Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful responses. A growing body of work shows that contextual priming, where earlier turns covertly bias later replies, constitutes a powerful attack surface, with hand-crafted multi-turn scaffolds consistently outperforming single-turn manipulations on capable models. However, automated optimization-based red-teaming has remained largely limited to the single-turn setting, iterating over static prompts and lacking the ability to reason about which forms of conversational priming induce compliance. While recent multi-turn, search-based approaches have begun to bridge this gap, the mutator design space underlying effective primed dialogues remains largely unexplored. We present ContextualJailbreak, a black-box red-teaming strategy that performs evolutionary search over a simulated multi-turn primed dialogue. The strategy leverages a graded 0-5 harm score from a two-level judge as an in-loop signal, enabling partially harmful responses to guide the search process rather than being discarded. Search is driven by five semantically defined mutation operators: roleplay, scenario, expand, troubleshooting, and mechanistic, of which the last two are novel contributions of this work. Across 50 representative HarmBench behaviors, ContextualJailbreak achieves an ASR of 100% on gpt-oss:20B, 100% on qwen3-8B, 100% on llama3.1:70B, and 90% on gpt-oss:120B, outperforming four single- and multi-turn baselines by 31-96 percentage points on average. The 40 maximally harmful attacks discovered against gpt-oss:120B transfer without adaptation to closed frontier models, achieving 90.0% on gpt-4o-mini, 70.0% on gpt-5, and 70.0% on gemini-3-flash, but only 17.5% on claude-opus-4-7 and 15.0% on claude-sonnet-4-6, revealing a pronounced provider-level asymmetry in alignment robustness.