As the US-Iran conflict enters a volatile new phase, Indian analysts are sharply divided over the direction of New Delhi’s foreign policy. Much is on the line: economic vulnerability at home and reputational risk abroad, particularly across the Global South.

How India responds to the West Asia crisis – and especially the Strait of Hormuz – deserves closer scrutiny. The thinking within the Ministry of External Affairs is far more nuanced than the tired Cold War tropes or recycled talking points often invoked in London and Lucknow.

Some commentators portray India as a passive bystander, arguing that its muted voice signals drift or feebleness  – especially since Pakistan occupies the diplomatic spotlight at the moment.

But this reading may be too shallow. Could India’s relative silence reflect strategic patience rather than indecision? Is New Delhi quietly positioning itself to move from balancing interests to shaping outcomes – perhaps even using the Hormuz crisis to advance a lasting neutrality framework, akin to the Montreux Convention or the governance models of the Suez and Panama Canals?

Sumeer Bhasin, an Indian geopolitical analyst, offers a provocative answer: “India must announce a Hormuz stabilization initiative – not as mediation, but as a framework-setting exercise.” Such an initiative would bring together major affected powers and shift India from the margins to the center of diplomatic coordination.

Given India’s economic weight, global partnerships, considerable maritime presence, and credibility across competing blocs, this is not an implausible ambition.

For now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar appear to be studying the geopolitical chessboard, waiting for the right moment to take the diplomatic initiative and move decisively. Whether this is calculated restraint or a missed opportunity remains unclear.

What is clear is that India faces a pivotal moment. Instability in West Asia could have cataclysmic effects across the immediate neighborhood and into East Asia, amplified by energy dependence and great-power rivalry.

A spectrum of views

The Hormuz crisis has exposed deep divisions within India’s foreign policy community.  Some defend the government’s multi-vector, pragmatic approach as a source of strategic autonomy. Others criticize it as overly cautious – too deferential to the United States and insufficiently bold for a rising power. Still others argue that what appears to be hesitation is in fact diplomatic sophistication: a deliberate effort to avoid entanglement while preserving flexibility.

Meanwhile, some critics fixate on Pakistan’s fleeting role as a mediator – an issue India could easily ignore or counterbalance.

Modi himself has offered little clarity. Addressing the Lok Sabha on March 23, 2026, he emphasized concern and a determination to protect Indian interests. “From the beginning, we have expressed deep concern over this conflict,” he said. “Through diplomacy, India is continuously working to ensure safe passage for Indian ships even in this war environment.”

But beyond these generalities, the strategy remains opaque. This ambiguity creates space for a more assertive initiative.

From balancer to architect

A Hormuz stabilization framework could provide that opportunity. It might even unify India’s otherwise fragmented foreign policy camps – at least temporarily – by offering a concrete, forward-looking objective.

Bhasin argues that India must move beyond hedging and become a rule-shaping power. Rather than merely navigating great-power competition, it should help define the rules of engagement. A multilateral initiative spearheaded by India – bringing together actors such as China, Russia, the EU and the Gulf states – could establish transparent protocols for maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The goal would be not confrontation but stability: constraining unilateral disruptions through collective agreement and shared incentives.

In Bhasin’s formulation, “This is India’s moment – not as a balancer, but as an architect.” The aim is to design an “operating system of access” that makes disruption costly and cooperation beneficial.

How might this work in practice? India could deploy a neutral naval presence, convene regional stakeholders and help define consequences for interference with shipping.

More broadly, it could champion an issue-based coalition model – one that reflects the realities of a multipolar world and gives emerging powers a greater role in shaping outcomes. If “friendship” is the new currency of international relations, as Bhasin suggests, India must ensure that such relationships are institutionalized and enforceable.

A moment worth seizing

Skeptics will call this ambitious, even unrealistic. But the alternative – continued muffled passivity – carries its own risks. India has the assets: strong regional ties, credibility across rival blocs, a tradition of non-alignment and a growing global profile. It directly profits from smooth energy and trade flows through Hormuz, as well as from a working Chabahar Port in Iran on the Gulf of Oman to facilitate connectivity with Central Asia.

Modi has said, “This is not an era of war. This is an era of dialogue and diplomacy.” If that principle is to mean anything, it must be operationalized. A Hormuz stabilization initiative – whether in Bhasin’s form or another – would be a concrete step in that direction.

India’s foreign policy establishment, for its part, would do well to temper ideological infighting and focus on advancing a coherent strategy. The goal is not just to secure national interests, but to help stabilize the global order while easing economic jitters across South Asia and the Global South.

Even if such an initiative falls short, the attempt itself would signal a shift – from cautious balancing to purposeful leadership. At this juncture, that may be exactly what the moment demands.