China’s new naval gun promises unprecedented range and firepower, yet its effectiveness in a Taiwan invasion scenario may ultimately hinge on overcoming the island’s formidable anti-access defenses.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s military is developing a record-breaking 155-millimeter naval gun system, moving closer to deployment following recent sea-based performance testing. Production of the 21.8-tonne prototype, built by state-owned defense conglomerate Norinco, was completed in March 2025.

In early May, the 6,000-tonne experimental warship Wu Yunduo conducted live-fire sea trials near Dalian to evaluate the weapon’s fire control and structural stability. Featuring a stealth turret to minimize radar detection, the system will become the largest caliber naval gun in active service worldwide.  

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reviving large-caliber artillery primarily to provide high-volume, cost-effective fire support for potential amphibious landings against Taiwan.

Using extended-range ammunition, the gun can strike targets up to 200 kilometers away, helping keep warships safe from shore-based anti-ship missiles. Interoperability with existing army munitions further lowers manufacturing and supply chain overheads.  

Beyond shore bombardment, experts note the rapid-fire system can provide a defensive layer against low-intensity threats, including intercepting incoming subsonic cruise missiles and countering swarm attacks from unmanned surface vessels.  

The SCMP article’s claim that a 155-millimeter gun using smart ammunition can hit a target 200 kilometers away warrants scrutiny. Such ranges are usually covered by tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), with ranges of up to 300 kilometers, bridging the gap between heavy artillery and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which could hit targets up to 1,000 kilometers away.

For instance, North Korea’s 170-millimeter M-1978 Koksan howitzer could achieve a range of 57 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPs), while the Soviet-era 203-millimeter 2S7 Pion howitzer, used by both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, could reach up to 47.5 kilometers with RAP ammunition.

Even the canceled US 155-millimeter Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) could achieve a range of only 83 kilometers when fired from the decommissioned Advanced Gun System (AGS) on the Zumwalt-class destroyers.

Still, China’s new naval gun contrasts with the US decision to repurpose its Zumwalt-class destroyers from stealthy shore bombardment platforms into hypersonic missile launchers.

With only three Zumwalt destroyers built, the cost of the LRLAP skyrocketed to $800,000-$1 million per round in 2017 dollars, which may have been a major factor in the US’s decision to decommission the AGS aboard its Zumwalt destroyers and convert the ships into hypersonic missile launchers instead.

Instead of fitting the new naval gun on specialized ships, China could opt to fit its new 155-millimeter gun on its Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers, currently fitted with 130-millimeter guns.

As of June 2026, China has 35 Type 052D destroyers and 10 Type 055 cruisers, which could provide a basis for economies of scale in producing specialized 155-millimeter ammunition and help avoid the cost pitfalls associated with the AGS and LRLAP rounds.

Looking into how China could use naval gunfire support in amphibious operations, Andrew Erickson and other writers mention in a November 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) that the PLAN is moving away from traditional shore bombardment toward high-volume, precision-guided systems integrated into a broader “systems-destruction warfare” framework.

Erickson and others say that while historically the PLAN was constrained by traditional linear tactics, it now emphasizes deploying modern stealth turrets and large-caliber artillery.

They note that such systems would operate from experimental and specialized amphibious platforms; these systems will utilize extended-range and rocket-assisted munitions to strike critical defensive nodes, early-warning radars, and command centers at extended ranges.

They add that this long-range capability allows PLAN warships to suppress entrenched coastal defenses and dismantle Taiwan’s anti-access networks while remaining safely outside the envelope of shore-based anti-ship missiles, effectively smoothing the transition for the first-echelon landing forces.

Beyond supporting amphibious landings on Taiwan, gun-based systems may alleviate the magazine-depth problem encountered with missile-based interceptor systems – a ship can fire only as many missiles as it carries.

Illustrating the problem, Johannes Fischbach points out in a December 2024 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that while the US Navy’s aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers are armed with 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, the Arleigh Burke destroyers have 96; limited reloading capabilities at sea handicap them.

In contrast, each AGS aboard the Zumwalt-class destroyers could carry up to 335 LRLAP rounds, and China’s new naval gun may have a comparable magazine.

Furthermore, Responsible Statecraft reported in January 2025 that from October 2023 to December 2024, the US Navy expended 168 SM-2s, 17 SM-3s, and 112 SM-6s interceptors while defending Israel against Iranian ballistic attacks and fending off Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

The high costs of these missiles compound the problem, with the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) reporting that an SM-2 costs $2,100,000 per missile; the SM-3 Block IIA costs $27,900,000 per missile; and the SM-6 costs $9,570,000 per missile.

Apart from those high costs, slow production times could cap replenishment rates. Mark Cancian and Chris Park note in a May 2026 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that it may take up to two years to replenish SM-3 and SM-6 stocks depleted during the Iran war.

However, the question remains whether China can achieve the necessary conditions to effectively use its new naval gun to support an invasion of Taiwan. China must secure localized sea control around Taiwan to ensure the maneuverability of its offshore artillery along Taiwan’s littorals.

That is a potentially challenging task, given Taiwan’s extensive asymmetric arsenal for localized anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) that could threaten ships close to shore – including those providing naval gunfire support to landing forces.

In March 2026, Taipei Times reported that Taiwan possesses 1,000 indigenous Hsiung Feng II and III missiles, as well as 400 US-made Harpoon missiles, potentially making it the country with the highest concentration of anti-ship missiles globally.

According to Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the subsonic Hsiung Feng II has a range greater than 100 kilometers, while the supersonic Hsiung Feng III has about the same range.

The Harpoon missile has a range similar to that of its Taiwanese counterparts, but variants purchased by Taiwan are said to have a longer range of 148 kilometers.

Hence, the effectiveness of China’s new naval gun may hinge not on range or firepower but on whether China can locate and suppress Taiwan’s dispersed and concealed anti-ship missile batteries – a daunting task, given that the US may have failed to fully suppress Iranian drone and missile forces deployed in a similar asymmetric posture in the ongoing conflict between them.