Days after Donald Trump was greeted in Beijing with a military band, an honour guard and dozens of youths waving American and Chinese flags, Vladimir Putin arrived in China to an almost identical spectacle.

The choreography of the two welcomes appeared deliberately mirrored, designed to showcase Beijing’s ability to host leaders from Washington and Moscow with equal grandeur.

But China also made sure the differences were noticed. Trump was met at the airport by China’s vice-president, a largely ceremonial role outside the Communist party’s real power structure, while Putin was welcomed by a sitting member of the politburo, the party’s top decision-making body, a subtle signal that China sees Moscow as a trusted partner of an emerging non-western world order led by Beijing.

The Kremlin appeared sensitive to the comparisons. Its spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, dismissed suggestions that the two visits were being measured against each another, insisting they should not be viewed through the prism of rivalry. The senior Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov stressed that Putin’s visit to meet Xi Jinping had been planned long before Trump’s trip to Beijing.

Even if Moscow insisted the two visits should not be compared, the message in Russia’s state press was clear. The Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty wrote that Putin was being received in Beijing “as an ally and reliable partner” while Trump had been treated as “a rival and competitor from whom anything can be expected”.

Behind the lavish ceremonies, both visits produced relatively modest results. While Trump and Xi projected an image of cooperation, their summit yielded few concrete breakthroughs, with little progress on key disputes over Nvidia chip exports and tariffs.

For Moscow, the stakes were arguably higher. Putin arrived in Beijing facing what may be the most difficult period of his long rule. His strongman image at home is beginning to fray as Russia’s economy struggles under the pressure of war and sanctions, while Russian forces have made little meaningful progress on the battlefield in Ukraine this year.

Russia’s mounting economic troubles are deepening its reliance on China, transforming what the Kremlin portrays as a partnership of equals into an increasingly asymmetric relationship. But the war between the US and Iran has given Russia a new opening. With instability in the Gulf threatening global energy supplies and the strait of Hormuz in effect closed, Moscow has sought to present itself to Beijing as a more reliable long-term supplier of oil and gas.

Before the summit, Russian officials said they hoped for concrete progress on energy cooperation, particularly on the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which would redirect gas from fields that once supplied Europe towards China instead.

Joseph Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said: “Ukraine’s attacks on Russian western energy infrastructure have further incentivised Moscow to look east, while the US-Iran war has heightened Beijing’s energy security anxieties.”

But on the day there was no specific announcement on Power of Siberia 2. Xi and Putin instead pledged in vague terms to deepen cooperation across a broad range of sectors, with Xi saying the two countries would “give full play to resources interconnection”.

Peskov later acknowledged that the timeline for the project’s implementation had still not been determined.

The biggest winner from the summits may have been Xi himself. China’s leader has long sought to project himself as a global statesman capable of dealing with rival powers. No previous Chinese leader has hosted back-to-back state visits in the same month from a sitting US president and a sitting Russian president.

Xi will cherish the image of China as a power capable of challenging the US economically while highlighting Beijing’s growing role as the lifeline of an increasingly dependent Russia.

During Trump’s visit, Xi was keen to remind his American counterpart that Beijing still retained a powerful strategic ally in Russia. As he hosted Trump inside Zhongnanhai, the Communist leadership compound rarely opened to foreign guests, Xi emphasised the exclusivity of the setting. Asked whether foreign leaders were often invited there, Xi shook his head. “Very rarely,” he said, adding with a chuckle: “For example, Putin has been here.”

Speaking later alongside Putin, Xi said relations between China and Russia were “rightfully regarded as a model for a new type of relations between major powers”.

Notably absent from public discussions during either summit was any serious attempt at a breakthrough on the two wars currently dominating global politics.

Trump said he had rejected a proposal from Xi for China to help broker peace between the US and Iran, keeping the strait of Hormuz shut.

Before Putin’s visit, the Financial Times reported that Xi had privately suggested to Trump that Putin could ultimately come to regret the war in Ukraine. China’s foreign ministry, as well as Trump, rejected the report.

Xi appeared keen to project a united front with Moscow, which has shown no signs of compromise to end the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In a joint statement, China and Russia reiterated their call for the “elimination of the root causes” of the war in Ukraine – language that closely mirrors the Kremlin’s narrative blaming the west for the conflict.

Still, Russia’s growing difficulties in Ukraine will not be lost on Beijing, which has closely monitored the war as an opportunity to study the successes and failures of both sides.

William Yang, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, said Xi may be seeking a clearer understanding of Putin’s thinking on the war in Ukraine, which has increasingly complicated Beijing’s relations with western countries at a time when China is trying to stabilise trade ties with Europe and the US.

China, which holds enormous sway over Russia’s economy, has played little meaningful role in trying to end the war in Ukraine, content to tolerate the conflict so long as it can preserve its trade and diplomatic ties with Moscow while extracting increasingly favourable terms from its weakened partner.