• Download a copy of the Delhi High Court’s Telegram judgment here.

The Delhi High Court on Friday dismissed Telegram’s petition challenging the Central Government’s emergency blocking order under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which temporarily restricted access to the platform until the immediate aftermath of the NEET-UG 2026 re-examination. 

Upholding the government’s action, Justice Tejas Karia held that the order satisfied the constitutional test of proportionality and fell within the Centre’s statutory powers under Section 69A. The Court also held that Telegram, as an application and platform, fell within the scope of the provision, observing that software-based infrastructure qualifies as a “computer resource” under the Act. 

Platform-wide blocking and free speech: The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), in a statement issued after the judgment questioned the court’s interpretation of Section 69A: 

• IFF argued that Shreya Singhal v Union of India upheld Section 69A because the power was understood to be narrowly drawn and directed at specific information.
• It warned that extending the provision to an entire intermediary treats “the speech of a whole population as a single switch to be turned off.”
• According to IFF, the precedent carries consequences for “the open internet that extend well beyond this case.”

Nikhil Pahwa, Founder & Editor at MediaNama, argued in an X thread that the ban was disproportionate and set a troubling precedent for future platform regulation. 

• Pahwa said the government had not proved that it had exhausted all possible avenues before resorting to a block and described pre-censorship as “an extreme step.”
• He argued that “blocking of a platform is different from blocking of a group, is different from blocking of an account, is different from blocking of a post” because the restriction affects lawful users, businesses, and speech across the platform.
• He warned that the ruling creates “a problematic precedence where the government of India will, on a whim, threaten to block entire platforms because they don’t accede to their extreme-censorship demands.”

Section 69A, proportionality, and less restrictive alternatives: IFF argued that the temporary nature of the restriction does not automatically make it proportionate.

• Citing Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, it said the State must demonstrate that no less intrusive alternative was available.
• It warned that “a blanket block, however brief, restricts the lawful expression and the right to receive information of millions of Indians.”

SFLC.in, in an X thread following the judgment, focused on the Court’s interpretation of “information” under the IT Act: 

• SFLC noted that the statute defines information broadly enough to include software and databases.
• However, it described the ruling as setting “a dangerous precedent” because it accepted a platform-wide restriction affecting nearly 150 million users as proportionate.

Writing for the Bar Bulletin, advocate Arjun Harkauli argued that the ruling effectively transforms a content-blocking provision into a platform-blocking mechanism.

• Harkauli questioned whether constitutional rights could be curtailed for millions because authorities found it difficult to target specific bad actors. He wrote, “This raises a critical question: Can constitutional rights be curtailed for millions on the basis of the inability of the State to target wrongdoers effectively?”
• He also argued that the judgment expands executive power under Section 69A and effectively “transforms a content-blocking provision into a platform blocking mechanism.”

Writing for Constitutional Law and Philosophy, Tanmay Durani, a researcher at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence, questioned whether the government had sufficiently demonstrated that narrower interventions had failed: 

• Durani argued that the judgment showed the executive claimed to have exhausted alternatives, but did not clearly establish why those alternatives were insufficient.
• He wrote that the Court could have required stronger evidence before accepting a complete platform block.

Platform architecture and future implications: Harkauli argued that the government relied heavily on Telegram’s channels, bots, cloud infrastructure, and message-editing features to justify the restriction: 

• He said the judgment endorses pre-emptive intervention based on anticipated harm rather than proven future misconduct.
• Harkauli also questioned what “principled standard” distinguishes Telegram from services such as WhatsApp or Signal.
• He further argued, “The absence of a clear, specific criterion risks selective regulation, which is constitutionally suspect. It will keep citizens and State alike in a situation of ambivalence. The instrumentalities of the State may ban messenger channels before any prominent examination or event in anticipation of harm to public order.”

Supreme Court advocate Shaileshwar Yadav argued that the judgment shifts the focus from intermediary compliance to platform design:

• Yadav wrote that once unlawful activity is attributed to a platform’s architecture rather than a failure to comply with legal requests, the intermediary’s obligation effectively becomes one of redesigning its services.
• He criticised the direction requiring Telegram to disable message editing, arguing that “Section 69A authorises the blocking of information. It does not authorise the redesign of software.”
• Yadav warned that the reasoning could justify future directions affecting encryption, anonymity, forwarding, and other platform features.

Durani similarly argued that the judgment treats a platform’s resistance to targeted intervention as justification for broader restrictions:

• He wrote that “the less amenable a platform is to surgical intervention, the more proportionate total intervention becomes.”
• Durani warned that the same reasoning could eventually extend beyond Telegram to encryption, anonymity tools, VPNs, and other privacy-enhancing technologies.

Due process and hearings: IFF criticised the use of the emergency procedure under Rule 9 instead of the ordinary hearing process under Rule 8:

• It argued that hearing rights are “integral to the fairness of the blocking process.”
• According to IFF, dispensing with those safeguards in these circumstances “calls for close scrutiny.”

SFLC highlighted a separate transparency concern:

• It noted that Telegram was able to challenge the order because, as an intermediary, it had access to the blocking directions.
• SFLC.in contrasted this with cases where Rule 16 confidentiality prevents ordinary users from accessing blocking orders.

Also read

• Explained: How Indian users are bypassing the government’s Telegram block
• X withholds Proton VPN manager’s account in India after he flagged telegram VPN surge
• “Complete non-application of mind”: Telegram tells Delhi HC on government’s platform restriction