The US President Donald J. Trump’s two-day (May 13–15) visit to Beijing came nine years after his last visit. This was the first of the several China-US meetings expected in 2026. Trump announced that President Xi Jinping has accepted an invitation to visit the US on September 21, 2026. Later meetings will be held on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Shenzhen in November and the Group of 20 (G20) Leaders’ Summit in Miami, Florida, in December 2026.

Much has changed since the last US presidential visit (President Joe Biden did not visit China). Xi has an extended term and greater confidence. China is more powerful. The US is embroiled in a war with Iran that has roiled its economy and severely depleted its stock of munitions and missiles. The Atlantic alliance between the US and Europe is strained, NATO is in disarray, the US’ international standing is in decline, and Trump is facing headwinds and negative approval ratings at home.

While the US has been on a downward trajectory, especially over the past year and a half, China has been building its strength through economic and technological advances, taking a lead on electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, quantum computing, and AI applications. When Xi said that changes unseen in a century were accelerating, he implied that countries should heed them. He was alluding, no doubt, to the ongoing Chinese transformation. China has also been winning friends across the world through its Belt and Road Initiative. This constitutes a perfect set-up for China to strike a favourable bargain with the US.

Over the past months, Trump has made many overtures to prepare the ground for his visit, beginning with toning down the anti-China rhetoric that marked his first term. He suspended a nearly $14 billion arms package for Taiwan by not forwarding it to the US Congress after Xi warned him over the phone in February. Trump publicly acknowledged that Xi did not want the sale to proceed and proposed discussing it bilaterally. The US administration authorised the sale of Nvidia’s H200 chips to China and reduced the impact of export controls. Chinese firms identified by US intelligence agencies have been spared sanctions.

Xi’s expected “big fat hug” (Trump’s words) did not materialise. Nor did Trump’s hope for a “monumental” summit. Through the visit, Trump remained deferential to Xi, repeatedly calling him his “friend”, a treatment he usually expects from other leaders. Trump ingratiated himself, telling Xi he was a “great leader”. Xi extended Trump the courtesies of a state visit but did not return the compliments. He credited himself and Trump, however, for having kept China-US relations generally stable in a turbulent world and said China’s great rejuvenation and America making America great again could go hand in hand.

Thus far, while China has benefited from US missteps, it has eschewed any action that could embroil it in a conflict with the US. The foremost issue discussed by the leaders was Taiwan; Xi’s focus on Taiwan was expected. The reunification of China is the primary objective of his foreign and security policy. The Chinese Foreign Office published a report quoting Xi telling Trump that proper handling of the Taiwan question would enable China-US relations to “enjoy overall stability”. Otherwise, the two countries would have “clashes, even conflicts”.

China wants a more unequivocal acknowledgement that Taiwan belongs to China and a practical demonstration of this is reflected in curtailed US military sales to Taiwan. Xi exerted pressure on Trump for an explicit statement opposing any Taiwanese move towards declaring independence, and pressed Trump to stop arming Taiwan.

Staff work before the visit was inadequate. Expectations were dumbed down in anticipation of a Chinese push for US accommodation on Taiwan, the absence of which would, therefore, become a mark of success. Trump was determined not to make concessions during his visit, especially regarding Taiwan, on which he insisted American policy remained unchanged. A status quo, nonetheless, signifies China’s success. It implies that the suspension of the $14 billion arms sale package is likely to continue, at least until Xi’s September visit to the US.

Given Trump’s unpredictability, though, there is no certainty about this. Trump saying that Taiwan was 59 miles from the Chinese mainland and 9,500 miles from the US would have caused perturbations in several Asian capitals. The implication being that the US would thus not be spoiling for a fight over Taiwan. The comment raises questions about the future of US strategic ambiguity on Taiwan.

Although it was widely assumed that Trump would ask Xi to intercede with Iran, China remained reluctant to help the US extricate itself from a problem caused by US actions. Trump stated that China had “strongly” committed not to give military equipment to Iran and that, like the US, China did not want Iran to have nuclear weapons and wanted freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz restored. China is unlikely to close the door on Iran. So far, China has been a traditional supplier of weapons to Iran, and there are US intelligence reports about a recent Chinese shipment of MANPADS (shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles) to Iran, routed through third countries. Evidently, the summit will have no bearing on ending the Iran war.

There has been little reporting on China-US exchanges on several political issues traditionally covered in earlier summits, including proliferation, nuclear and missile modernisation, arms control, and East Asian and South Asian security. Right-wing commentaries talk of Trump having raised with Xi the prospect of a tripartite (China, Russia, and US) denuclearisation; if he did, Xi is unlikely to have responded positively.

Since the time of the Mao-Nixon meeting, India has been an object of Sino-US discussions. It was not so this time. That is no reason to celebrate. The main reason for this is that India does not figure in Trump’s imagination. China also has no reason to take up subcontinental developments with the US, given that India and Pakistan are now equated in global perception. China is content that India is keeping itself busy in South Asia.

Locked in a geostrategic contest

The paradox of the China-US relationship is that both countries are locked in a geostrategic contest for global dominance while being mutually dependent economically. This is why American big business has traditionally been a lobbyist for China and was well represented on Trump’s team. In November 2023, 20 top US CEOs tripped over themselves to attend a subscription-based meeting in San Francisco with Xi, where they gave him a standing ovation, giving the impression that they were strong votaries of business as usual with China, distinct from the US administration’s policy of tightening export control rules.

Trump’s current party included the top executives of Tesla, Apple, Nvidia, Boeing, BlackRock, Blackstone, Cargill, Citi, Coherent, GE Aerospace, Goldman Sachs, Illumina, Mastercard, Meta, Micron, Qualcomm, and Visa. Xi assured them that China was open to doing business. Although no deals were formalised, the group acted as cheerleaders during the visit. By bringing the CEOs into the formal talks, Trump signalled that his attitude towards China would be determined by big business rather than by the foreign policy establishment.

Contrary to the dominant Western media assessment of a lack of tangible results, no doubt prompted by the absence of any joint statement, declaration, outcomes document, or big-ticket announcements, the Xi-Trump conversations resulted in a Sino-US modus vivendi on several bilateral issues, particularly trade and investment. China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, affirmed that the two sides reached “balanced and positive results”, including in the implementation of all agreements reached during previous consultations. This seems to be a reference to extending the prevailing Busan deal, establishing a one-year truce on trade and tariff, that was struck by Xi and Trump on the margins of the APEC Summit in October 2025. The US had then promised to suspend high tariffs and loosen export controls on dual-use goods and technologies in return for Chinese relaxation of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals and a commitment to buy more US goods.

Wang Yi confirmed, without specifying details, that China and the US reached a consensus for a council on trade and one on investment, and to resolve differences so that bilateral trade could increase through lower tariffs. The US seeks a more balanced trade and China to purchase more Boeing aircraft, beef, and soya beans. While China refrained from making concrete commitments on purchases or investments, Trump and his officials touted them. Trump said that China was buying 200 Boeing planes with GE engines, and the number might increase to 750. The US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, announced that China agreed to buy “double-digit billion” dollars’ worth of US agricultural products every year over the next three years, renew US beef exporter accreditations, buy US oil, and bring robust investments. Trump spoke of “fantastic deals” and affirmed he would welcome Chinese investment in the US. Meanwhile, China is still short of fulfilling an earlier promise to buy US soya beans.

China waits

As in Busan, Trump again evoked the G2 idea in Beijing. In an interview with Fox News upon concluding his official engagements, Trump said the G2 summit was “a very historic” one. For China, G2 is less a collaborative condominium to manage the world between China and the US than a recognition that the two countries are the global powers that matter most. Between them, they account for nearly half of the global economic output. They will argue over contentious issues but find ways to accommodate each other on non-core matters.

Trump has disengaged from the bipartisan consensus in Washington, DC, about China posing a long-term strategic threat to the US. This will be a matter of concern for American friends and allies, who now have to recalibrate their relations with these two powers. Trump’s disregard for international law has wrecked multilateralism. He has devalued the Quad, with little prospect of a summit this year. His decision to disinvite South Africa, the outgoing chair, from the G20 Summit in Miami is a big blow to the G20.

Interestingly, while the US media discounted the achievements of the meeting, the Chinese media noted China’s new positioning in China-US relations.

After evoking the “Thucydides Trap” theory about the inevitability of a dominant power clashing with a rising one, Xi carefully proposed “constructive strategic stability”, amplifying his 2012 proposition of striking a new type of great power relations between China and the US, designed to keep competition below the threshold of conflict.

Although China is in reality a revisionist power, thanks to Trump’s actions it has positioned itself globally as the defender of the international rules–based order. It remains reticent, however, to bear the burden of maintaining the order, despite having greatly benefited from it. China seeks leadership of the Third World and echoes the Russian quest for a multipolar or polycentric world, even if what it truly desires is to become the co-equal of the US. Notwithstanding the US’ diminishing comprehensive national power and Trump’s many failings, Xi is unlikely to challenge American global dominance directly. China will move towards that when its leadership deems the moment opportune. China is becoming stronger economically and militarily. All it has to do is wait. The Chinese leadership is sure that time is on its side.

Jayant Prasad, a retired diplomat, is a former director general of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He was a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania and a fellow at Harvard University.

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