An American delegation, led by Vice President JD Vance and including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, arrives in Islamabad Friday for talks with Iranian delegation led by  Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s speaker of parliament, who is a former mayor of Tehran and former commander of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

A continued belligerent tenor and frayed tempers from both sides present a formidable challenge for the host, Pakistan.

Responding to Iran’s threat to withdraw from the ceasefire if Israel did not stop its continued attacks on Lebanon, Vance said Tehran would be “dumb” to let talks collapse over Lebanon. There are also contested views on the Strait of Hormuz, which now lies at the very center of these talks.

All this puts the onus on the host nation and calls for a serious examination of Pakistan’s leverages and liabilities as a mediator.

Pakistan’s sudden elevation to the front rank of West Asian diplomacy has been a story less of trust than of timing. In a region where mediation has traditionally been the preserve of Oman and Qatar – quiet brokers of difficult conversations – Islamabad’s emergence as the pivotal channel between the United States and Iran presents a geopolitical puzzle: As crises accelerated, mediation has shifted from credibility to accessibility.

Pakistan stepped in when other channels’ moves were were too piecemeal, stitching together a pause that was as urgent as it was fragile. That Islamabad – not Muscat, Cairo, Doha, Ankara or New Delhi – has occupied the center stage underscores how crisis diplomacy increasingly privileges speed, proximity and political access over traditional notions of neutrality and patience.

From ‘lies and deceit’ to tactical camaraderie

At the core of this shift lies the transformation in President Trump’s ties with Pakistan, especially with Prime Minister Shebaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir. This has not been any reconciliation rooted in trust or national interests but a recalibration driven by personal necessities.

Trump’s first-term denunciation of Pakistan for offering “nothing but lies and deceit” now sits uneasily alongside his newfound reliance on Islamabad. Soon after Trump’s second inauguration, security channels were reopened by Pakistan’s calculated cooperation in US apprehension of Mohammad Shariffulah, suspect for a Kabul airport bombing that had killed 180 Afghans and 13 American soldiers during the August 2021 US exit from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s outreach especially during its May 2025 military confrontation with India and subsequent public eulogies in which Shehbaz Sharif credited Trump as “savior of South Asia” cemented political goodwill further. Promises of access to Pakistan’s “massive oil reserves” and rare earths as well as a crypto deal with benefits for the Trump family deepened their manufactured camaraderie yet further.

This brought General Asim Munir unprecedented access to the White House and drew Trump’s public praise for the general as his “favorite Field Marshal.” This is what qualifies Pakistan as Trump’s messenger into this crisis. Coming true to expectations in prioritizing speed, Sharif tweeted messages suspected of having been drafted for him by the Trump team.

The resultant marginalization of other intermediaries reveals as much about Washington’s urgency as it does about regional politics. Turkey’s ideological assertiveness, Egypt’s and Bahrain’s alignment with Gulf monarchies and India’s preoccupation with strategic autonomy limited their appeal to Trump. Even Oman and Qatar – trusted in Tehran – lacked the immediacy of Pakistan. Pakistan was especially helped by China, which persuaded Tehran to move from defiance to engagement.

Ceasefire or strategic timeout?

While not the most trusted actor, Pakistan was the most willing to take the risk to hurriedly hammer together a contested ceasefire and talks. Tehran sees Pakistan as Trump’s messenger and insists that the ceasefire must extend to Lebanon. Israel has rejected this interpretation and continued to strike Lebanon. Comments on the fate of Strait of Hormuz have also deepened their contestations.

This is the classic pathology of hurried ceasefires: agreement on cessation without defining the mandate and scope of talks. The dispute over the Strait of Hormuz now lies at the heart of the ceasefire’s fragility. This was not even an issue till the initial weeks of this conflict. There are not just competing claims but competing perspectives. One is anchored in deterrence and regional control; the other in openness and systemic order.

Accusations of ceasefire violations point to a familiar pattern: agreements eroding not through decisive collapse but through incremental angst and mistrust. However, Beijing’s quiet but influential intervention – driven by its energy dependence, investments and strategic partnerships – provided assurance the ceasefire could be sustained for long enough to initiate talks. That President Trump acknowledged China’s role underscores a rare moment of convergence.

Compulsion and ambitions

Also lending hope are Pakistan’s compulsions for mediation. Its long and porous border with Iran, especially across Balochistan, makes it acutely vulnerable to spillover instability. Instability in Iran risks amplifying insurgency, sectarian tensions and domestic violence. Islamabad’s economic stakes are equally stark. With over 80 percent of its oil imported – much of it through the Strait of Hormuz – Pakistan cannot afford continued disruption.

Islamabad also sees this as an opportune moment to reassert its role in the Islamic world, deepening ties with partners such as Saudi Arabia while projecting itself as a peacemaker. Its mediation, therefore, is as much about domestic stability as it is about international ambitions.

As of now, however, its mediation remains procedural; its role, more that of a messenger. 

Pakistan’s recent leverage in Washington is undeniable. Pakistan also has had historical and religious ties with Iran, but these are currently marked by a strong trust deficit. Iran is, therefore, engaging Pakistan out of necessity and because of China and it continues to rely on parallel channels with other mediators. Moreover, Pakistan’s role is heavily personalized, tied to the Trump-Munir cosmetic bonding – which creates speed and flexibility, but also fragility. This is mediation built on access, not institutions.

Most importantly, the conflict itself resists confinement to US-Iran talks. What is formally a US-Iran ceasefire in practice involves multiple actors – Israel, Hezbollah, the Houthis and even China – each with its own calculus and strategy. No single mediator, let alone Pakistan, can impose coherence on such a fragmented theatre.

Pause, not peace

Historically, all ceasefires remain vulnerable to violations and contested interpretations. The ceasefire in Gaza since October provides the most recent example. Things get especially complicated when a ceasefire involves actors beyond its formal framework and lacks a binding enforcement mechanism. The gap between Washington’s 15 points and Tehran’s 10-point counter-proposal remains far too wide, not only in substance but in strategic vision.

Pakistan has, without doubt, delivered a diplomatic opening at a moment of acute crisis. But openings are not outcomes, especially when they provide access without authority. The ceasefire Islamabad has helped broker is best understood as a pause – negotiated through proximity, sustained by necessity and shadowed by the ever-present risk of collapse.

In the end, Pakistan’s role captures the paradox of contemporary mediation. It derives its strength from leverages – its proximity to power, its access to decision-makers – but remains constrained by liabilities that include limited trust with key actors, its exposure to regional instability and its dependence on personalities rather than procedures.

Whether its mediation moment marks a durable shift in Pakistan’s diplomatic standing or merely a fleeting interlude will depend on what follows in Islamabad talks. For now, the precarious ceasefire continues to hold – but only just that.

Swaran Singh is professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.