Ukrainian drone strikes are devastating Russian communities. The city of Sevastopol, the largest in Russian-occupied Crimea, is the latest community to be hit, losing power as Ukrainian drones strike energy facilities in the region.

Given the immense importance attached to Crimea by both Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ukrainians — it was the first area of Ukraine annexed in 2014 — the disruption was of great symbolic value.

Furthermore, drones damaging both the Russian economy and Putin’s pride are an increasingly common phenomenon in the conflict.

Ukraine has used drones with notable effect throughout the conflict. In the initial phases of the war in 2022, Ukraine successfully used Turkish-made Bayraktars to disrupt Russia’s invasion timeline. Ukraine’s greatest advancements, however, have come from its own drone industry.

Ukraine holds many cards

Ukraine’s domestic drone industry now ranks among the best in the world. Drones have given Ukraine considerable cards to play in not only the war with Russia, but also in relations with other countries as well.

Ukraine’s drone technology is so advanced, in fact, that Gulf countries consulted Ukrainian officials on countering Iran’s drone attacks during the recent Iran-United States-Israel war.

Ukraine’s significant success with drones is creating a fixation on the technology’s capabilities throughout the world’s military and political establishment. The Canadian military is committing nearly a billion dollars to drone research.

Drones can certainly impact warfare, as conflicts in Ukraine, Iran and elsewhere have clearly demonstrated. Nevertheless, drones aren’t yet fundamentally altering warfare more broadly. Ukraine, in fact, is using drones to make up for shortfalls in other areas.

Drones have a place in warfare, but countries cannot rely on them entirely, and they need the right military culture to successfully use them.

Ukrainian drone industry

Ukraine’s drone industry at the start of the war was relatively small. Most drones were imported, but there was a small and enthusiastic drone community.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, members of the drone community both enlisted and supported Ukrainian resistance against Russia. They proved to be highly effective in both monitoring Russian movements and employing a wide variety of drones to strike Russian military assets.

Drones offered Ukraine three significant advantages.

First, drones, compared to other military hardware, are cheap. Given the differing economic might between Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine needed to maximize its limited resources if it was to succeed in the conflict.

Second, drones, once factories were established, could be built in Ukraine. Given the frequent lag in military hardware arriving in Ukraine from abroad, even before Donald Trump assumed the American presidency for a second time in 2025, this was a significant advantage.

Third, the effective employment of drones replaced the need for humans. Ukraine, over the last couple of years, has faced personnel shortages and resulting political challenges over pressure from allies to increase enlistment rates.

These realities caused the Ukrainian military to enthusiastically embrace drones to the point that Ukraine became the first country to create a separate branch of the armed forces for drones.

Providing intelligence, strikes

Ukraine’s political and military needs meant that drones were required. Furthermore, Ukraine, contrary to the assessments of drone enthusiasts, is not employing drones in revolutionary ways. Instead, Ukraine is employing drones for tasks that have been common to armed forces for more than a century.

Short-range Ukrainian drones provide both battlefield intelligence and strike capabilities against Russian forces. In other armed forces, various sensors, as well as artillery and other munitions, perform these tasks.

Medium- and long-range Ukrainian drones have struck at Russian logistical hubs, as well as energy infrastructure inside Russia.

These are tasks that various branches of the armed forces of countries have performed for decades. The United States and Israel’s strikes against Iran are an example.

Not easily replicated

What’s often forgotten with technology is that it’s not just the hardware that matters, but also the people operating it. Armies are typically conservative institutions that resist change.

Ukraine, out of necessity, has a culture that embraces drones to enhance the country’s capabilities. This has gone so far as to “gamify” war. Russia, while also employing drones, has not been as effective as Ukraine, despite having vastly superior economic and industrial might.

Russian employment of drone operators is a large reason why. In Russia, those recruited as drone operators are diverted instead to serve as replacement frontline infantry in the attritional assaults favoured by Russian commanders. Not only is Russia thereby depriving itself of skilled drone operators, but media reports about the Russian army’s use of these drone enthusiasts discourage more of them from enlisting.

While many countries will try to copy Ukraine’s successful drone tactics, technology alone is not enough. The stark contrast between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries proves that culture matters just as much as — if not more than — the weapons themselves. To truly harness this new technology, a military must first build a culture capable of maximizing its potential.

James Horncastle is an assistant professor who holds the Edward and Emily McWhinney chair in international relations, Simon Fraser University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.