惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
G
Google Developers Blog
V
V2EX
美团技术团队
H
Help Net Security
月光博客
月光博客
爱范儿
爱范儿
Engineering at Meta
Engineering at Meta
The Cloudflare Blog
U
Unit 42
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
A
About on SuperTechFans
博客园 - Franky
The GitHub Blog
The GitHub Blog
N
Netflix TechBlog - Medium
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
博客园 - 司徒正美
MyScale Blog
MyScale Blog
B
Blog
雷峰网
雷峰网
Y
Y Combinator Blog
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from no...
Vabuk Pahari, Andrea Canidio · 2025-09-19 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

We analyze 15,097 blocks proposed for inclusion in Ethereum's blockchain over an eight-minute window on December 3, 2024, during which 38 blocks were added to the chain. We classify transactions as exclusive -- appearing only in blocks from a single builder -- or private -- absent from the public mempool but included in blocks from multiple builders. We find that, depending on the methodology, exclusive transactions account for between 77.2% and 84% of the total fees paid by transactions in winning blocks. Moreover, we show that exclusivity cannot be fully attributed to persistent relationships between senders and builders: only between 7% and 8.4% of all on-chain exclusive transaction value originates from senders who route exclusively to one builder. Finally, we observe that transaction exclusivity is dynamic. Some transactions are exclusive at the start of a bidding cycle but later appear in blocks from multiple builders. Other transactions remain exclusive to a losing builder for two or three cycles before appearing in the public mempool. These transactions are therefore delayed and then exposed to potential attacks.