This aerial photo taken on March 15, 2026 shows the wreck of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) carrier Arctic Metagaz, which is adrift between Malta and Lampedusa. The vessel, which was hit by "sudden explosions followed by a massive fire" according to Libyan port authority, was sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for being one of Russia's so-called "shadow fleet" of ageing tankers that carry its oil and gas around the world, skirting Western restrictions. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Kyiv of having carried out a "terrorist attack" on the Arctic Metagaz. All 30 crew members were rescued, Moscow said. (Photo by Miguela XUEREB / Newsbook Malta / AFP via Getty Images)

Newsbook Malta/AFP via Getty Images

For years now, there have been recurring incidents in which Ukrainian operatives have targeted Russian interests and personnel with drones far from the Ukrainian battlefield. These extraterritorial drone teams have operated as far away as Sudan to stymie Russian activities and reportedly provided drones and training to the Syrian rebels who ousted Moscow’s long-time ally Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. More recently, they have dramatically emerged on another front far from home: the North African country Libya, which they have used for one of their most high-profile attack on Russian interests to date.

On March 3, the Russian-flagged Arctic Metagaz, part of Russia’s shadow fleet evading sanctions against Moscow and helping fund its war effort against Ukraine, came under attack by suspected sea drones. The LNG carrier, transporting 61,000 tons of gas, sustained major damage and drifted off toward Libya. All 30 of its crew members survived and were rescued. Despite enduring severe damage and a massive fire, it did not sink and remains a charred floating testament to the lengths Ukraine will go to undermine Russia’s war effort against it.

Little more than a month later, the Associated Press reported that Ukrainian drone experts operating from military bases in western Libya, which is controlled by the UN-recognized Government of National Unity, executed this attack. Most of them are concentrated at an airbase in Misrata, but there are others present in the capital, Tripoli, and the town of Zawiya on the coast.

Libya has long remained divided between the GNU under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in the west and the Libyan National Army under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the east. These two sides last fought each other in a civil war that ended in an uneasy ceasefire in 2020, which has held ever since. In April, both administrations participated in the U.S. Flintlock 2026 military exercise hosted on Libyan soil, giving some hope that military reintegration is possible.

Most of Ukraine’s past extraterritorial drone operations, in Sudan and elsewhere, are widely believed to have relied on small, easily transportable forward-person-view drones. Conversely, the March 3 attack on the Arctic Metagaz was carried out by much larger and more sophisticated sea drones, like the homegrown models Ukraine has used so effectively against Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.

Why the GNU allowed the Ukrainians’ use of its territories and military bases isn’t immediately clear. While there were clear benefits, there were also significant risks.

Russia has maintained a presence in eastern Libya for several years, where it has supported Haftar’s LNA. On the other hand, Ukraine’s rival presence wasn’t established overnight nor only in recent months.

“When Russian combatants first appeared near Tripoli fighting on behalf of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in September 2019, as part of his offensive against the Libyan capital, NATO adopted a clear doctrine: Tripoli must remain out of Russia’s reach,” Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist associated with the Royal United Services Institute, told me in an interview.

“That principle led Washington to endorse a massive Turkish military intervention, which resulted in the deaths of several Russian fighters between late 2019 and May 2020,” Harchaoui said.

“After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, a few sabotage operations followed on Libyan soil, including the destruction of an expensive Russian cargo plane in December 2023 in al-Jufrah Air Base,” he added.

“Those incidents, which caused no Russian casualties, have long been suspected of being carried out in large part by Ukrainian operatives with likely help from NATO.”

Flash-forward to roughly the last 6-9 months, and the U.S. military has cultivated a close relationship with the GNU’s Deputy Defense Minister Abdel Salam Zewbi, training his elite Battalion 80 unit.

“In light of this rapprochement, it is entirely plausible that, with the knowledge and blessing of NATO powers — chiefly the United States but also the United Kingdom and Turkey — several small groups of Ukrainian operatives now maintain a presence in the greater Tripoli area,” Harchaoui said.

Several distinct considerations beginning in May 2025 also convinced Prime Minister Debeibeh to permit the Ukrainian presence.

The RUSI expert noted that between May and December 2025, Debeibeh found himself in real danger. His country faced tensions that had nothing to do with Russia or Ukraine and their depleting conflict and everything to do with “local security dynamics” in Tripoli, problems with his rival, Haftar, and concerns about Tripoli’s traditional backer, Turkey, increasingly “trying to please” that eastern rival.

“All of this combined created a real situation of genuine danger for him,” Harchaoui said.

Consequently, Debeibeh sought to distinguish himself from Haftar, presenting himself as a “unique and valuable” leader to NATO and in the eyes of the United States. As part of these efforts, he delivered a suspect in the infamous murder of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in September 2012.

“By NATO, I mean not just Turkey but also the UK,” Harchaoui said. “There’s a difference between Ukraine kind of being active, having some operatives on the ground, which I think has been more or less a reality in Libya since probably early 2023 or mid 2023.”

“But then what the March 3 incident indicates to us is that things became bigger, more audacious, more brazen.”

The incident single-handedly demonstrated how Ukraine had gained a much larger and more visible footprint and could act with such boldness to “endanger an incident as shocking” as the Arctic Metagaz attack.

“I mean, even from an environmental perspective, it’s really, really disastrous,” Harchaoui said of that attack. “I think any proper analysis should recognize that in the months preceding it, there was a situation in Tripoli where Prime Minister Dbeibeh really felt huge pressure on himself and was in all likelihood desperate to show that he was different from Haftar.”

“And one way of being different from Haftar, who is pro-Russia, is to be anti-Russia.”

In doing so, the prime minister could distinguish Tripoli and his government as an island out of Russia’s reach. In addition to remaining beyond Moscow’s reach, it welcomed commercial companies from Ukraine, including those specializing in drone development and deployment. Doing so served Ukraine’s “agenda of hurting Russia outside of Ukraine, in Africa in general, and Libya, in particular.”

More broadly, establishing ties with Ukraine is beneficial, given its rapid rise to become what Harchaoui dubbed the “drone capital of the world.” Since Russia’s 2022 invasion in particular, Kyiv has repeatedly shown “vivacity and dynamism and initiative” in all things pertaining to drones. From small loitering munitions and FPV drones launched in their hundreds on the frontlines to the large sea drones that have proven devastatingly effective.

“There’s so much dynamism in that sector that it has created commercial endeavors,” Harchaoui said. “In other words, small companies whose legal entity might be based in Bulgaria or in Serbia or perhaps even in Russia, Turkey, or Ukraine, obviously.”

These entities have Ukrainian technicians specializing in their various indigenous systems and munitions. They can also “deploy and give advice and bring somebody up to speed in whichever part of the world, once they pay up,” Harchaoui noted.

In return for helping Libya enhance its drone capability, it’s understandable that Ukraine may have sought a quid pro quo. Kyiv would undoubtedly have welcomed, if not actively sought, leeway to conduct “extracurricular activities” from Libyan soil. If Tripoli objected, Kyiv could simply threaten to leave and take its increasingly sought after expertise elsewhere.

“There’s probably a little bit of that, but we should not exaggerate it,” Harchaoui said.

“I don’t think Dbeibeh knew that the March 3 incident was going to be that big and that embarrassing, with several weeks of drift afterward going ironically in the pro-Russian part of Libya,” he added.

The dramatic incident, aside from the above-mentioned environmental damage, was a clear affront to Russia and potentially saw Tripoli facing retaliation.

Notably, Dbeibeh met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Turkey on April 18, 2026, on the sidelines of the 5th Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

Harchaoui believes the Libyan premier probably apologized for the incident during that meeting but noted that without minutes or an official readout it’s impossible to determine if that was the case. Nevertheless he believes it’s more likely than not that this was what he did given the widespread attention and coverage the incident has continued to receive in the subsequent weeks.

“Unfortunately, for Tripoli, the vessel didn’t just sink, it started drifting, so it drew much more world attention from the press,” he said. “And then you end up with the Associated Press article, which confirmed that Ukraine was responsible for the attack.”

Again, had he known this would be the ultimate outcome of allowing the Ukrainians to conduct such operations from his country’s soil, the Libyan leader may well have made different decisions.

“I don’t think Dbeibeh sat in his office and said, ‘I know what is going to happen and I approve of it.’ It just happened,” Harchaoui said.

“And I don’t think he’s going to approve it again.”