The peace framework signed between the United States and Iran sounds impressive, but it is not viable. It promises formal closure to the prolonged, asymmetric, and complex military conflict that began on February 28, 2026. A 60-day negotiating window has been agreed upon to settle outstanding issues and secure a lasting, comprehensive peace treaty. From the outside, the arrangement looks reasonable. Whether it can hold is another matter. The Iran conflict is complicated, and a quick fix is not easy. The framework is layered with challenges, contradictions, and structural impossibilities. To understand why, it is necessary to work through the 14 points and uncover what is embedded in each.

The 14 points span four broad areas: military and sovereignty, maritime trade, nuclear and sanctions, and implementation.

Point 1 calls for an immediate ceasefire, the termination of military operations, and a no-use-of-force principle. This applies to Lebanon. Point 2 concerns non-interference in sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internal affairs. Point 3 establishes the 60-day negotiating window for the final peace deal; the window can be extended under mutual consent. Point 4 requires the US to begin lifting its naval blockade and complete the process within 30 days, with a corresponding withdrawal of forces adjacent to Iran within 30 days of the finalised deal.

Under Point 5, Iran undertakes to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, ensure safe passage for merchant ships, and restore passage volume to pre-war levels within 30 days. Iran is also to neutralise mines and technical obstructions. Point 5 further states that no tolls or transit charges shall be levied on commercial vessels during the 60-day negotiation period.

Point 6 establishes a Reconstruction Fund amounting to a $300 billion package for economic development. Under Point 7, Iran reaffirms its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), pledging no procurement and no development of nuclear weapons. It does not, however, promise to eliminate existing enrichment capacity, nor does it provide an assessment of current stockpiles. Point 8 refers to the nuclear status quo: no new uranium enrichment and no expansion.

Point 9 provides for immediate sanctions waivers. The US Treasury lifts sanctions on oil and petrochemicals, enabling Iran to export oil free from US sanction parameters. Point 10 promises the release of frozen funds: during the 60-day negotiation period, the US agrees to release $24-$25 billion of frozen Iranian assets for economic reconstruction. Point 11 states that the US pledges no additional troop deployments and no new sanctions during the negotiation period. Point 12 underscores that maritime reopening, blockade removal, and sanctions waivers are to be implemented in good faith, and that the path to a permanent treaty is opened thereby. Point 13 calls for early steps to make the negotiation process feasible. Point 14 provides for UN endorsement: the UN Security Council (UNSC) will ratify the final comprehensive peace agreement.

More optics than architecture

Read together, these 14 points have the appearance of a comprehensive settlement. Given the depth of the US-Iran rivalry, they are more accurately described as a framework for negotiation rather than a resolution. One of the most conspicuous omissions is Israel. A primary stakeholder in the conflict, Israel features nowhere in the peace process. Other actors in West Asia have been similarly sidelined. The question of whether this agreement is sustainable has a clear answer: no.

The first problem is with Point 1 itself. An immediate ceasefire in Lebanon requires Israel’s compliance, and Israel is not a signatory. The US shares no border with Lebanon; Israel does. Hezbollah has been a persistent threat to Israeli security, and with Israel now in a position of military strength, it will not concede strategic depth in the region on the basis of a Washington-Tehran agreement. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has said explicitly that Israel is not bound by the memorandum and will preserve its freedom of action.

Israel reportedly continues airstrikes in southern Lebanon, and its Defence Minister has stated that Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza for an indefinite period. Iran, for its part, insists that Point 1 is non-negotiable and that Lebanon must be part of any ceasefire. The impasse is structural. Without resolving the Lebanon question, the first point collapses—and with it, the treaty’s foundation.

Point 2 embodies a different paradox. Its non-interference clause is silent on Iran’s regional proxy network and its asymmetric operations, which themselves impinge on the sovereignty of other states. Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria—operates in countries whose governments did not invite these forces. Iran distances itself by arguing that ideological support does not constitute interference. This distinction will not satisfy Israel, which has long defined Iran’s proxy sponsorship as a direct security threat.

Nor does Point 2 address cyber operations, state-sponsored hacking, or digital disinformation campaigns—all of which constitute covert forms of interference. It also ignores Iran’s earlier violation of Part III of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through the weaponisation of the Strait of Hormuz. No condition has been added to prevent Iran from doing so again.

Timelines, withdrawals, and undefined proximity

Point 3’s 60-day timeline is plainly insufficient to settle the outstanding issues: nuclear stockpiles, the legality of lifting sanctions, maritime law, and the security framework. The 30-day period in Point 4 for blockade removal and force withdrawal raises the prior question of sequencing. Who withdraws first, and by how much? Will the withdrawal be equal and simultaneous, or asymmetric? Who verifies? The point is silent on proximity. How far from Iran must US forces withdraw to satisfy the condition? US air bases in the Persian Gulf—Al Udeid and the Fifth Fleet Headquarters among them—remain operative. Whether Iran would consider these outside the ambit of Point 4, or treat them as a continuing violation, is unresolved.

Point 4 introduces an additional problem: “proximity” is undefined. Complete US withdrawal from the region is impossible, as both sides understand. But leaving the term undefined creates scope for accusations of non-compliance. If the US lifts the blockade while maintaining its regional bases, Iran may use the ambiguity to delay its own obligations. Washington, in turn, may find it difficult to reorganise its naval logistics after a partial pullback. A US military drawdown, however limited, will also generate anxiety among regional allies who experienced Iranian missile strikes on their territory during the conflict.

Point 5 requires Iran to clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, underwater debris, and disabled vessels within 30 days. Given Iran’s degraded military capacity, this is logistically untenable without third-party assistance. The point contains no provision for third-party verification. US naval vessels cannot enter the zone without violating Point 2’s sovereignty provisions. Maritime insurance syndicates are unlikely to allow commercial shipping until independent verification is complete. The result is that the onus falls entirely on Iran, with no enforcement mechanism if it delays, citing lack of capacity.

The $300 billion question

Point 6 establishes a $300 billion reconstruction fund but designates no payer. The assumption is that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will bear the cost. This assumption is fragile. GCC states were themselves targets of Iranian missile strikes during the conflict and face their own infrastructure reconstruction costs. Writing a cheque of this scale for a country that attacked them will be politically and economically difficult. They may feel compelled to comply given their dependence on Washington’s security umbrella, but no formal commitment has been obtained.

The fund’s architecture creates an additional risk. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls significant levers of the Iranian economy. Without strict auditing and disbursement guidelines, reconstruction funds could be diverted to replenish its arsenal, strengthen its proxy network, or resume clandestine nuclear enrichment. Point 6 provides no such guidelines.

Point 7’s sanction relief covers unilateral US measures, UNSC sanctions, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board resolutions. Lifting all of these simultaneously, without verification that the IRGC’s nuclear activities have been permanently curtailed, inverts the logic of economic leverage. Critics argue that with economic breathing room restored, the IRGC will use the 60-day window to recover, rearm, and reorganise—emerging stronger when talks eventually fail.

The nuclear problem: frozen, not resolved

Point 8’s commitment to the NPT is, on its face, significant. Iran reaffirms it will not procure or develop nuclear weapons. But the point does not address the status of Iran’s existing enriched uranium stockpile. According to IAEA data, as of June 2025, Iran held 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent—just below the 90 per cent weapons-grade threshold. That stockpile is now earmarked for down-blending, a process Point 8 empowers the IAEA to observe. However, the memorandum establishes no enhanced or intrusive inspection protocol. If Iran walks away from the talks, its scientists could reverse the process and re-enrich the material to weapons-grade levels within days. Point 8 does not require zero enrichment capability. A temporary pause leaves Iran a nuclear threshold state.

Point 9 applies the nuclear status quo freeze only to declared sites—Natanz and Fordow. Undeclared sites are not covered. The absence of an intrusive inspection regime for undeclared facilities is not a detail but a fundamental gap. The IRGC has shown no inclination to surrender clandestine infrastructure.

Points 10 and 11 together provide Iran with immediate economic relief—sanctions lifted, oil exports resumed, $24-$25 billion in frozen assets released in phases—before the nuclear compliance questions have been resolved. The US states that asset releases will be tied to verified progress on nuclear milestones, but no strict humanitarian-only guardrails govern the use of released funds. Critics, including opposition voices in the US, argue that this sequencing rewards Iran before it has dismantled its nuclear infrastructure and stockpile. Gulf nations and Israel share that concern: the economic lifeline may enable the IRGC to intensify power projection, not reduce it. Military success does not automatically translate to durable strategic leverage.

Compliance, enforcement, and the UNSC gamble

Points 12 and 13 are the framework’s enforcement provisions—and they are its weakest link. Point 12 does not cover Iran’s funding and arms transfers to its regional proxy network. Point 13 requires compliance from both sides on ceasing military operations, lifting the naval blockade, ensuring Hormuz passage, and removing UN restrictions—without specifying who assesses compliance or what remedies exist for violations. Both sides are likely to accuse each other of non-compliance early in the 60-day window. Given the depth of mutual mistrust, a stalemate that freezes the peace process is not a remote possibility but a probable outcome.

Point 14 asks for a binding UNSC resolution to ratify the final peace agreement. This presupposes the consent of all five permanent members. China and Russia are unlikely to endorse a resolution that consolidates what they may frame as a US diplomatic victory. Both hold vetoes and have incentives to keep Washington tied down in West Asia while they pursue their own strategic interests elsewhere. Securing unanimity among the P5 on Iran, given the state of US-China and US-Russia relations, is an ambitious goal in the best of times. In the current climate, it is an unlikely one.

A framework destined for the shelf

The 14-point framework is ambitious in scope and vague in execution. Its silences are as telling as its commitments: no mention of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, no enforceable mechanism on proxy networks, no intrusive inspection regime for undeclared nuclear sites, no named payer for the reconstruction fund, no defined meaning of “proximity” for US force withdrawals, and no formal role for Israel or the GCC states whose security is directly at stake.

Washington’s unilateral agreement with Tehran has complicated rather than resolved regional dynamics. Israel has rejected the Lebanon ceasefire provisions. Gulf states are being asked to underwrite reconstruction costs without having been party to the negotiations. The framework is perceived in Tehran as a recognition of Iranian resilience, if not outright victory. It does not read as a document that reflects US strategic leverage.

The 60-day window may produce a permanent treaty. It may equally produce a prolonged stalemate, a gradual unravelling of provisional commitments, and renewed conflict. The conditions for a durable peace—verified nuclear disarmament, an enforceable halt to proxy warfare, a defined security architecture for West Asia—remain unmet. The framework is a beginning, but the distance between a signed memorandum and a sustainable peace has rarely looked longer.

Jajati K. Pattnaik is a Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Chandan Panda is a Professor at Central University of Karnataka.

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