You’ve been a reporter, if I may call you that, for 50 to 55 years. Did you ever expect to see a President like this sitting in the White House?

I don’t think anybody could have imagined it. This is something extraordinary. The United States has long prided itself as a country of rule of law and freedom of the press, and it has come to a stage that would have been absolutely unthinkable even five years ago.

What is your sense of what’s happening—and not just in Iran? Let’s look at Venezuela, Cuba, all the things Donald Trump is trying to do. Is this a case of fading American power or assertive American power?

Whether it is fading or assertive may be a bit too early to predict. But one can see how we have come to this state of disorder. The disorder didn’t start with Donald Trump—he accelerated it. It started at least 25 years ago with the Kosovo crisis, when NATO intervened with air power without any approval from the United Nations. Then came a series of American interventions. The most consequential was the Iraq intervention in 2003. The Iraqi regime was overthrown, and in its place emerged a whole series of terrorist groups. The consequences of that are still being felt—in our own neighbourhood, for instance, in the form of ISIS Khorasan, which is a progeny of what began in 2003.

Disorder also crept in through smaller actions. In 2019, the United States stopped appointing its candidate to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. As a result, the WTO became inoperative. An international organisation that had held together world trade was rendered dysfunctional. The United States has also withdrawn from the WHO and from the Paris climate change. So some of the institutions built by the United States and others have been systematically dismantled.

What followed is a kind of free-for-all. If the Americans can set up bases wherever they want, China asks: why not us? China has created some seven bases in the South China Sea, reclaiming land from the sea and building air and missile installations there in violation of international law. Countries are going ahead and doing things that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, because there was a body of customary law that people respected—and if they did not, there was a court to turn to, an enforcement mechanism.

Without enforcement, the law exists but has no value. Without predictability—knowing what consequences an action will bring—order breaks down. The Security Council is essentially inoperative. Institutions that could preserve a degree of order and predictability have been either dismantled or hollowed out. What Trump is doing is, in a sense, the final stage of dismantling this order.

Veteran journalist Nayan Chanda | Photo Credit: ashoka.edu.in

We do know that power vacuums tend to get filled. You’re right to point out the WTO, because I recall very well how the Western world was keen that China and Russia should become members and be part of the rules-based trading order. But that’s history now.

Given this power vacuum and the disorder we see, many regional players—countries like Saudi Arabia—have attempted to assert themselves. Pakistan, as you said, sets precedents. Do you think China is filling, or going to fill, the space vacated by the United States?

To some extent, certainly in Asia. Outside Asia, their only base is in Djibouti, but Djibouti is strategically important for keeping an eye on the Gulf and the vital sea lanes that carry oil to China. Chinese presence across Southeast Asia is enormous—they are building a naval base in Cambodia at Ream, they have begun building a port at Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, and their maritime force in Southeast Asia is expanding rapidly. They have Coast Guard ships the size of destroyers going around enforcing Chinese law—telling local fishermen they are forbidden from fishing in certain waters and driving them away with gunboats.

The Philippines took China to the international court, which ruled that Chinese are in the wrong. China simply said the ruling was not worth the paper it was written on and ignored it. This is the law and disorder we are seeing.

Apart from the military bases, do you feel that China as an economic power is now in a position to challenge what was US hegemony?

It is—and it is not. You have to remember that Chinese power is built substantially on access to the American market. Thanks to the short-sightedness of Western business corporations, they moved their production facilities to China, and Chinese goods have since flooded the West. Almost anything worth more than fifty dollars in a US or European supermarket is made in China. Chinese success depends on that market access. That is precisely why China also has to remember it can only pressure the West to the extent that doing so doesn’t kill the goose.

US President Donald Trump speaks with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during a summit meeting in Beijing in May 2026. | Photo Credit: Reuters

But China also has a huge domestic market.

The domestic market is actually quite small compared to what China has outside. And because of China’s skewed economic system, the domestic population tends not to spend. The government has had to offer incentives for people to buy, because ordinary Chinese are holding on to their money—putting it in the bank or investing in apartments—because they have no confidence about how they will survive in old age.

Looking at the global scenario as a whole—the US, China, the European Union, Russia— how do you think these powers are faring? And in the next five to 10 years, how do you see things shaping up?

One thing is clear: China has gained the upper hand in technology. Earlier, people said the Chinese were simply copycats, but they are now innovating and producing goods superior to those made in the West. The one area where they still lag is in cutting-edge semiconductors—three-nanometre semiconductor remain beyond their reach—but they are producing many other advanced chips that are fuelling their technology sector. Their advances in electronics, rocketry, and aerospace are significant; they have even produced a commercial passenger jet.

China’s manufacturing and industrial prowess has grown enormously. The challenge is population. The population has begun to shrink, and the cheap labour force that fuelled low-cost production is being replaced by robots—though that transition will take time. Whether China can make the country rich before it gets old remains an open question. China’s banking system is also in serious trouble, owing to lending to companies that squandered the money building vast housing complexes that lie unoccupied.

So while China is technologically advanced, it must ensure it can sell its products abroad. And there is one major advantage we haven’t mentioned: China has captured control of nearly 80 per cent of rare earth minerals, which are critical for making high-tech equipment—from jet engines to automobiles.

We saw that play out in Europe—a ban was announced and then had to be withdrawn.

Exactly. China’s control of rare earths gives it enormous bargaining leverage. That is precisely why Donald Trump backed down on tariffs when the Busan summit between Trump and Xi took place last October—Xi signalled that China would restrict the export of rare earth materials, and Trump climbed down.

How do you look at Europe, Russia, and the United States? There are tensions between Europe and America, and the future of NATO itself is in question.

Russia is genuinely feeling foolish about its adventure in Ukraine. They were so sure they would sweep into Kyiv and install a government of their choosing. Four years on, the latest reports indicate that Russian forces are actually ceding territory they had earlier occupied, under relentless Ukrainian drone attacks that have struck hundreds of miles inside Russia.

Drones even hit Moscow just a week before the Victory Day parade, leading to calls for a ceasefire at least during the celebrations. Russia has lost roughly three per cent of its armed forces manpower over the past four years.

It looks like a standoff.

It is a standoff. Moscow is looking to China to help turn the tide. The Chinese have been cautious—they have promised not to supply weapons to Russia, though they are providing components for making drones. That may no longer be enough to reverse the situation. Russia does have one advantage: enormous reserves of oil and gas. Putin is promising China a steady, secure supply via a pipeline that would not be affected by anything happening in the Middle East. That is what Putin pledged to Beijing just last week—energy security guaranteed from Russia.

What is your sense of Europe? The Europeans are backing Ukraine to the hilt, which seems somewhat surprising—one would have expected the major European players to push harder for a negotiated end to the war.

They did try, initially. Russia used its energy leverage—Russian gas heats homes across Europe. But after the Ukraine invasion, Europeans stopped buying Russian gas. Now Russia can no longer count on the European market, which is one more reason it wants to secure the market in China.

As for why the Europeans are backing Ukraine so firmly: they believe that if they allowed a violation of borders to go unchallenged—if they accepted that a powerful neighbour can simply march into a country and redraw borders at will—then European borders everywhere would be vulnerable. Crimea was the first shot, and they swallowed it. When Ukraine was invaded, they said that is too far.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg arrives for a wreath laying ceremony at NATO headquarters in Brussels, on April 4. | Photo Credit: AP

But the Russians argue it is because of NATO and its expansion. And there was no strategic reason, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, for NATO to expand the way it did. Many warnings were issued by the Russians at the time—that is their contention.

That is their contention. But if you look at the Russian domestic media, there has been a build-up of nationalism centred on the narrative that Ukraine has no right to exist—that Ukraine has always been part of Russia. This was a power grab. Putin felt humiliated by what happened to the Soviet Union; he has called its dissolution a catastrophe. He has been trying to recapture some of Russia’s old glory, and when he successfully took Crimea, he was emboldened. The next step was an attempt to take all of Ukraine—not just the border provinces.

How do you explain the equation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin?

I think Trump has a genuine admiration for dictators. He simply loves them—the way they command and get things done.

Which is perhaps why he also admires the army chief in Pakistan.

Yes, he loves Kim Jong-un—he calls him strong, someone who just commands and people obey. He admires that kind of power. Look at the adjectives he uses for Xi Jinping or Kim Jong-un: they are strong. Trump once remarked that he envied the way Xi Jinping or Kim Jong-un walks into a hall and everyone stands up—and when either of them speaks, everyone listens intently. Those are the attributes of leadership Trump admires: that they are strong and can enforce the law. Trump wishes he could exercise that kind of authority in the United States.

Do you think it’s only that? There are also suggestions that Russian intelligence has some compromising material on him.

That has been a speculation for a long time. Putin’s standard operating procedure is to use kompromat to control people, so it is possible. What is clear is that Trump has been very deferential towards Putin. At their first meeting in Helsinki, Trump essentially said he believed Putin over his own intelligence agencies, which had established that Putin had tried to influence the US election. There is enough evidence of Russian interference, yet Trump publicly declared he trusted Putin’s denial. Why such deference? That remains a matter of speculation.

Turning to the United States: midterm elections are coming. There is substantial domestic opposition to Trump. Do you see any change in the Trumpian approach over the next two-and-a-half years—he still has a good two years plus of his term remaining?

I don’t. In fact, the latest results in Republican primary nominations show Trump consolidating significant gains. He will make every possible attempt—through gerrymandering and enormous campaign spending—to change the outcome of the midterms. But the midterms will be very difficult for him to win. There is also speculation about whether he would actually allow the elections to go ahead—there could be some declared national emergency.

Can he do that?

He can—if a national emergency is declared, he can postpone elections. And consider what happened just yesterday: Raúl Castro, the brother of Fidel, was indicted by an American court. He is in Cuba. Speculation is already building about whether the US will do to him what it did to Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela—who was indicted in a New York court, and then US special forces landed in Caracas and took him. Cuba could be another hotspot coming up.

I raised this at the start of our conversation—regarding the role and status of the United States: one thing that is clear is that American actions are no longer predictable, whether we are talking about tariffs, the Maduro operation, or whatever may come next with Cuba. So how does the rest of the world deal with the United States?

Everyone just wakes up in the morning and checks Trump’s Truth Social to find out what America is going to do next. That is not sustainable. But because of the enormous power the United States still wields—economic and military—the world remains deferential to whatever Trump does, even as resentment builds. That resentment is, frankly, overwhelming across the globe.

But don’t you think America’s military power has genuinely been challenged by Iran? Three months on, Iran is still standing, its capabilities intact. They brought down a number of top-flight American aircraft. How do you see that?

I think this Iran war will be studied for years to come as a turning point in global strategy. Look at how the Iranians used cheap drones to strike targets deep inside the Middle East and the Gulf—aided, it is said, by Chinese satellite data, without which the drones could not have achieved the pinpoint targeting they demonstrated. The combination of external assistance and their own innovation has shown that the power balance based on the tonnage of warships or the speed of jet aircraft may no longer be sufficient to establish dominance.

So what happens now? The Iranians have shown they are still standing and ready for another round if the Americans want one. If there is no negotiated end to this crisis, this war unleashed by the United States. Will this become a standoff like the one we see in Ukraine?

It looks as though Iran has established a kind of authority to control the Strait of Hormuz. Ships are passing regularly now. One doesn’t know what deals individual countries are concluding with Iran to allow passage—whether they are paying in cryptocurrency or renminbi, because the Americans have said they will not accept any toll on free passage. But it appears the Iranians are collecting, and ships are passing. The Iranian foreign minister has visited numerous US allies, including Japan. What deals are being concluded? One can presume they are telling each country: we will let your ships through on these terms. If every country strikes its own private arrangement with Iran, it will be very difficult for Trump to reverse the situation to where things stood three months ago.

So the deal-making itself is a subversion of the rules-based order we were discussing.

Yes.