China may be preparing to supply Pakistan with a stealth fighter that could give Islamabad a new edge in striking deep into India—and unsettle an already fragile nuclear balance.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s state broadcaster has signaled that the country may be preparing to export its J-35A fifth-generation stealth fighter, most likely to Pakistan, after airing footage showing an apparent export variant rolling out of a hangar with markings from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) instead of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The aircraft, identified as the J-35AE, was shown on CCTV and featured design elements such as an internally integrated electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), indicating a mature, combat-ready platform suitable for foreign sales.

The unveiling marked the first full operational display of the export model, suggesting it is ready for delivery, with Pakistan viewed as the primary initial customer amid reports that it may acquire about 40 units as part of a broader defense package.

The move reflects China’s push to compete with the US in high-end arms exports, particularly in stealth fighters comparable to the F-35, while leveraging strong defense ties with Pakistan, which sourced up to 80% of its arms imports from China in recent years.

While Pakistan’s J-10C drew media attention for allegedly downing an Indian Rafale in May 2025 clashes, the clashes exposed the limits of both countries’ 4th-generation fighters.

Christopher Clary mentions in a May 2025 Stimson Center article that India’s S-400 long-range air defense systems reportedly downed one Pakistani aircraft, and that India attempted surface-to-air intercepts from within its territory.

Last year’s Operation Rising Lion underscored how fifth-generation fighters can dismantle modern air defenses. For instance, Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward mentioned in an October 2025 report that Israel’s F-35Is were employed within integrated strike packages, sometimes flying ahead in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles to guide targeting and support coordinated attacks against Iranian air defenses.

Palmer and Ward note these operations contributed to strikes that decimated Iran’s integrated air defense system (IADS) and enabled Israel to achieve air superiority within four days, allowing aircraft to operate freely over Iran without losses.

They add that air and missile forces, supported by such capabilities, were decisive in the campaign, which depended on maintaining air superiority long enough to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure through sustained strikes.

That model — using stealth aircraft to suppress air defenses and enable follow-on strikes — offers a template Pakistan could seek to replicate with the J-35AE. Seen through that lens, the J-35AE could give Pakistan a credible conventional counterforce option against India’s nuclear infrastructure.

Illustrating the idea of conventional counterforce, Kartik Bommakanti mentions in a March 2026 Observer Research Foundation (ORF) report that during the May 2025 hostilities, India used supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles to attack Pakistani airbases, notably Nur Khan airbase.

Nur Khan is located just over 1.6 kilometers from the headquarters of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, responsible for managing the country’s nuclear arsenal. Mhairi McClafferty points out in a March 2026 BASIC report that India may have chosen to strike Nur Khan to signal Pakistan that it can decapitate its nuclear command and control.

Likewise, Mansoor Ahmed states in an April 2025 interview with the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that Pakistan is responding with its conventional counterforce options, comprising long-range precision and standoff capabilities.

Integrated into a broader operational ecosystem, Ashok Kumar mentions in a June 2025 Defense Security Asia report that China may have provided critical space-based ISR for Pakistan during the May 2025 hostilities, noting that such intelligence helped Pakistan redeploy its air defense radars to monitor Indian aerial activity effectively.

Combined with Chinese ISR, J-35AEs could be used to exploit gaps in India’s air defenses to strike deep, including against nuclear-linked targets.

Such capabilities, however, risk pushing future crises up the escalation ladder. Rakesh Sood warns in a February 2026 report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) that India-Pakistan crises typically begin with sub-conventional or conventional actions — terrorist attacks or limited strikes — followed by calibrated military responses and counter-mobilization, as seen in 2001–02 and later crises.

Sood points out that escalation proceeds through conventional force deployments, cross-border strikes, and intensified exchanges, while both sides signal restraint to avoid full-scale war.

He notes that Pakistan’s nuclear posture, including ambiguity and lower thresholds, introduces risks of escalation, while India anticipates possible nuclear threats if it crosses key thresholds. Despite China’s promotion of its military hardware, such as the J-35AE, it hasn’t become a major arms supplier.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) show that, from 2021 to 2025, China was the fifth-largest arms exporter, accounting for 5.6% of global arms sales. In comparison, the US holds the top spot over the same period, accounting for 42% of global arms sales – far outstripping China’s.

Delving into the reasons for China’s relatively minuscule arms sales, Ghulam Ali mentions in an April 2026 Think China article that China refrains from entering into formal military alliances.

Ali notes that China’s restraint on alliances discourages potential buyers, who would be wary of developing military dependence on China, because arms sales are crucial tools for building defense and security ties and for securing possible backing in times of conflict.

He also mentions China’s weak client base, consisting mostly of poor and unstable countries, which cannot afford sophisticated weapons. In contrast, he says wealthy countries in Europe and the Middle East remain closely tied to the US and other Western suppliers.

Ali adds that China’s weapons remain untested in large-scale combat situations. He says that while the May 2025 India-Pakistan clashes validated a few Chinese systems, they have not fully changed perceptions of Chinese weapons.

In line with that, reduced-capability export versions of China’s military hardware could be considered “good enough” for clients on a limited budget fighting conflicts against similar adversaries, but it may not stand up to high-end equipment operated by China’s near-peer adversaries, such as the US.

But in any case, the real messaging behind the J-35AE’s reveal is likely to signal a closer alignment between Pakistan and China, entrapping India in a two-front war in Kashmir and the disputed regions in the Himalayas against two nuclear-armed adversaries.

The result is a tightening strategic vise on India: a potential two-front challenge from China and Pakistan, coupled with uncertain support from traditional partners such as Russia and an unreliable alignment with the US.

If realized, the J-35AE’s export may not just reshape airpower in South Asia but also complicate India’s nuclear deterrence calculus in ways harder to manage — and far riskier to test in crisis.