aware trigger to make the infected classifier predict any given input to any target label with a high possibility. Under both dirty- and clean-label settings, we show empirically that the proposed attack achieves a high attack success rate without sacrificing accuracy across various datasets, including SVHN, CIFAR10, GTSRB, and Tiny ImageNet. Furthermore, the PPT attack can elude a variety of classical backdoor defenses, proving its effectiveness.