Ukraine officially opened membership talks with the ‌European Union this week in a move hailed by Ukrainian officials as “a Rubicon” moment for the war-torn country. While this is welcome news for Kyiv, it remains unclear how long it could still take to actually join the EU.

In order to maintain momentum, one potential interim solution suggested recently by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is so-called associate membership for Ukraine. This would potentially allow for the rapid participation of Ukrainian representatives in various EU institutions without voting rights.

Merz’s proposal has already been dismissed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “unfair.” The idea has also been criticized by a number of Kyiv commentators. Their skeptical response comes as no surprise, given Ukraine’s slow progress toward EU integration in recent decades as a result of continuous European hesitation.

Kyiv first made membership of the European Union an explicit goal in 1998, but did not become an official candidate country until 2022. The consistent gap between rhetoric and results has created lasting distrust throughout Ukrainian society. This no doubt led many to treat the German leader’s suggestion with suspicion.

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For Ukrainians, the most immediate fear is that associate status would become a tool to postpone the country’s full EU membership indefinitely. These concerns are understandable, but it seems unlikely that Merz would have such an outcome in mind. After all, Germany has emerged since 2022 as a key supporter of Ukraine’s defense and a vocal backer of the country’s EU integration.

Attitudes toward Ukraine are now also visibly shifting across the EU as a whole due to practical considerations, with Kyiv recognized as a key contributor to European security and an indispensable partner in the defense against Russia. In this new geopolitical context, Ukraine is increasingly viewed in Berlin and many other EU capitals as an asset rather than a burden.

Some in Kyiv are also worried that Merz’s proposal may serve as a distraction with the potential to draw energy and attention away from the longer term push for full membership. This cannot be excluded, but it could be addressed. To make sure Ukraine’s accession ambitions do not become sidetracked, it must be made clear that associate membership status should not interfere with this process and is not seen as an alternative.

As long as existing EU membership negotiations continue, it should prove difficult to sabotage accession under the pretext of associate status. On the contrary, while Merz’s plan would mean no voting rights for Ukrainian officials within European institutions, their presence could actually help facilitate productive engagement and potentially speed up the closing of individual chapters on the long road toward eventual EU membership.

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Ukraine’s cautious response to the suggestion of associate membership has been shaped by negative perceptions that the country is somehow being downgraded. This is not surprising, especially given Ukraine’s long experience of various different EU engagement formats and endless summits that have produced plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete progress toward membership.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that concentrating energies on the existing EU accession format and focusing exclusively on chapter negotiations is unlikely to result in rapid progress. Due to Ukraine’s large size and ongoing war with Russia, the country’s membership bid is by far the most geopolitically complex case among all current candidates. With this in mind, it is unrealistic to envision a fast track toward full member status.

Despite valid concerns, associate membership could be both practically and symbolically useful for Ukraine. Ukrainian representation within EU institutions, if indeed this proves possible, would help to intensify dialogue with officials in Brussels and individual member states, while also sending a strong message to Moscow that Ukraine is no longer in the geopolitical grey zone and is now on a clear trajectory toward further European integration. With sufficient political will in Brussels and Kyiv, it would also be realistic to achieve associate member status within a short time frame. This could actually add to the momentum of Ukraine’s bid to join the EU.

As long as associate status is understood by all parties as an intermediate step toward future full membership, Ukraine should not rush to reject this option. While associate membership would be an imperfect solution that could also reasonably be perceived as a downgrade, it has the potential to provide tangible advantages and would almost certainly strengthen the relationship between Ukraine and the EU in ways that could enhance the broader accession process.

Much would depend on the ability of Brussels and Kyiv to reach agreement on a constructive format for associate status that moved the partnership forward without undermining Ukraine’s push for full membership. In the current geopolitical climate of an expansionist Russia and a US administration that is looking to reduce its commitment to transatlantic security, Ukraine’s integration is now a European strategic priority. Associate EU membership could be a useful stepping stone toward consolidating this special relationship.

Dr. Andreas Umland is a policy fellow at the newly founded European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK) and an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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