The office of the Governor is a colonial inheritance. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the British Governor wielded sweeping discretionary powers—overriding elected Ministries, vetoing legislation, and assuming direct administrative control. For nationalist leaders, retaining such an office in a sovereign democratic republic posed a profound constitutional dilemma.

In the Constituent Assembly, alternative models were debated: a directly elected Governor; appointment from a panel chosen by the State Legislature; or Presidential appointment without State participation. The framers adopted the last model, conceiving the Governor as a neutral constitutional head—a link between Union and State—entrusted with only limited, exceptional powers. This was how Dr. B.R. Ambedkar put it:

“The Drafting Committee felt... that the Governor is not to have any kind of functions... no functions which he is required to discharge either in his discretion or in his individual judgment. According to the principles of the new Constitution, he is required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters... We felt that the powers of the Governor were so limited, so nominal, his position so ornamental that probably very few would come forward to stand for election.”

That founding vision has steadily eroded. Especially after 1967, when different parties governed at the Centre and in several States, the office increasingly became an instrument of partisan leverage. Each instance of gubernatorial overreach—manipulating government formation or collapse, refusing to summon the Assembly, withholding or indefinitely delaying assent, publicly criticising an elected government, or turning Raj Bhavan into a partisan outpost of the ruling dispensation at the Centre—has eroded public confidence in the institution. An office conceived to safeguard federal balance has too often unsettled it.

Constituent Assembly debates

Between January and October 1949, a vocal group of sceptics in the Constituent Assembly raised compelling concerns about the potential misuse of the Governor’s office.

Biswanath Das questioned the need for the office if its functions were minimal. Drawing on his experience under British rule, he cautioned:

“You cannot have democracy and autocracy functioning together. In the provinces you are going to have democracy from toe to neck and autocracy at the head. Both are bound to fail; you are inviting friction.”

Shibban Lal Saxena opposed the provision allowing the Governor to hold office “during the pleasure of the President”, arguing that such insecurity would compromise independence and dignity. He described the emergency power enabling Union intervention as “a retrograde step”.

K.T. Shah insisted that real executive authority must lie with the elected State government, not with a centrally nominated outsider, whom he called a “bird of passage”.

Hriday Nath Kunzru argued that if the Governor was to be nominated by the Centre, discretionary powers such as reserving Bills or facilitating emergency intervention should be removed.

H.V. Kamath objected strongly to discretionary authority under Draft Article 143 (now Article 163) and criticised the vague language in Draft Article 278 (now Article 356) that permitted imposition of President’s Rule “otherwise” than on a Governor’s report.

Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri issued a stark warning:

“If in spite of this experience of ours we are asked to clothe the Governors with the powers to act in the exercise of their discretion, I am afraid we are still living in the past which we all wanted to forget.”

He cautioned that a Governor empowered to act in discretion could become a “veritable King Stork”, unchecked and unaccountable.

Also Read | The curious farce of R.N. Ravi

Despite these concerns, the Assembly preferred nomination to election. T.T. Krishnamachari argued that discretionary powers were narrowly confined, and Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar described the Governor as a neutral “sagacious counsellor”.

Ambedkar moved an amendment to Draft Article 175 (now Article 200) to mandate that once a Bill is re-passed by the Legislature, “the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom”. However, no timeline for action was specified, leaving space for the modern “pocket veto”, whereby Governors withhold assent indefinitely without returning the Bill.

Patterns of misuse

In retrospect, the concerns raised in the Constituent Assembly about the politicisation of the Governor’s office and the erosion of State autonomy appear strikingly prophetic. The episodes below—by no means exhaustive—illustrate how those early apprehensions have translated into recurrent constitutional strain.

Floor tests

In Madras (1952), despite the United Democratic Front securing 166 seats against the Congress’ 152, Governor Sri Prakasa invited C. Rajagopalachari to form the government, nominating him to the Legislative Council. The Congress later consolidated power through defections.

In Andhra Pradesh (1984), Governor Thakur Ram Lal dismissed Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao, without a floor test, accepted an unverified majority claim by N. Bhaskara Rao, leader of a defecting faction, and installed him without proof of majority. National outrage followed. NTR later demonstrated majority support before the President, leading to his reinstatement and the Governor’s removal.

In Bihar (2005), after a hung Assembly, Governor Buta Singh alleged “horse-trading” and recommended dissolution before the House met, seeking to forestall the formation of a JDU-BJP government. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), the Supreme Court declared the action unconstitutional but declined to restore the Assembly as elections had already been notified.

In Karnataka (2018), Governor Vajubhai Vala invited the single largest party (BJP) to form the government, bypassing a post-poll Congress–JD(S) coalition that claimed majority support, and granted 15 days for a floor test. The Supreme Court intervened and directed an immediate test; the Chief Minister resigned before voting.

In Maharashtra (2022), amid a rebellion in the Shiv Sena, Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari ordered Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray to prove a majority at short notice. Thackeray resigned before the floor test. Ten months later, in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), the Supreme Court held the Governor’s order unconstitutional for lacking objective material to infer loss of confidence, but declined reinstatement since Thackeray had resigned voluntarily, leaving the political outcome undisturbed.

Dismissal of State governments

In Kerala (1959), Governor B. Ramakrishna Rao reported administrative breakdown amid the “Liberation Struggle” launched by a coalition of opposition parties and religious groups. President’s Rule was imposed despite the E.M.S. Namboodiripad communist government holding a majority.

In West Bengal (1967-68), after a faction led by P.C. Ghosh withdrew support from Ajoy Mukherjee’s United Front government, Governor Dharma Vira demanded an immediate floor test. When the Cabinet proposed a later date, he invoked Article 164(1) to withdraw his “pleasure”, dismissed the Mukherjee Ministry, and swore in P.C. Ghosh as Chief Minister. This was a gubernatorial dismissal, not an Article 356 intervention. President’s Rule followed.

In 1977, the Janata Party government dismissed nine Congress-ruled States and removed 15 Governors, claiming loss of “moral right to hold office”. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977), the Supreme Court held that the President’s “satisfaction” under Article 356 was subjective and largely non-justiciable.

In 1980, the Congress government at the Centre dismissed nine non-Congress State governments. Two Governors were removed in 1980 and 1981.

In Karnataka (1980), after 19 MLAs withdrew support, Governor P. Venkatasubbaiah denied Chief Minister S.R. Bommai a floor test and recommended President’s Rule. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), a nine-judge Bench curtailed misuse of Article 356, holding that the majority must be tested only on the Assembly floor. Dissolution requires Parliamentary approval, failing which the government revives. The Court restored robust judicial review and declared federalism a basic feature.

In 1990, the V.P. Singh-led National Front government asked all Governors appointed by the previous regime to resign.

In 2004, the UPA-1 government dismissed four Governors for alleged ideological affinity with the NDA. In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India(2010), the Supreme Court held that removal of a Governor is judicially reviewable and cannot be arbitrary or mala fide. However, it ruled that reasons need not be stated, and review is limited to examining the existence—not the adequacy—of reasons, thereby weakening protection.

Since 1950, Article 356 has been invoked over 130 times. The Sarkaria Commission (1983-88) noted that only 26 of the first 75 proclamations were justified.

Summoning and Proroguing the Assembly

In Arunachal Pradesh (2015-16), amid a Congress rebellion against Chief Minister Nabam Tuki, Governor J.P. Rajkhowa advanced the Assembly session without Cabinet advice and placed the Speaker’s removal as the first agenda item. Dissident MLAs met separately and claimed to impeach the Speaker. In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2016), the Supreme Court struck down the Governor’s actions and held that the Governor may summon or advance the Assembly under Article 174 only on Cabinet advice, except to order a floor test where majority is demonstrably lost.

In Punjab (2023), Governor Banwarilal Purohit refused to summon the Budget Session. The Supreme Court held that the power under Article 174 is non-discretionary and must be exercised on ministerial advice.

In Telangana (2023), Governor Tamilisai Soundararajan withheld the Article 207 recommendation for introducing the Budget, citing the absence of a Governor’s Address. The impasse ended through a High Court-facilitated compromise, after the State agreed to the Address.

Governor’s conduct

In West Bengal (2019-22), Governor Jagdeep Dhankhar publicly criticised the State government, summoned officials, and engaged in confrontational exchanges.

In Kerala (2022-23), Governor Arif Mohammed Khan publicly criticised the LDF government and warned on social media that Ministers who “lowered the dignity of his office” risked withdrawal of his “pleasure”.

In Tamil Nadu, Governor R.N. Ravi omitted portions of the DMK government-prepared address in January 2023, prompting a resolution by the Assembly to restore the text. He has since refused to deliver the customary address in 2024, 2025, and 2026, walking out of the Assembly on each occasion.

Assent, withholding, reserving Bills

In Kerala (2022-23), University Amendment Bills and the Lok Ayukta Amendment Bill were withheld for extended periods before being reserved for the President.

In Tamil Nadu (2021-26), the NEET Exemption Bill remained pending for months. After reconsideration by the Assembly, it was reserved for the President, where it remained pending for over two years. University Amendment Bills faced a similar delay. In April 2025, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that Article 200 does not permit indefinite inaction and set indicative timelines.

The Presidential Reference that followed—In re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India (Special Reference No. 1 of 2025)—was decided by a five-judge Constitution Bench on November 20, 2025. The advisory opinion declined to prescribe binding timelines or recognise a general doctrine of deemed assent. It held that Governors cannot withhold assent indefinitely but possess discretion under Article 200 that is not fully bound by ministerial advice. It also held that the President’s actions under Article 201 are not justiciable and cannot be subjected to court-imposed deadlines.

The Kurian Joseph Committee

The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State Relations, constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu in April 2025—of which the author is a member—has undertaken a comprehensive examination of these issues and concluded that India’s colonial-era model of the Governor has outlived its justification. The office must be fundamentally restructured and depoliticised to function as a neutral constitutional sentinel grounded in accountability, restraint, and federal propriety. What follows is a summary of the principal recommendations in Part I of the Committee’s Report, placed before the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly on February 18, 2026.

State-led selection and removal

Under Article 155, the Governor is formally appointed by the President but effectively by the Union Council of Ministers. When different parties govern the Union and a State, such unilateral appointments have repeatedly generated friction.

The First Administrative Reforms Commission (1966-70) recommended consultation with the Chief Minister as convention; the Rajamannar Committee (1969-71) insisted it be mandatory; and the Sarkaria Commission urged constitutionalising consultation, noting that States were often merely informed of appointments.

Globally, India’s centrally controlled model is unusual. In Australia, state Governors are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the State Premier, not the Commonwealth government—insulating the office from federal influence. In Canada, although the Lieutenant Governor of the Province is appointed by the Governor General on federal advice, the post is almost entirely ceremonial, and a strong convention requires informal consultation with the provincial Premier. Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain have no centrally appointed overseer of sub-national governments. In the United States and Brazil, Governors are directly elected.

A referee appointed exclusively by one of the competing teams cannot credibly claim neutrality. India must move away from a system in which the Centre exercises absolute control over gubernatorial appointments. At the same time, to avoid parochialism, the Governor should ideally be an outsider to the State. A balanced model is one where the State Government proposes three eminent outsiders, the State Legislature endorses them by a majority of the total membership of the House or Houses, and the President is constitutionally bound to appoint one of the three as Governor.

Correspondingly, removal of the Governor from office should be possible only upon a resolution of the State Legislature, passed by a majority of the total membership of the House or Houses, with the President constitutionally bound to act on such a resolution within 14 days. Article 155 should be amended accordingly.

Reforming tenure

Professor Ashok Pankaj’s empirical study highlights the instability of gubernatorial tenure. Between 1950 and 2015, only 18 per cent of Governors completed a full five-year term, 37 per cent served under one year, and 15 per cent between one and two years. Such instability undermines independence and institutional credibility.

Expert bodies have long warned that neutrality requires security of tenure. The Rajamannar Committee recommended removal only for proved misbehaviour or incapacity after inquiry by the Supreme Court, and disqualification from further governmental office. The Sarkaria Commission noted that two-thirds of Governors appointed up to 1986 failed to complete five years and were often transferred “as if they were civil servants”, weakening their ability to act impartially.

Comparative practice reinforces the point. In Australia, the removal of a State Governor occurs only on the advice of the State Premier. In Canada, although formally appointed on federal advice, strong conventions ensure incumbents are not removed for political disagreement. India alone retains a centrally appointed Governor removable at will, without recorded reasons.

India must move beyond the colonial-era pleasure doctrine. Article 156 should therefore be amended to provide a single, fixed, non-renewable five-year term; bar eligibility for other constitutional offices (except President or Vice-President); and delete the proviso permitting continuation beyond term. Upon expiry, the Chief Justice of the High Court should officiate until a successor assumes office.

Eminence and neutrality of Governor

Article 157 prescribes only minimal qualifications—Indian citizenship and age above 35—allowing appointments often driven by political convenience. Professor Ashok Pankaj’s study shows that nearly two-thirds of Governors appointed up to 2015 were drawn from politics or the civil services, including former Chief Ministers, Ministers, and legislators. Such backgrounds sit uneasily with the framers’ vision of a detached constitutional umpire.

The First Administrative Reforms Commission noted that the office had too often become a refuge for defeated politicians and recommended that Governors be individuals of stature and public experience, capable of rising above party loyalties, and not eligible for reappointment. The Sarkaria Commission criticised the appointment of “discarded and disgruntled” politicians and urged that Governors be eminent outsiders, unconnected with State politics and free from recent partisan roles. These recommendations were reaffirmed by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC, 2002) and the Punchhi Commission (2007-10).

Article 157 should therefore be amended to require that a Governor be an eminent outsider to the State and not have held any political office or office of profit under the Executive, Legislature, or Judiciary in the preceding five years.

Restore Instrument of Instructions

The Draft Constitution (1948) originally included an Instrument of Instructions—modelled on Section 53 of the Government of India Act, 1935—to guide Governors in exercising limited discretionary powers. It was deleted in October 1949 on the assumption that conventions would suffice. Seven decades of experience have disproved this.

Recurring controversies reveal that the absence of a codified framework has fostered uncertainty and conflict. The Rajamannar, Sarkaria, National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), and Punchhi Commissions have all identified this structural vacuum as the principal cause of friction between Governors and elected State governments.

To complete this unfinished constitutional design, a new Thirteenth Schedule—Instrument of Instructions for Governors—should codify principles governing government formation and floor tests; summoning, proroguing, and dissolution of the Assembly; standards of constitutional conduct; assent, withholding, and reservation of Bills; recommendations for President’s Rule; and other discretionary powers.

Reforming discretionary powers

Article 164 empowers the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister and, on the Chief Minister’s advice, the Council of Ministers, who hold office during his “pleasure”. In theory, the Governor’s discretion arises only when no party or pre-poll alliance commands a clear majority. In practice, hung Assemblies have led to delay, uncertainty, and perceptions of partisanship due to undefined discretion.

The First Administrative Reforms Commission stressed that any doubt about a majority must be resolved exclusively through a floor test. The Rajamannar Committee confined discretion to appointment, dismissal, and dissolution, and urged binding norms to prevent misuse.

The Sarkaria Commission laid down a clear order of preference where no party has a majority: first, a pre-poll alliance with a majority; second, the single largest party with assured support; third, a post-poll coalition with all government partners; fourth, a post-poll alliance with outside support. It stressed two principles—no independent assessment of a majority by the Governor and mandatory floor testing of rival claims. The Punchhi Commission reaffirmed this framework.

The NCRWC proposed an investiture vote in a hung Assembly, allowing members to elect the prospective Chief Minister before appointment, thereby eliminating gubernatorial discretion at the most sensitive stage.

The following principles should be codified in the Instrument of Instructions: mandate the Sarkaria order of preference; prohibit reliance on personal or extraneous assessments; require a floor test within seven days (extendable only for recorded reasons); and forbid manipulation or delay in convening the House.

The Instrument of Instructions must also codify the Supreme Court’s limits on Article 174 powers. Summoning and proroguing the Assembly should occur strictly on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except where loss of majority is demonstrable. A Governor may order a floor test suo motu only when a no-confidence motion is pending or when credible, objective material indicates loss of confidence. Dissolution must be based solely on ministerial advice. If a Ministry falls, the Governor must first explore viable alternatives. Dissolution must never be used to pre-empt or avoid a floor test.

Recent episodes in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and Kerala—where Governors publicly criticised governments, omitted portions of Addresses, walked out of Assemblies, or engaged in social-media disputes—have strained constitutional norms and eroded neutrality. The Instrument of Instructions must mandate restraint, prohibit public criticism, and require all disagreements to be conveyed privately through constitutional channels. Article 176 (Special Address by Governor), now largely ceremonial and contentious, should be omitted.

Article 200 empowers the Governor to assent to a Bill, return it to the Legislature for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President. If a returned Bill is re-passed, assent is mandatory. Under Article 201, a reserved Bill may be assented to, withheld, or returned by the President; if re-passed within six months, it must again be presented to the President.

The Sarkaria Commission held that the Governor has no general discretion under Article 200 and must act on ministerial advice, reserving Bills only in exceptional cases. To curb delay, it recommended a four-month limit for Presidential decisions, clarifications within two months, and disposal of reconsidered Bills within four months. The NCRWC proposed six months for the Governor and three for the President. The Punchhi Commission recommended a six-month decision limit and mandatory assent for re-passed Bills.

In Australia and Canada, assent powers survive in text but have become dead letters through convention. In the United States, a Bill becomes law if the President does not sign or veto it within 10 days (excluding Sundays) while Congress is in session. Kenya’s Constitution (2010) provides for deemed assent after 14 days.

Also Read | Governance hurdles may test Rekha Gupta as Delhi’s new Chief Minister

The Kurian Joseph Committee regards the Supreme Court’s April 2025 judgment—imposing defined timelines on both the Governor and the President—as constitutionally sound. By contrast, the November 2025 Advisory Opinion, by declining to impose timelines and excluding the President from judicial review, forces States into repeated litigation, institutionalises delay, and risks paralysing State legislatures when Governors reserve multiple Bills and the President defers a decision.

The Committee also rejects the Advisory Opinion’s view that constitutional silence precludes deemed assent. Silence cannot imply unlimited authority or unlimited time. Indefinite inaction would erode federalism, a Basic Structure principle. The Supreme Court has previously filled constitutional gaps—through the collegium framework, the creamy-layer doctrine, reservation ceilings, and time-bound directions in defection cases—when necessary to prevent institutional abuse. Where constitutional lacunae threaten responsible government or federal balance, corrective action under Article 142 is justified.

Accordingly, Articles 200 and 201 should be amended to incorporate binding timelines for assent, return, or reservation of Bills, with deemed assent upon expiry. Except where constitutionally required, State-List Bills should not be reserved. The Governor must assent or return such Bills within 15 days; if re-passed, assent must follow within 15 days. Similar limits should apply to Concurrent-List Bills, with reservation only in cases of repugnancy to a Union Bill under Article 254. The reservation must be supported by a written legal opinion and accompanied by reasons within 60 days.

As a constitutional principle, neither the Governor nor the President should exercise an executive veto over a duly passed State Bill, as this would undermine two elements of the Constitution’s Basic Structure: parliamentary democracy and separation of powers. Valid concerns, if any, may be addressed by Parliament under Article 246(2) or through judicial review.

Restoring federal balance

The Governor is seen today less as a federal link and more as a vestige of colonial control—a modern analogue of the British-era “Resident” who supervised the princely States. Partisan misuse of the office has diluted democratic mandates, obstructed legislative processes, strained Union–State relations, and corroded constitutional trust.

Reform is therefore necessary. When conventions falter, constitutional amendments must supply clarity. Few provisions of the Constitution warrant more urgent and comprehensive re-examination than those concerning the Governor. To preserve federal balance, the office must be restored to its original conception as a constitutional guardian—not an alternative power centre.

K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty is a retired IAS officer of the Tamil Nadu cadre; a former Vice-Chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, Chennai; and a member of the High-Level Committee on Union-State Relations constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu.