As India pursues its ambition of becoming a developed economy by 2047 — the centenary of its independence — reliable access to overseas markets has become a strategic imperative.

Yet recent crises in West Asia — ranging from the Gaza war and Red Sea disruptions to the Iran war and Strait of Hormuz blockade — have all exposed an uncomfortable reality: connectivity is ultimately a function of geopolitics.

For a country investing substantially in projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the question is no longer simply how to build connectivity but how to make it resilient.

These developments offer important lessons on the limits of connectivity planning in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment and raise a pressing question: what options does India have to secure reliable access to markets and build resilience into its trade architecture?

A major lesson is that no corridor is geopolitically immune. IMEC was announced in 2023 with great enthusiasm, but within weeks, the Gaza conflict had disrupted the political environment necessary for its implementation.

Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea has faced persistent attacks and rerouting, demonstrating that geopolitical risk can derail even the most promising corridor projects overnight.

India’s connectivity problem is fundamentally geopolitical, not one of engineering. India does not lack the technical ability to build ports, roads or logistics systems, nor the capital to participate in such projects.

Beyond the current Hormuz challenge, India’s most direct routes to Eurasia pass through regions marked by rivalry, sanctions, conflict or intense strategic competition. Pakistan blocks direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while China’s growing influence stretches across much of Eurasia.

India’s search for reliable trade corridors is inseparable from its search for diplomatic space. In an era of geopolitical fragmentation, resilience lies not in a single flagship route but in maintaining varied pathways to markets.

India, therefore, needs multiple corridors, such as IMEC for Europe and the Mediterranean, and Chabahar and INSTC for Central Asia and Russia, now more than ever.

The assumption that economic logic alone drives connectivity has been proven wrong. Pakistan has blocked transit access to India despite clear economic gains; Iran sanctions have affected Chabahar’s development and viability; and regional rivalries have complicated IMEC. The lesson is that corridors succeed only when political alignments support them.

Middle powers cannot afford to outsource strategic risk. For decades, many Gulf states assumed that major powers such as the US would guarantee the security of global trade routes and ensure uninterrupted commerce. Recent events have demonstrated the limits of that assumption.

Great powers get distracted; their priorities shift, and critical shipping lanes can become hostages to geopolitical rivalries. India must therefore strengthen its own maritime capabilities through greater naval reach, enhanced maritime domain awareness and more resilient logistics networks.

The Gulf has become indispensable to India’s economic strategy, and is no longer merely an energy supplier. Countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar are increasingly becoming investment partners, logistics hubs, technology collaborators and connectivity nodes.

From lessons to options

These developments suggest that India’s challenge is not merely to identify the right corridor but to build a diversified connectivity architecture capable of withstanding geopolitical shocks.

The question is not whether India should choose between IMEC, Chabahar or INSTC, but how to balance these initiatives while strengthening its economic foundations.

India’s most realistic near-term option is to double down on Chabahar and INSTC. Despite sanctions risks and delays, both corridors already exist in some form.

India can expand cargo volumes through Chabahar, invest in logistics, customs integration and digital tracking, work with Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan and Central Asian states on missing links and target specific sectors such as pharmaceuticals, engineering goods and agricultural exports.

The downside is that India has limited control over Iran-Russia dynamics and Western sanctions. Iran is more important than many Indians appreciate. Many discussions treat Chabahar as merely a port project, but, in reality, Iran occupies a unique position, connecting the Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia.

Sitting astride key energy routes, Iran provides India with its only viable land bridge to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. For India, Iran is not merely another bilateral relationship — it is a gateway geography.

India could increasingly prioritize IMEC. Gulf countries are financially stronger than Iran, India’s relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia are sound, and European participation brings capital and technology while avoiding sanctions-related complications.

The challenge is that IMEC depends on regional political stability, particularly involving Israel and the broader Middle East. India can influence IMEC, but cannot build it alone.

Historically, India’s greatest strategic advantage has been maritime rather than overland. Expanding ports on both coasts and strengthening links with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, East Africa and Southeast Asia would build on that natural strength.

India’s Mundra Port, Jawaharlal Nehru Port and Vizhinjam International Seaport can serve as anchors for shipping partnerships and transshipment hubs, avoiding many continental geopolitical obstacles.

While dedicated undersea pipelines remain economically and technically challenging, India can pursue long-term energy security with countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman through strategic reserves, dedicated port infrastructure, refinery partnerships, green hydrogen projects and priority supply arrangements. Such initiatives would strengthen energy security while complementing broader trade connectivity efforts.

India should strengthen ties with ASEAN, accelerate connectivity with Myanmar and Thailand, expand trade agreements and integrate supply chains with Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore.

Key projects in this connection include the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and broader Indo-Pacific connectivity initiatives, though Myanmar’s instability has slowed progress.

The crisis has reinforced the argument that robust political relationships across multiple camps can ease many connectivity challenges. Over the years, India has cultivated strong relationships with the Gulf monarchies, Iran, Russia, ASEAN, Europe and the United States.

Even with China, despite the border dispute, India maintains decent economic ties. India will need to deepen and fortify these relationships further, because a country seeking continental connectivity cannot choose its geography.

The uncomfortable reality is that connectivity projects alone do not generate economic power. This lesson has exposed the limits of corridor-centric thinking. History suggests the reverse: successful corridors emerge when strong economies create demand for them.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was effective not because it built roads and ports, but because it was backed by manufacturing scale, export competitiveness and robust financial resources.

India’s long-term success will therefore depend less on announcing new corridors and more on strengthening its industrial base, logistics capabilities and trade competitiveness.

India may need to reframe connectivity as diplomacy rather than infrastructure. Traditionally treated as a subset of foreign policy, connectivity is increasingly becoming its driver.

China’s BRI was not merely an infrastructure initiative but an instrument for shaping political relationships. India may require a similar approach, though less coercive and more partnership-driven.

Countries with the most resilient connectivity are not those possessing a single ideal route but those maintaining productive relations with the greatest number of countries along multiple routes.

In that sense, India’s long-standing pursuit of strategic autonomy is no longer merely a foreign policy doctrine – it is increasingly a connectivity strategy.

Raghu Gururaj is a retired Indian ambassador and former foreign service officer.