In recent years, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s participation in summits of post-Soviet integration structures has become one of the clearest indicators of Yerevan’s changing foreign policy course. Formally, Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the CIS and the CSTO. Yet the political behavior of the Armenian leadership points to a different reality: Pashinyan is increasingly avoiding personal attendance at platforms dominated by Russia, while in the case of the CSTO, Yerevan has effectively moved toward an open freeze of its participation.

The latest example is Pashinyan’s refusal to travel to Astana for the EAEU summit on May 28–29, 2026. Officially, the decision was explained by his domestic schedule and the election campaign in Armenia ahead of the parliamentary elections on June 7. Armenia is being represented at the events in Kazakhstan by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan. At first glance, this may look like a routine redistribution of responsibilities within the government. But against the broader backdrop of Armenian-Russian relations, the decision carries a much deeper political meaning.

Pashinyan is not simply skipping a single event. He is demonstrating that Eurasian formats are no longer an unconditional priority for him. At a time when Armenia is preparing for elections, and the country’s foreign policy orientation has become one of the key themes of the campaign, personal participation in an EAEU summit could have been interpreted as a signal of loyalty to Moscow. Pashinyan, by contrast, is trying to preserve room for maneuver: not leaving the EAEU, not breaking economic ties with Russia, but also not displaying excessive political attachment to Russia-centric structures.

The situation with the CSTO is especially revealing. It is within this format that Yerevan’s distancing has become most pronounced. Back in November 2023, Pashinyan refused to attend the CSTO summit in Minsk. In 2024, Armenia announced a de facto freeze of its participation in the organization’s activities, arguing that the CSTO had failed, in Yerevan’s view, to fulfill its obligations to Armenia during the crises of 2021–2022. In November 2024, Pashinyan did not travel to the CSTO summit in Astana. In November 2025, Armenia also did not take part in the CSTO summit in Bishkek, although it did not object to the adoption of agreed documents.

Photo credit: Kabar

This is no longer a diplomatic gesture, but a consistent political line. Armenia formally remains within the CSTO, but politically behaves like a country that has withdrawn from active participation. For Moscow, this is a painful signal, because the CSTO has always been regarded as Russia’s main military-political instrument in the post-Soviet space. When one of its allies stops attending meetings, refuses to take part in exercises, does not pay membership contributions and publicly expresses disappointment in the organization, this undermines not only bilateral relations, but also the image of the structure itself.

The situation with the CIS is less clear-cut. In October 2023, Pashinyan did not attend the CIS summit in Bishkek, citing “a number of circumstances.” Against the backdrop of the crisis in relations with Moscow at the time, this was seen as a political signal. However, in October 2024, he personally attended the CIS summit in Moscow. Therefore, when it comes to the CIS, it is more accurate to speak not of a full boycott, but of selective participation. Pashinyan uses this format pragmatically: when participation is necessary to maintain channels of communication, he attends; when the political costs outweigh the benefits, Yerevan lowers the level of its representation.

The EAEU presents an even more complicated picture. For Armenia, this is not only a political platform, but also an economic one. The Armenian economy remains closely tied to the Russian market, energy supplies, migration, remittances and trade within the Eurasian space. For that reason, Yerevan cannot afford a sharp withdrawal from the EAEU without serious economic consequences. This is precisely why Pashinyan is trying to separate the economic agenda from the military-political one. He may criticize the CSTO, distance himself from Moscow and develop ties with the EU and the United States, while at the same time preserving Armenia’s participation in the EAEU as a tool of economic pragmatism.

Yet even within the EAEU, Pashinyan’s personal presence has become an increasingly sensitive issue. In December 2024, he participated in a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council by video link after testing positive for COVID-19. That meeting also saw a public exchange with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, after the Armenian prime minister made it clear that the Armenian delegation did not intend to personally attend a future meeting in Minsk. The episode showed that the issue had moved beyond protocol. For Yerevan, the venue of meetings and the composition of participants had become part of a broader political distancing from Russia’s allies.

At the heart of this policy lies a deep crisis of trust between Yerevan and Moscow. After the events surrounding Karabakh, especially after 2023, Pashinyan concluded that the old security system had failed to protect Armenia. In Yerevan, there is a belief that Russia and the CSTO did not provide the guarantees Armenia had expected as an ally. Moscow, in turn, views Pashinyan’s actions as a pivot toward the West and an attempt to dismantle the previous architecture of Russian influence in the South Caucasus.

Against this backdrop, Armenia has intensified its relations with the European Union and the United States. Yerevan is increasingly speaking about diversifying its foreign policy, strengthening sovereignty and reducing dependence on a single center of power. For Pashinyan, this is not merely a diplomatic formula, but an important element of domestic politics. Ahead of the elections, he is trying to show Armenian society that the country is no longer obliged to automatically follow Russia’s line and can seek alternative pillars of support.

This is why Pashinyan’s absence from EAEU, CIS and especially CSTO summits should be viewed not as a coincidence, but as part of a new political tactic. He is not taking abrupt legal steps where they could damage the economy. He is not leaving the EAEU, because that would create risks for trade, energy and Armenian business. He is not severing ties with the CIS, because this format remains a useful channel of communication. But he is consistently reducing the level of political engagement in structures that are increasingly seen in Armenia as instruments of Russian influence.

The main conclusion is that Pashinyan has chosen a model of gradual distancing. Armenia remains inside the old post-Soviet organizations, but is changing the substance of its participation. In the CSTO, this has already become a de facto freeze. In the CIS, it is selective presence. In the EAEU, it is economic pragmatism without the former political loyalty. For Moscow, this means the loss of its previous ability to manage Armenia. For Yerevan, it is an attempt to buy time, preserve economic benefits and, at the same time, move toward a more independent foreign policy.

Therefore, Pashinyan’s refusal to travel to Astana for the EAEU summit is not merely an election-related episode. It is the continuation of a broader line: Armenia no longer wants to look like part of Russia’s orbit without the right to make its own choices. Pashinyan is trying to show that Yerevan is not yet slamming the door, but it is no longer sitting at the table in the same way as before.  

By Murad Samedov  

News.Az 

By Ulviyya Salmanli