Our new report asks a profound question: just how dependent is the UK on US technology, and what could that mean for the UK’s sovereignty? It is an enormous question, but as our report shows, there are real and beneficial answers if the UK shifts from one way dependence on US tech giants to shared technology, based on a Digital Commons, including Open Source, open standards and open hardware.

Our report surveys the mess that is the UK’s digital dependence, mostly on US tech giants but also in some cases Chinese technologies. Starting with the risks, we identify:

• Security risks: including threats of service withdrawals and sanctions, or even the use of technologies to launch attacks on government systems.

• Surveillance risks: including foreign powers compelling companies to provide access to UK government data.

• Economic risks: such as extractive economic behaviour, including tax avoidance, structuring of profits overseas, and depletion of economic value of government spending.

• Policy and democratic risks: through lobbying, threats of withdrawal of ‘investment’, and techno-solutionism; alongside centralised control of social media driving public discourse through the preferences of tech oligarchs.

Each of these is a big topic. The security risks have become pretty clear, as US President Donald Trump has made significant use of sanctions against individuals, resulting in them being cut out of European banking systems, as well as American tech platforms. However, the mere existence of potential leverage is also a threat, as it reduces the maneuverability of any government to resist pressure from the US in the event of a foreign policy or trade disagreement. Surveillance risks have a similar profile.

The UK’s digital policies are looking the other way

The report goes into the details of the UK’s current policy position, showing a remarkable absence of thinking about these risks in public policy documents. Reliance on US tech and the apparent faith of the government that AI will deliver significant benefits for the UK’s economy is in fact driving the other way. This strategy is made plain in the UK’s Tech Sectoral Plan. The inevitable result will be greater economic extraction and less value to the UK. This approach will drive the tax-ability of the tech sector downwards, relocate high value jobs outside of the UK, and result in ever greater pressure on public spending. Weakening regulation of data protection and competition policy only makes the situation worse.

Related to this, the UK also has a woeful record in allowing tech companies to be acquired by US and other overseas owners. Two of the biggest example include DeepMind, now owned by Google, and ARM chips, owned by a Japanese investment company and mostly US shareholders. Acquisitions of this kind make the UK tech sector wholly dependent on US tech. This stands in contrast to similar firms in European countries, which are regarded as strategic assets, and not sold on.

The UK’s failures regarding outsourced IT systems date back decades, whether these rely on US corporations such as Oracle, Microsoft, and IBM, or UK, Japanese and European vendors such as Capita, Accenture, Fujitsu and CapGemini. The Post Office scandal and the current debacle with civil service pensions did not come out of nowhere. Nor did the bankruptcy of Birmingham City Council, the victim of spiralling costs during a transition to an Oracle management system. Cloud dependence on Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services is just another chapter in vendor lock-in leading to over-charging.

Democracy is at risk

The democratic and policy risks of digital dependence are profound. They include lobbying, interference in trade agreements, promoting digital restrictions and producing e-waste. Techno-solutionism can also be a result of digital dependency, as vendors promote their way of doing things. The risks are profound, as Big Tech shapes what we do as a country. As Siân Berry MP describes in her foreword:

“Some of the practices of these not-so-friendly giants we rely on sit very uncomfortably with the ethics and values our country holds dear. For example, I have watched in horror as Palantir has crafted data-analytics software to facilitate ICE’s fascist deportations, sharing data between government departments to surveil and track migrants. While its CEO, Alex Karp is free to joke about its mission, saying chillingly in 2025: “Palantir is here to disrupt… and, when it’s necessary, to scare our enemies and, on occasion, kill them.”

The dominance of Big Tech in social media is itself a risk to democracy, as an EU study Fractured Reality also concluded this month. Yet the government is supporting Big Tech monopolies with ad spending and content, without publishing on the alternatives. The government complains about Big Tech’s failures, while only giving users the opportunity to engage with government through Big Tech. Clive Lewis MP writes in his foreword:

“Data and algorithms do not merely power economic activity. They increasingly mediate how citizens encounter information, interpret events and form political opinions. The systems that curate what we read and watch now have the power to shape public debate itself. We have already seen how foreign-owned platforms can promote, suppress or algorithmically amplify particular viewpoints — sometimes reflecting the preferences of their owners. Control over digital infrastructure therefore extends beyond markets and innovation into something more fundamental: who shapes the public sphere, and on whose terms.”

But there is a way forward

We also present the potential solutions. On these, the picture is much more encouraging. We show that many European governments are learning to collaborate and escape Big Tech, for reasons of economic and political sovereignty. France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark are making great strides in reducing dependence on US tech giants. As Lord Clement-Jones writes in his foreword:

“What gives me hope is the evidence assembled here that alternative approaches work. The economic case is overwhelming: open source generates £4 for every £1 invested and has created 2-3% of global GDP. France’s Open Source preference has driven 9-18% annual growth in tech start-ups. The sovereignty case is equally clear: when you control the code, you control your destiny.”

The key is having clear institutional leadership to promote the alternatives to Big Tech, and secondly, by using shared, Open Source technologies the route to Digital Sovereignty. Rather than just asking to “Buy British”, we need to ask, “how do we collaborate with our neighbours and reduce costs for everyone?” There should not be a proprietary “British Office Suite” and a “British Operating System”, owned by some company that may well be bought up by Microsoft, Amazon or Oracle in the future. Rather, Open Source allows multiple partners and governments to develop the tools they need. Indeed, using US companies where useful becomes entirely manageable if the products are Open Source.

These principles can equally apply for cloud providers, and especially for AI, where transparency, control and understanding of the fundamental technology is even more necessary. Europe has made significant investments in commercial and academic AI research and modelling. France has developed methods to control deployment and swapping in and out of AI models.

Stopping Big Tech’s control of social media can be achieved. The powers to open up social media already exist in competition law. Users on BlueSky and Mastodon can switch from providers they do not like, and choose the moderation values that they want. EU users no longer have to use Meta’s WhatsApp to talk to WhatsApp users. Once you can escape Big Tech, without the downsides of losing your networks, any exodus of users will push platforms to think hard about their toxic online environments.

What we believe is needed next is for digital rights, safety and tech accountability campaigners to come together around the opportunities that the growing debate on Digital Sovereignty offers. It is a means to create a wide debate on the nature of our dependence on Big tech, and how we exit coercion and control.

There is growing political interest. Chi Onwurah MP is leading work at the Science and Technology Committee to press for answers. Liberal Democrat, Labour and Green Parliamentarians have kindly provided help with this report. A growing number of MPs that have signed the Parliamentary ‘Early Day Motion’ calling for a Digital Sovereignty strategy, and debates on the topic have highlighted its pressing need during the Cyber Security Bill. It will take political courage to end our digital dependency on powerful companies but the risks of not acting are greater.