How do you see the India-US interim trade deal impacting Indian agriculture and farmers?

The India-US interim trade deal is not an isolated agreement but part of a longer trajectory of trade liberalisation that has steadily eroded domestic agricultural protections. Even the so-called “interim” or limited concessions can have disproportionate effects on farmers’ prices. This is particularly so in a country where most farmers are smallholders operating with thin margins and high production risks. Exposure to US agricultural commodities produced under heavy subsidies and scale advantages can quickly destabilise Indian markets.

The US agricultural system is built on massive public support, including direct income payments, crop insurance, and export incentives. Indian farmers, by contrast, face rising input costs, declining public investment, and poor price support mechanisms. When imports enter such an uneven playing field, the burden of adjustment falls almost entirely on farmers. Corporations that benefit from cheaper raw materials are not those who are affected.

These trade deals also reflect whose interests dominate policymaking. Those who make these deals prioritise strategic and corporate considerations over food security, rural livelihoods, and price stability. For farmers, the concern is not merely about trade volumes but about the long-term hollowing out of domestic agriculture and the loss of policy autonomy to regulate markets in the public interest.

Are there concerns only over the India-US deal, or are there similar issues with the FTAs recently concluded with the European Union and New Zealand?

The concerns are systemic and extend well beyond the India-US deal. Agreements with the EU, New Zealand, and the UK raise similar, if not greater, anxieties for Indian farmers. These economies are characterised by highly capitalised agricultural sectors, strong state backing, and sophisticated regulatory regimes that allow them to protect their farmers even while demanding openness from countries like India.

In the case of the EU, non-tariff barriers related to standards, traceability, and environmental norms often function as hidden protectionist tools. Indian farmers are rarely supported to meet these standards. Yet they are expected to compete in markets shaped by them. New Zealand’s dairy sector, meanwhile, is export-oriented and highly efficient, posing a direct threat to India’s vast network of small dairy producers if market access is widened.

These FTAs institutionalise unequal exchange. They lock India into agreements where the risks are socialised among millions of farmers, while the benefits are cornered by a handful of exporters, importers, and multinational agribusiness. 

Union Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal says that the rights of farmers and sensitivities around dairy and agriculture have been protected. As a representative of the Samyukta Kisan Morcha, would you agree with this view?

We flatly reject this assessment. Protection of farmers’ rights cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of official assurances or selective exclusions. Real protection must be measured by outcomes: whether farmers receive remunerative prices, whether domestic markets remain stable, and whether livelihoods are insulated from sudden import surges.

Experience shows that once trade concessions are made, safeguards are either weak or poorly enforced. Small farmers, particularly in dairy and allied sectors, lack the institutional capacity to absorb price shocks. In such a context, claims of “sensitivity” ring hollow unless accompanied by legally enforceable protections of a minimum support price, as per the Swaminathan Commission formula of C2 + 50 per cent, a guarantee of procurement, and transparent review mechanisms.

From the standpoint of the SKM, farmers’ rights include the right to policy certainty and democratic participation. Decisions taken without farmers at the table cannot credibly claim to have protected their interests. What is presented as protection often turns out to be postponement of damage rather than its prevention.

The Minister claimed that the demand for importing distillers’ dried grains with solubles (DDGS) came from industry due to rising numbers of livestock. Is it a fact that the domestic fodder supply is insufficient?

The narrative of fodder scarcity must be carefully examined. India does face challenges in fodder availability, but these are not natural or inevitable shortages. They are the result of long-term neglect of fodder crops, degradation of grazing commons, and diversion of agricultural land towards non-agricultural and corporate uses.

Crop residues, traditional fodder systems, and mixed farming have historically supported India’s livestock economy. These systems are being undermined by policy biases that favour commercial crops over fodder cultivation. Importing DDGs addresses the requirements of large industrial users, but not the needs of small livestock farmers.

Imports substitute for domestic investment. Instead of strengthening local fodder economies and providing support to small farmers, policy choices are tilted towards facilitating cheap imports for industry. This deepens farmers’ dependence and weakens rural self-reliance.

An Aam Aadmi Party demonstration against the interim India-US trade deal in Bengaluru on February 16. Dhawale says trade policy today redistributes income upward, away from producers in the field and towards corporations in global supply chains. | Photo Credit: SUDHAKARA JAIN

More concretely, would you say that the interests of soyabean and cotton farmers have been protected?

Soyabean and cotton farmers are among the most vulnerable to global price movements, and there is little evidence that their interests have been adequately protected. These crops are deeply integrated into international markets, and even minor changes in import policy or trade signals can depress domestic prices. That is precisely why the largest number of distress suicides in India over the last three decades of neoliberalism have been those of soyabean and cotton farmers.

US soybean and cotton producers benefit from extensive subsidies, marketing support, and technological advantages. Indian farmers face rising costs of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, diesel, water, and power, while price support mechanisms remain either inadequate or poorly implemented. In such conditions, exposure to import competition is economically devastating. Six months before the India-US trade deal, the Union government slashed the import duty on raw cotton, including from the US, from 11 to 0 per cent. 

Protection must mean shielding farmers from volatile global markets, not integrating them more deeply into them. Without strong MSP regimes, procurement, and import regulations, claims of protection for soybean and cotton farmers remain unconvincing.

The Minister said no trade deal was concluded without consulting the private sector. Were farmers or peasant organisations consulted?

Not at all! But this is not surprising. For the present Union government, millions of farmers have always been an expendable item. There is a fundamental problem in equating private sector consultation with stakeholder consultation. Farmers are not merely another interest group; they are the backbone of the agricultural economy. Yet there was no engagement with farmer or peasant organisations during these negotiations. Farmers’ organisations were informed after decisions are taken, not before. 

This again reflects whose voices matter in policymaking. When farmers are excluded, trade policy becomes detached from rural realities. Democratic legitimacy demands that those most affected by trade decisions have a decisive say in shaping them.

Beyond tariffs, do farmers worry about asymmetries in subsidies and non-tariff barriers between India and Western economies?

Yes, this is a central concern. Tariffs are only one part of the equation. Western agricultural systems are sustained by massive subsidies, income support, research funding, and risk mitigation mechanisms. These allow their farmers to export at prices that do not reflect true costs of production.

Non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary standards, environmental norms, and certification requirements, are often used selectively to restrict imports from developing countries. Indian farmers receive little support to comply with these standards, turning them into instruments of exclusion rather than quality assurance. This asymmetry represents a structural injustice in global trade. Asking Indian farmers to compete under such conditions is not free trade; it is unequal trade that systematically disadvantages small producers.

Are these deals likely to trigger another major round of protests by farmers?

Farmers mobilise when livelihoods are threatened. That is the cardinal lesson of the iconic and victorious SKM-led year-long farmers’ struggle against the three farm laws. When these trade deals begin to depress prices, undermine domestic production, or weaken food sovereignty, resistance will certainly emerge. The SKM, the AIKS, and many other farmers’ bodies have already condemned these FTAs and are preparing for a large joint mass struggle.

The memory of past struggles has made farmers acutely aware of the consequences of reactionary policies. The experience of recent movements has shown farmers the importance of collective action and sustained mobilisation. Trade agreements, though negotiated quietly, have long-term and visible impact on rural incomes. When these impacts become evident, farmers will respond.

From a broader perspective, such struggles are not merely defensive, as shown most recently by the massive and successful AIKS-led Palghar and Nashik peasant marches in Maharashtra. They represent a demand for an alternative development path—one that places food security, livelihood security, and democratic participation above corporate-led trade integration.