When Thomas Munson was approached by an enthusiastic recruiter on Linkedin, he was first pleased – before realising it may be a Chinese intelligence agent…

“Hello,” the message read. “I have been deeply impressed by your expertise.” I, like many such people on Linkedin, had been exploring my career options and so, as you might imagine, I hoped this was the beginning of an exciting opportunity.

Alas, that optimism was short-lived. In all likelihood, I had just been approached by one of Chinese intelligence’s ever growing army of Linkedin agents.

Visiting the sender’s profile aroused my suspicion. Originally from Beijing, where she had worked as an analyst at The People’s Bank of China, she was now claiming to work for a Chinese construction company. She went on to tell me she was visiting London and was keen to meet me to “learn more about my work” and the organisation I was employed by.

Had I been, say, a public affairs manager at Kier this might not have seemed quite so out of the ordinary. However, given I spent the previous four years working for two high profile government ministers, followed by The Henry Jackson Society (a foreign affairs think tank and vocal critics of the Chinese Communist Party), that someone working in Chinese ‘construction’ wanted to meet me struck me as, at the very least, odd.

Naturally, I declined the meeting.

The truth is, I can’t know for sure whether this was the first step of a genuine attempt by the Chinese state to recruit me. But recent coverage by the Wall Street Journal on China’s use of Linkedin makes me think that is more likely than not.

Linkedin espionage

The American newspaper reported the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network accused China of systematic attempts to recruit Western government employees, military experts and the like through Linkedin. MI5 believes around 20,000 people in the UK have been approached by Chinese agents using the site in the last few years.

I was not in the least bit surprised upon reading these figures, indeed only recently an Oxbridge educated friend working in Westminster quipped he’d had more such approaches than those of legitimate recruiters. Both him and I were fortunate enough to be able to turn down any such advances – but that won’t be the case for everyone.

We’re often told how difficult the job market is right now, particularly for young people, as a result of sluggish growth and the incorporation of AI. Nearly one in eight 16 to 24-year-olds are not in education, employment or training. Understandably, much of the commentary around these statistics has focused on the economic and sociological impact of this concerning phenomenon. What I’ve not seen is a conversation about the ramifications for our national security.

Put yourself in the mind of a senior parliamentary assistant. You’ve been lucky enough to find work, unlike a number of your contemporaries, but you are still feeling the economic squeeze. Your modest salary, determined by IPSA (the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority), just about covers the dry cleaning for your Moss Bros suits, a box room in Brixton and some subsidised pints in the Woolsack (it’s a bar in Parliament) on a Thursday night. However, you happen to work for an MP who sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee. You can’t afford any big plans this weekend but, out of the blue, you’re approached on Linkedin. This person finds your experience ‘deeply impressive’ (just like mine was) and offers you a generous sum for a small piece of writing on the Committee. It’s harmless you think, most of the information is in the public domain and you can probably get AI to write it anyway. Easy money. Things spiral and, before it’s too late, you’re being blackmailed by the Chinese state to hand over sensitive Committee information. It’s as easy as that.

Without adequate investment and growth, not only are we depriving today’s young adults of opportunities, we are exposing them and the state itself to the threat of espionage on an industrial scale.

Thomas Munson is a freelance writer