Bangladesh has spent most of its independent existence navigating the anxieties and opportunities of geography. To its west, north and east lies India, an unavoidable giant with whom it shares history, rivers, trade routes, and political trauma. To its north looms China, geographically distant yet strategically ever more present, offering capital and infrastructure without the suffocating intimacy of neighbourhood politics.

Few countries are forced to practise balance between two regional giants. And few moments have revealed that balancing act more starkly than the early foreign-policy calculations of Bangladesh’s new Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman.

Rahman’s likely decision to make China his first bilateral destination as Prime Minister is already rich in symbolism. In South Asia, first visits are rarely ceremonial. They are read as declarations of strategic intent. Beijing clearly understands the optics. The Chinese ambassador, Yao Wen, recently described relations with Bangladesh as having reached “a new height” and said Rahman’s upcoming visit would further deepen the “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” between the two countries.

China also signalled that it stands ready to support Bangladesh’s “political stability, economic development and public welfare activities”.

The centrepiece of this new warmth is likely to be the long-delayed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, a proposal carrying consequences far beyond irrigation canals and embankments. Bangladesh has sought a durable arrangement over the Teesta for years.

The river is the lifeline of the country’s northern districts, sustaining millions of people through agriculture and fisheries before flowing into India’s West Bengal and eventually Bangladesh. During ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Dhaka repeatedly hoped India would move forward on a Teesta water-sharing agreement. New Delhi never fully delivered, constrained largely by opposition from Mamata Banerjee, until recently the Chief Minister of West Bengal. Into that vacuum stepped China.

Beijing’s willingness to finance and assist the Teesta restoration scheme has long carried geopolitical implications. Bangladeshi officials now openly acknowledge that discussions with China’s Exim Bank are progressing and that the project remains under active review.

Yet, the Teesta is an arena where the strategic insecurities of Asia’s two great powers intersect. India has historically viewed Chinese involvement in river management projects close to its vulnerable Siliguri Corridor with deep suspicion. Chinese participation in a river system tied directly to India’s own hydrological and security concerns touches a particularly raw nerve in New Delhi.

That nervousness has only intensified because China itself sits upstream on the Brahmaputra, or Yarlung Tsangpo, where its expanding hydropower ambitions have alarmed both India and Bangladesh. Beijing insists its dams are run-of-the-river projects with minimal downstream impact. But downstream countries remain unconvinced.

For Bangladesh, which depends on transboundary rivers for survival, Chinese financing of one river project while China simultaneously controls upstream flows elsewhere creates an uncomfortable paradox. Dhaka increasingly finds itself relying on the same power it quietly fears.

This is the essence of Bangladesh’s geopolitical dilemma. China offers money with speed and fewer political conditions. India offers geographical inevitability. Bangladesh cannot afford hostility with either. Yet closeness to one invariably unsettles the other.

Under the Muhammad Yunus administration, relations with India deteriorated sharply after the massive uprising of 2024. Delhi’s perceived closeness to the Hasina government and its decision to shelter the former Prime Minister fuelled widespread resentment in Bangladesh. Visa restrictions, diplomatic friction, and mutual suspicion followed. Several analyses noted that the relationship became hostage to symbolism and accumulated grievances over unresolved issues such as water sharing, border killings and trade asymmetries.

India now appears eager to reverse that slide. Its appointment of veteran politician Dinesh Trivedi as high commissioner to Bangladesh was widely interpreted as a signal that New Delhi wants political repair work. Reuters described the move as part of a broader Indian attempt to rebuild trust while countering China’s growing influence in Dhaka. Quiet intelligence diplomacy has resumed. Visa services are gradually reopening. Fuel cooperation has restarted. Both countries are probing for a reset without publicly admitting how damaged the relationship had become.

But Bangladesh’s new government is also making clear that improved ties will not mean strategic submission. Foreign Affairs Adviser Humayun Kabir recently declared that Bangladesh would not be “intimidated by barbed wire fencing” or readily tolerate issues such as border killings. The statement was significant for its tone.

Previous governments often managed tensions with India quietly, fearing economic or political fallout. The Rahman administration appears determined to demonstrate greater public assertiveness while simultaneously keeping diplomatic channels open.

This dual-track posture reflects domestic political realities. Anti-India sentiment has become an increasingly potent force in Bangladeshi politics, particularly among younger voters shaped by nationalism rather than memories of 1971. Yet economic reality imposes limits on confrontation.

India remains Bangladesh’s largest neighbour, a major trading partner, and the essential transit route for regional connectivity. Geography traps Bangladesh into cooperation even when politics pushes toward defiance.

China’s recalibration of approach

China understands this tension and has calibrated its approach accordingly. Rather than demanding explicit alignment, Beijing presents itself as Bangladesh’s “reliable development partner”, promising investment in ports, renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport connectivity.

Chinese firms have expanded rapidly in Bangladesh since the political transition, while people-to-people ties have also deepened through growing numbers of flights, visas, and educational exchanges. China’s strategy is subtle but effective: entrench itself economically so deeply that political shifts in Dhaka become largely irrelevant.

For Bangladesh, however, dependence on Chinese financing carries risks beyond debt. The more Beijing becomes central to major national projects, the harder it becomes for Dhaka to maintain genuine strategic neutrality. The Teesta project encapsulates that danger. If Chinese financing moves forward aggressively, India may interpret it as strategic encroachment in a zone it considers vital to its own security.

And yet Bangladesh can plausibly argue that India created the opening itself. For years, Delhi hesitated on Teesta water sharing despite repeated Bangladeshi appeals. Strategic vacuums rarely remain empty in Asia. China simply occupied the space India left unattended.

The coming months will therefore test whether Bangladesh can practise what its diplomats often call “balance diplomacy” under far harsher regional conditions. South Asia is increasingly shaped by China-India rivalry, and smaller states are finding neutrality more difficult to sustain. Sri Lanka’s debt troubles, Nepal’s oscillating alignments, and the Maldives’ strategic swings all demonstrate how regional competition can destabilise domestic politics.

Bangladesh has historically managed this game more skilfully than most. It leveraged India for security, China for infrastructure, Japan for development finance, and the West for export markets. But balancing becomes harder when rivalry sharpens and domestic nationalism intensifies.

Tarique Rahman inherits precisely such a moment: an India seeking reassurance, a China seeking opportunity and a Bangladeshi public increasingly unwilling to appear subordinate to either.

That may ultimately define the foreign policy of the new administration. Bangladesh no longer wants to be treated as India’s dependent neighbour or China’s strategic outpost. It wants room to manoeuvre. The challenge is that geography rarely grants such luxuries.

Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist.

Also Read | What Bengal’s BJP sweep means for Bangladesh

Also Read | Can ‘golgappa diplomacy’ fix what ails India-Bangladesh ties?