Michael Walter
We examine the relationship between correctness definitions for Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and the associated security definitions. We show that reactive notions of correctness imply INDCPA-D and sINDCPA-D security. But that to obtain both INDCPA-D and sINDCPA-D security we need to use a randomized version of the evaluation procedure. Such randomized evaluation procedures cause problems in real life deployments of FHE solutions, so we then go on to show how one can de-randomize the evaluation procedure and still obtain sINDCPA-D security in the random oracle model for the specific FHE scheme of TFHE.
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2005,
author = {Nigel Smart and Michael Walter},
title = {Reactive Correctness, {sINDCPA}-D-Security and Deterministic Evaluation for {TFHE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2005},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2005}
}
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