惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

Engineering at Meta
Engineering at Meta
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
小众软件
小众软件
博客园_首页
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
美团技术团队
博客园 - 叶小钗
Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft Security Blog
有赞技术团队
有赞技术团队
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
H
Hackread – Cybersecurity News, Data Breaches, AI and More
I
InfoQ
MongoDB | Blog
MongoDB | Blog
The Cloudflare Blog
J
Java Code Geeks
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
博客园 - 聂微东
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
Blog — PlanetScale
Blog — PlanetScale
IT之家
IT之家
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Y
Y Combinator Blog

Let's Encrypt Community Support - Latest topics

New Certificate Fails with Unauthorized 403 Seeking Clarity and Consistency on Configuring HTTP-01 challenge for multiple domains Certifiate failing renewal Letsencrypt blocked in Iran Problem with http verification Cyber-attacks from the secondary verification source addresses Certbot failed to authenticate some domains (authenticator: webroot). The Certificate Authority reported these problems: How will clients handle X2 by X1 cross certificate revocation HTTPS Certificate Renewal and Mixed Content Issues Affecting My Real-Time Morse Code Website Using Let’s Encrypt .conf Files and Nginx along with Certbot Forbidden by policy error generating the let’s encrypt certificate SSL Certificate installed for 1 of 2 domains Certificate apparently not working Certbot 5.6.0 Release Would signing the key authorization with the ACME private key increase security? Lego 5.0.0 Release Certificate renewal incomplete: missing domains beeandlunetrading.com We can’t renew your Let’s Encrypt certificate automatically until the issue is resolved Is using preferred-chain "ISRG Root X2" still a good idea? Crypt::LE --delayed not being honored Expressway certificate renewal error even after upgrading to the latest version Yocto Bitbake install of Certbot luadns fails with 'NoneType' object is not callable Intended audience for "tlsserver" profile Trouble finding Charter Communications as Web Hoster 2026.05.08 Gen Y Cross-Certified Subordinate CAs missing serverAuth EKU Certbot deploy-hook Obtaining account ID from xmox.nl email server SSL Certificate Expired - pwgroup.plabcapy.com More cultural recognition of HTTPS adoption Certificado certbot Upcoming Let’s Encrypt Profile Changes On May 13
Root Cert Protection and Signing Process for e.g. Interme...
@Osiris · 2026-04-19 · via Let's Encrypt Community Support - Latest topics

April 18, 2026, 8:59pm 1

kinda curious, how exactly are the Root certs handled, is that something the public is allowed to know?

while I assume that it is not QUITE as extreme as the DNSSec Root keys I would assume there is a similar idea, fully offline multiple people who have to be together to unlock different levels of access which are all needed to in the end get to however the root cert is protected right?

for reference, the DNSSec Process:
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/

Osiris April 18, 2026, 9:05pm 2

Something like that as far as I know indeed. So called "root signing ceremonies". Look it up, there's probably info about it out there related to the web PKI too.

1 Like

The legal requirements that all public certificate authorities have agreed on - Let's Encrypt included - are documented in the Baseline Requirements from the CA/Browser Forum. Some excerpts:

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation
the CA SHALL:

  1. prepare and follow a Key Generation Script,
  2. have a Qualified Auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process or record a video of the
    entire CA Key Pair generation process, and
  3. have a Qualified Auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its key ceremony during
    its Key and Certificate generation process and the controls used to ensure the integrity and
    confidentiality of the Key Pair.

In all cases, the CA SHALL:

  1. generate the CA Key Pair in a physically secured environment as described in the CA’s
    Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
  2. generate the CA Key Pair using personnel in Trusted Roles under the principles of multiple
    person control and split knowledge;
  3. generate the CA Key Pair within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable technical and
    business requirements as disclosed in the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice
    Statement;
  4. log its CA Key Pair generation activities; and
  5. maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was
    generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in its Certificate
    Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement and (if applicable) its Key Generation Script.

4.3.1.1 Manual authorization of certificate issuance for Root CAs
Certificate issuance by the Root CA SHALL require an individual authorized by the CA (i.e. the CA
system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator) to deliberately issue a direct command in
order for the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

Effectively, this boils down to a) having auditors present when you do critical things, b) storing your key securely, c) having access controls (multi-person, security etc) in place. This involves putting them on a Hardware Security Module, and additionally you may want to keep them offline when they're not needed. Precise details are not usually public.

As stated in the BRs, a CA must describe their practices in their Certification Practice Statement. As such, you will find some further information there. Quoting from Let's Encrypts CPS:

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
A number of tasks, such as key generation and entering areas physically containing operating ISRG PKI systems, require at least two people in Trusted Roles to be present.

6.7 Network security controls

ISRG implements reasonable network security safeguards and controls to prevent unauthorized access to CA systems and infrastructure. ISRG complies with the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements. Identified vulnerabilities are responded to within 96 hours of review, and remediated within a timeframe based on their risk profile: critical vulnerabilities within 96 hours, high-risk within one month, medium-risk within three months, and low-risk within six months.

ISRG's network is multi-tiered and utilizes the principle of defense in depth. Firewalls and other critical CA systems are configured based on a necessary-traffic-only allowlisting policy whenever possible.

ISRG Root CA Private Keys are stored offline in a secure manner.

4 Likes

My1 April 18, 2026, 11:04pm 4

I've seen a post about those in here, not that much details though, not sure if the procedures are different between making and signing new roots vs just handling intermediates and CRLs.

I have been very intrigued how insanely specific the DNSSec root process was even up to the level that the proces is fully public including video footage.

I think you can find some of the documentation you're looking for under the WebTrust Audits section of their legal repository page, including some key generation reports. I don't think all the details are nearly as publicly visible as the DNSSEC ceremonies are, though.

4 Likes

Osiris April 19, 2026, 7:47am 6

Depends what you mean with "handling intermediates" and "handling CRLs".

The intermediates are continuously used to sign leaf certificates, so they are "online" all the time (if in use). But to sign an intermediate, the root is required and that one needs to be kept offline and requires a ceremony, also to make sure the new intermediates aren't tampered with.

With regard to CRLs: the end leaf CRLs are signed by the intermediates, so no issue there. The intermediate CRLs are signed by the root certs, but only once to maybe twice a year (maybe? I dunno TBH, CRL is valid for a year after signing, but maybe they update it earlier to mitigate the risk if something goes wrong), so that'll require the root to be "activated" so most likely would require some sort of ceremony perhaps? Not sure how "big" and how much risk of tampering there would be.

My1 April 19, 2026, 10:39am 7

Well handling intermediates and crls from the root are basically "just" signing operations and don't particularly affect the root key and therefore might just need a lower quorum than when setting up new root keys or a new hardware and potentially copying keys if needed. (eg in dnssec aside from the always needed people like the ceremony admin, safe people witnesses etc, normal signing needs 3 cardholders for the TPMs while an operation where they backed up the keys to a new tpm needed 5.

Osiris April 19, 2026, 1:19pm 8

Most likely, sure.