An American President stuck in an unwinnable and unpopular war, undertakes a risky trip to Beijing to seek Chinese intervention for a desperately needed off-ramp. The hosts feign sympathy and help, albeit in a layered, unhurried manner. They are subtle and discreet in proposing a hefty quid pro quo. Over the next few months, things are sorted out: the White House disengages from a sticky mess, quietly letting the “vanquished” opponent prevail. Long sceptical and often hostile, Washington becomes a reluctant believer in China’s “peaceful rise”.

The 1972 summit

Is this a likely pre-script for Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing that begins today? It may turn out to be. But it does sum up the first United States-China bilateral Summit in February 1972, when a Vietnam-mauled President Richard Nixon met Chairman Mao. As the post-visit Shanghai Communiqué panned out, the U.S. recognised the long-reviled Communist People’s Republic as the sole China, gave it a P5 status, and threw Taiwan under the bus. Subsequent western capital and technology surge propelled China’s phenomenal economic and geostrategic take-off.

In return, China abandoned Hanoi, enabling the U.S. to extricate itself from a haemorrhaging war. Vietnam, too, emerged as a victorious and unified nation. So, while other stakeholders benefited, China hit a jackpot.

Half a century later, history may be tantalisingly close to repeating itself in Beijing on the first such visit by an American President since 2017 for a summit. It would have a comprehensive agenda, from bilateral (trade/tariff, economic, tech-transfer, and Taiwan) to various global issues.

The U.S.-Iran war is likely to figure prominently in Beijing because an early face-saving exit from the West Asian imbroglio is currently Mr. Trump’s top priority. The Iran war has had huge economic and geostrategic costs, including to his legacy.

Waging a clever asymmetric strategy, Iran has converted a military debacle into a strategic win with a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, staunching crude supplies and causing economic pain globally. Its refusal to capitulate to Mr. Trump’s conditions has denied him an off-ramp, denting his approval at home as he faces an uphill battle in the upcoming Congressional midterm election.

China as Iran’s anchor

China is Iran’s largest economic partner, buying over 80% of its oil exports, estimated at up to $45 billion in 2025. The additional non-oil bilateral trade is estimated to be over $9 billion and is suspected to include many of the crucially needed Chinese war materials. Pakistan, an ‘ironclad’ friend, keeps China informed about the U.S.-Iran negotiations. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, visited Beijing on May 6 for bilateral discussions, without the traditional joint communiqué. These factors make China the most prominent foreign determinant for Iran, with Beijing the go-to destination with a key to the Iranian imbroglio. Thus, despite Mr. Trump’s assertion to the contrary, he may need Chinese President Xi Jinping’s help to cobble a modus vivendi with Iran.

Against this backdrop, observers discern several competing tendencies during the last week: the Trump team was keen to finalise the negotiation road map with Iran before the Beijing Summit to keep China out.

However, Iran delivered an uncompromising response after 10 days, which was rejected by Mr. Trump. The U.S. “Operation Freedom” to jump-start the Strait of Hormuz navigation was a non-starter. The Trump administration has officially “terminated” the Iran war to avoid running afoul of the War Powers Act. Suspended negotiations, problematic military option, escalating oil prices, and the incoming Hajj have created a perfect maelstrom for Mr. Trump’s Beijing foray. Two tendencies afford an insight into the ever-inscrutable and minimalistic Chinese mindset on this issue.

Following Mr. Araghchi’s visit to China, Tehran’s position has hardened perceptibly on contentious issues such as Hormuz, nuclear enrichment, missiles and the proxies. Apart from highlighting its mistrust of Mr. Trump, Tehran has also upped its demands on reparations, security guarantees, defreezing assets, closing the American military bases in the region and a ceasefire in Lebanon and Yemen. Simultaneously, China and Russia have raised the ante by threatening to veto even the toned-down U.S.-backed draft UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution on the Hormuz blockade.

A possible strategy

While the Summit scenario is still evolving, Beijing’s nod-and-wink to Iranian defiance indicates a hardball strategy for the Trump-Xi summit. China seems to perceive that prolonged or deepened Gulf tensions would enable it to extract more American concessions on bilateral issues in return for sorting out Iranian obduracy. It may ask Mr. Trump to yield on tariffs and sanctions, technology denial and Taiwan. Citing the Iranian trust deficit, Beijing may cynically carve a role for itself either as a mediator-guarantor or through a UNSC Resolution. The proposed unwinding could be phased over the next few months.

It remains to be seen if Mr. Trump, a self-styled consummate transactional dealmaker, has a counterstrategy of his own for a potential grand bargain: Chinese help for an Iranian off-ramp in return for minimal concessions. Otherwise, he may sell out like Henry Kissinger, who sheepishly admitted later, “I think if we drink enough mao tai [a potent Chinese liquor], we can solve anything.”

Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador with an interest in West Asia and oil matters