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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Secure Tug-of-War (SecTOW): Iterative Defense-Attack Trai...
Muzhi Dai, Shixuan Liu, Zhiyuan Zhao, Junyu Gao, Hao Sun, Xuelon · 2025-07-30 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

The rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) has led to breakthroughs in various applications, yet their security remains a critical challenge. One pressing issue involves unsafe image-query pairs--jailbreak inputs specifically designed to bypass security constraints and elicit unintended responses from MLLMs. Compared to general multimodal data, such unsafe inputs are relatively sparse, which limits the diversity and richness of training samples available for developing robust defense models. Meanwhile, existing guardrail-type methods rely on external modules to enforce security constraints but fail to address intrinsic vulnerabilities within MLLMs. Traditional supervised fine-tuning (SFT), on the other hand, often over-refuses harmless inputs, compromising general performance. Given these challenges, we propose Secure Tug-of-War (SecTOW), an innovative iterative defense-attack training method to enhance the security of MLLMs. SecTOW consists of two modules: a defender and an auxiliary attacker, both trained iteratively using reinforcement learning (GRPO). During the iterative process, the attacker identifies security vulnerabilities in the defense model and expands jailbreak data. The expanded data are then used to train the defender, enabling it to address identified security vulnerabilities. We also design reward mechanisms used for GRPO to simplify the use of response labels, reducing dependence on complex generative labels and enabling the efficient use of synthetic data. Additionally, a quality monitoring mechanism is used to mitigate the defender's over-refusal of harmless inputs and ensure the diversity of the jailbreak data generated by the attacker. Experimental results on safety-specific and general benchmarks demonstrate that SecTOW significantly improves security while preserving general performance.