Tehran’s reply on May 10 was entirely predictable. Ceasefire, security guarantees for the Strait, total sanctions relief, reparations — the standard package. What apparently surprised Washington was the timing, which produced President Donald Trump’s terse verdict: “totally unacceptable.”
Even so, a surprising number of voices in Washington are still pushing ahead with a narrow bilateral deal whose main objective is to reopen the Strait and get the tankers flowing. If oil prices climb sharply or insurers start pulling back, that pressure will only increase. Quick relief and fast action can be both prudent and feel like leadership. But the Vietnam precedent should make everyone think twice.
Henry Kissinger might have predicted this. The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 called for American withdrawal and a ceasefire, but did nothing to protect South Vietnam. “Peace with honor” would fall apart in under two years. Kissinger eventually conceded that deal-making was usually temporary, unless military and political realities changed.
Trump’s upcoming meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14–15 further raises the stakes. Hormuz will almost certainly be a central topic. China is Iran’s largest oil customer and holds real cards in Tehran, but it has so far avoided heavy pressure.
Kissinger, the old master of triangular diplomacy, would treat the summit as an opportunity to pursue linkage.
Yet trying to enlist Beijing to enforce a bilateral US-Iran understanding is fraught with danger. It risks giving China a de facto veto over Gulf security, allows Beijing to continue hedging between Tehran and Washington, and deepens suspicion among Gulf allies that America is again looking for an exit rather than a solution.
The most likely result is a short-lived pause that keeps Iran’s leverage alive while strengthening China’s hand in the region.
The bigger problem is what happens the day after any such deal is signed. A limited bilateral agreement would send a clear message to Tehran: choking the Strait works. When Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Iran’s control of Hormuz as an “economic nuclear weapon,” he was right.
Billions of barrels can disappear from global markets almost overnight. Saudi Aramco’s chief executive has already spelled out the serious damage, and Goldman Sachs analysts warn that restoring normal conditions could take many months — or years if Iran decides to play for time.
Shipping rates and insurance costs would stay high. Supply chains would remain fragile. Washington would essentially be teaching Tehran a repeatable tactic for holding the global economy hostage.
Gulf partners have every reason to be skeptical of American guarantees. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that Washington draws red lines, then quietly retreats as pressure mounts. A deal focused only on the Strait would leave Iranian missiles and proxy networks largely untouched, while Gulf countries continue to host US bases and live with the daily threat.
Talk of an “insurance policy” is already spreading. That means more arms purchases from China, tighter economic ties with Beijing, and stronger Saudi insistence on regional talks that go beyond US mediation.
This approach would certainly weaken any chance of forming a stable regional order. While Iran might temporarily pause proxy attacks or missile activities, without independent verification and enforceable restrictions on proxies and missiles, Tehran is likely to wait for the next chance.
Bilateral initiatives to reopen the Strait could buy critical time, and the current US-Bahrain draft at the Security Council is a promising development. However, for a lasting solution, active Gulf participation in monitoring and enforcement will be vital.
Short-term thinking has harmed the US in the past. Repeating this pattern in the Gulf could lead to new energy shocks and prompt key allies to hedge more quickly. A smarter strategy would involve collaborating with Gulf states to develop a long-term framework to limit Iran, rather than settling for another superficial agreement between Washington and Tehran.
Only by ending this cycle of short-term fixes can the US transform the current crisis into an opportunity for lasting change, rather than just the prelude to the next crisis.
Eric Alter is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former UN civil servant.