After being on the opposite side of the fence for decades, West Bengal’s newly elected Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari is aiming to make common cause with the State police force and other security agencies, whose personnel remain deployed in the State even after completion of the poll process. This aim, however, if practised without making any departure from the BJP model of governance as practised in all States governed by the party, will be duplicitous and counter-productive.
The backdrop to Adhikari’s recent statement that he would not “tolerate attacks on the police” was provided by his government’s “bulldozer action” in a volatile Kolkata locality, where two allegedly illegal buildings were partially demolished by authorities. The government’s action, aimed to establish the BJP’s “arrival” in what was considered its Last Frontier, was not preceded by the due administrative processes required before demolition of homes and buildings. Angered by this, the people there went beyond verbal protests, resulting in a skirmish that led to injuries to 10 cops and 3 CAPF personnel.
Stating that incidents like stone pelting had stopped even in volatile regions like Kashmir, Adhikari said that Bengal would no longer permit lawlessness in the name of democratic protest. “Gone are the days when police personnel would get injured while the Police Minister merely sat in an air-conditioned room, watching things unfold,” the Chief Minister declared.
Adhikari however chose to overlook instances when his party leaders and cadres were in opposition and creating the same kind of ruckus in the name of protest. For instance, past high-profile BJP agitations in Bengal—such as the Nabanna Chalo (March to the Secretariat)—saw intense clashes between BJP party workers and the police, with stone-pelting, torching of police vehicles, and widespread public disruption.
And not just in Bengal. Through the long years when it was not a party of dominance and was but another opposition party, the BJP was known for its political and communal mobilisations. It is also well known that the party’s growth from a minor political player into a dominant national force was frequently accompanied by massive street-level agitations, yatras (marches), and bandhs (strikes) that periodically degenerated into widespread violence and civil unrest.
In the initial growth period after its founding in 1980, the BJP shifted away from early attempts at moderate “Gandhian Socialism” towards a more assertive platform of Hindu nationalism (Hindutva). This is what, with the articulation of the demand to build a Ram temple in Ayodhya by demolishing the Babri Masjid, resulted in localised communal clashes, provocative religious processions, and aggressive street agitations across northern and western India in the late 1980s.
It is also well known that the 1990s marked the most turbulent period of mass agitation in the party’s history, characterised by large-scale political rallies that frequently collided with law enforcement and opposing groups. In fact, it was BJP president L.K. Advani’s countrywide chariot procession or Rath Yatra demanding the construction of the Ram temple that precipitated severe communal violence and intense rioting along its route through multiple States, including Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh, culminating in thousands of arrests and significant loss of lives.
It is pertinent to recall that a pivotal role in the initial part of the Yatra, from Somnath to Mumbai, was played by none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Based on his “credible” performance at that time, he was appointed as “national coordinator” for the Ekta Yatra led by then party chief Murli Manohar Joshi, which went from Kanyakumari to Srinagar. The BJP’s pursuit of the Yatra brand of political mobilisation eventually resulted in Babri Masjid’s demolition and large-scale communal violence.

Civic workers carry out an anti-encroachment drive to remove illegal shops near the Howrah railway station area in West Bengal on May 17, 2026. | Photo Credit: PTI
It is pertinent to recall that by the late 1990s and 2000s, the BJP had transitioned into a ruling party at the Centre and in several States. But disciplined action against sectarian violence was not enforced by the party in these place as it was in other parts of India, and street-level friction and aggressive agitations continued to surface during all times of heightened political polarisation.
It is here that we must record the BJP’s doublespeak of that period. The National Agenda of Governance that the BJP and its coalition partners officially adopted then made no mention of the three divisive issues that the BJP propounded. The ruling coalition, the National Democratic Alliance, removed the demand for constructing the Ram temple, abrogating Article 370, and adopting a Uniform Civil Code. The BJP, however, the leading constituent of the NDA, remained committed to these three issues. The RSS chief of the time, Rajendra Singh (Rajju Bhaiyya), stated that the three contentious matters had been put on the back-burner and would be prioritised when political equations permitted it. That happened in 2019, when the Ram temple judgement was delivered and Article 370 was deleted.
Every citizen of India still remembers how the Gujarat State government responded to the Godhra carnage, with a protest call morphing into Statewide violence that chiefly targeted Muslims. There were widespread deaths, rapes, arson, and destruction of property. The episodes of violence resulted in international scrutiny over the role of the local State machinery, the party cadres, and allied organisations during the unrest.
The BJP when in office, either in States or at the Centre, has been accused by critics, human rights organisations, and opposition parties of selectively handling or enabling violent protests to serve its own political ends. The primary argument is that the state machinery has occasionally demonstrated “strategic inaction”, either by delaying police intervention against friendly groups or by allowing highly charged mobilisations to escalate. This approach is often contrasted with the swift and heavy-handed crackdowns that BJP-led governments in the States and the Centre has used against anti-government demonstrations.
It is in this context that Adhikari’s call for restrained behaviour from protestors and opposition party members makes zero sense, especially when he questions the legitimacy of the agitators. The BJP has repeatedly frowned over protests of all sorts, even when they are articulated and staged within constitutional boundaries and at designated locations.
Just as the BJP arrived at its place of overwhelming power today by using avenues of protest and rebellion, often to pursue majoritarian principles, it has to allow other political forces the right to disagree and to display their disagreement in public.
Adhikari repeatedly declared during his election campaign that he was seeking the votes only of Hindus, and that might well be the case, but once he has been elected, his government cannot be oriented towards fulfilling the rights and necessities of one community only.
At an estimated 71 per cent of the population, the Hindus are the largest community in Bengal by religious identity, but the government must be committed to working for all. If it does not do so, social harmony will become non-existent and, besides everything else, it will certainly fail to restore Bengal to economic glory.
The worry, however, is that the Adhikari government has so far displayed strongly undemocratic traits and the Bengal Chief Minister appears committed to vocalised majoritarianism. The Uttar Pradesh and Assam Chief Ministers, Yogi Adityanath and Himanta Biswa Sarma, appear to be Adhikari’s role models, thereby suggesting a politically claustrophobic future for Bengal.
Close on the heels of the contentious Special Intensive Revision and the unanswered questions regarding the legitimacy of the election, statements such as the one Adhikari made suggest that the BJP remains, in spirit, a party of the opposition, although control of the State machinery has passed to it. This, to say the least, is a dangerous precipice for the nation to be placed on.
Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay is an author and journalist based in Delhi-NCR. His latest book is The Demolition, The Verdict and The Temple: The Definitive Book on the Ram Mandir Project. He is also the author of Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times.
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