The past few weeks have revealed more of the strengths and limitations of energy-centric warfare.

The outcome of the latest peace talks between Washington and Tehran remains uncertain. Even though the US resumed strikes against Iran on Monday, US officials were optimistic that a “framework” to extend the ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and make steps toward a longer-term deal on Iran’s nuclear program is coming together.

But it’s clear that Iran’s gambit to close the strait and choke off one-fifth of the world’s oil and LNG trade is paying dividends, potentially putting the country ahead of where it stood prior to the war on key points of contention with the US, even before the thorniest nuclear issues have gone back on the table.

“Iran has played its hand very well,” Greg Brew, senior analyst at the Eurasia Group, told me. “It leveraged control of the strait and its ability to threaten regional energy infrastructure into a deal that could cement the ceasefire, end the US blockade, unfreeze frozen funds, and deliver some sanctions relief, with virtually no nuclear concessions in exchange.”

To be sure, Iran was also hurt, with its citizens exposed to spiraling fuel prices, its government cut off from oil export revenue, and its oil industry quickly running out of storage space. But it proved that squeezing an energy chokepoint is an exceptionally painful and effective judo maneuver.

Washington should have seen that coming, particularly given that it deployed a miniature version of the same strategy, via an oil blockade, to kneecap Cuba and soften its government up for negotiations. Ukraine, meanwhile, has interpreted the Hormuz crisis as a signal from Washington that “the gloves are off” when it comes to energy warfare, one Western official here told me recently; Kyiv’s long-range drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure has accelerated in the past month and brought roughly one-quarter of Russian refinery capacity to a “standstill,” according to Reuters, effectively offsetting much of the financial windfall that Moscow would otherwise have enjoyed from higher oil prices and recent US sanctions waivers.

The lesson here is that diversification is the best defense. Ukraine itself avoided total collapse this winter despite the destruction of its electric grid by leaning into distributed energy sources and new trade alliances. Russia, which bypassed numerous opportunities in the past few decades to pivot its economy away from oil, faces economic stagnation. Cuba’s overreliance on Venezuelan crude left its ruling regime highly vulnerable.

As I’ve argued before, China appears best prepared for this new reality, with enough energy options to hold the advantage in talks with the US, Russia, or anyone else. If energy weaponization is the future of warfare, other countries should prepare accordingly.