Former Russian president and incumbent deputy chair of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned on X that “the Russian Defense Ministry’s statement must be taken literally: the list of European facilities that make drones and other equipment is a list of potential targets for the Russian armed forces. When strikes become a reality depends on what comes next. Sleep well, European partners!”

The remarks followed the defense ministry’s publication of the addresses of foreign companies producing drones for Ukraine.

In its statement, the ministry said it acted because “the European public should not only clearly understand the underlying causes of the threats to their safety but also know the addresses, as well as the locations, of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘joint’ companies producing UAVs and their components for Ukraine in their countries.”

The implication is that antiwar activists could target these facilities, similar to a previous arson attack on an Israeli-linked arms partner in Czechia. It is also possible that Russia could seek to recruit saboteurs for this purpose.

However, by publishing these companies’ addresses and amplifying the message through Medvedev’s comments, authorities may also be creating justification to increase security and deter potential sabotage.

This interpretation has led some observers to give more weight to Medvedev’s claim that the list represents “potential targets for the Russian armed forces,” rather than merely sabotage targets. The suggestion is that Russia could escalate to direct strikes.

While some of Russia’s supporters at home and abroad may favor such escalation, it would risk a broader conflict, potentially even World War III.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, often viewed as cautious by critics, is unlikely to take that step over foreign drone suppliers, particularly given his restraint following what has been described as “Operation Spider Web.”

That episode involved a series of Western-backed Ukrainian drone attacks on elements of Russia’s nuclear triad last summer—the largest such operation to date, though not the first.

Some observers in alternative media interpret Medvedev’s position as deputy chair of the Security Council as evidence that he speaks directly for Putin, but that is not necessarily the case.

As illustrated by debates among analysts such as Sergey Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev — who have proposed sharply different strategies, from escalation against NATO to negotiation with the United States — there appear to be competing factions within Russia’s policymaking community.

Medvedev and Karaganov are often characterized as hawks, while Bordachev and Putin are seen as more moderate.

Over the course of the Ukraine conflict, more hardline proposals have generally not been adopted, suggesting that Medvedev’s latest remarks may not translate into policy. He frequently makes forceful statements that fail to materialize, which may be intended to instill fear in Western policymakers and the public.

Overall, the defense ministry’s publication of foreign drone companies’ addresses in Europe is more likely intended to signal that Russian intelligence has penetrated Ukraine’s supply chains than to warn of imminent attacks, as Medvedev suggested.

His statements are often interpreted cautiously, given the gap between his rhetoric and actual policy decisions and actions under Putin.

This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished here with editing for clarity, fluency and grammar. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.