Colombia is entering the decisive phase of its presidential campaign after a first round that not only determined the two finalists but also exposed the depth of the country’s political divide.

On June 1, the main focus in Colombia turned to the results of the May 31 vote: right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella finished first and will now face left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in the runoff. The second round is scheduled for June 21, and it will answer the central question in Colombian politics: will the country continue the course associated with President Gustavo Petro, or will it make a sharp turn to the right?

According to international media reports, de la Espriella received around 43.7% of the vote, while Cepeda secured roughly 40.9–41%. The gap between the two candidates was not large enough to make the outcome of the runoff a foregone conclusion. However, the political significance of the right-wing candidate’s first-place finish is difficult to overstate. It was a serious blow to the left-wing camp and, at the same time, a sign that a large part of Colombian society has grown disappointed with the results of Petro’s presidency, particularly in the areas of security, the economy, and the state’s relations with armed groups.

From the outset, these elections were seen not merely as a contest between individual candidates, but as a kind of referendum on Gustavo Petro’s political course. The incumbent president, who became Colombia’s first left-wing head of state in 2022, cannot run for a consecutive second term. Yet his political legacy has become the central issue of the campaign. For many voters, Iván Cepeda represents the continuation of Petro’s left-wing project, while Abelardo de la Espriella has built his campaign around the promise to end what he describes as the experiments of the current government and restore the authority of the state.

The “total peace” policy, one of Petro’s signature initiatives, has occupied a particularly important place in this campaign. Its core idea was to move beyond military pressure on armed groups and try to reduce violence through negotiations, agreements, and political mechanisms. For supporters of the strategy, it is a continuation of Colombia’s historic peace process after the agreement with the FARC. For critics, however, it has become a symbol of state weakness in the face of criminal and armed structures.

This issue now lies at the heart of the runoff. Cepeda defends the logic of negotiations and argues that Colombia cannot overcome decades of violence through repression and military operations alone. His platform is based on the belief that security is impossible without social reforms, the fight against inequality, land reform, and a stronger state presence in impoverished regions. For him, “total peace” is not a concession to armed groups, but an attempt to address the root causes of conflict.

De la Espriella, by contrast, is betting on a hardline law-and-order agenda. He speaks the language of voters exhausted by violence: the state, he argues, must stop engaging in endless negotiations and instead regain control over territories, strengthen the army and police, and strike harder against criminal networks and drug trafficking. His supporters see him as a politician capable of acting decisively and without being constrained by old political compromises. International observers have already compared his rhetoric to the approach of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, especially because of his promises of tough measures against crime and his support for the idea of mega-prisons.

The first round showed that security has once again become a central issue for Colombia. Despite years of peace efforts, armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and territorial control continue to wield influence in several regions. For residents of these areas, the issue is not merely ideological. It is about everyday security, fear of violence, and the weak presence of the state. This is why de la Espriella’s pledges to restore order resonate with part of the electorate.

At the same time, hardline rhetoric always carries political risks in Colombia. The country has a painful history of internal conflict, guerrilla movements, right-wing paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and large-scale human rights abuses. For the left-wing camp, a de la Espriella victory could therefore mean not simply a change of government, but a return to a logic in which the state relies primarily on coercion. Cepeda will try to convince voters that such an approach may mobilize society in the short term, but in the long run could push the country back into a cycle of violence.

Cepeda, however, faces a serious challenge of his own: he must distance himself from the weaknesses of Petro’s presidency without breaking his connection with the left-wing electorate. Petro came to power on a wave of hope for social change, but his presidency has been marked by intense political polarization, difficulties in pushing through reforms, and growing criticism from the opposition. Many voters who supported change in 2022 may now question whether the left has delivered what it promised.

De la Espriella will build his runoff campaign precisely around these doubts. His main goal is to turn the June 21 vote into a choice between “the continuation of Petro” and “the end of Petro.” In this framing, Cepeda will be portrayed not as an independent politician, but as the heir to the incumbent president and the guarantor of his course. This is a powerful electoral formula because it allows the right-wing candidate to unite not only his own supporters, but also everyone who is tired of Petro’s political style.

Cepeda, in turn, will have to show that he is not simply a replica of the sitting president. He needs to offer voters an updated version of left-wing politics: more manageable, more pragmatic, and less confrontational. If he is perceived only as Petro’s candidate, it will be difficult for him to expand beyond the left’s core base. But if he can convince some moderate voters that his victory would not lead to chaos or a new wave of polarization, the runoff may remain genuinely competitive.

The position of the candidates who failed to reach the runoff will also be crucial. After the first round, the right has a clear opportunity to consolidate around de la Espriella. Support from other right-wing and conservative forces could strengthen his position ahead of the final vote. According to international media reports, right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia, who received about 6.9% of the vote, has already backed de la Espriella, which could become an important factor in the runoff.

But votes do not transfer automatically. Some moderate and centrist voters may be wary of de la Espriella’s tough rhetoric. For them, security and the fight against crime matter, but so do institutional stability, economic predictability, and Colombia’s international image. Therefore, the second round will not only be a battle for the right and the left, but also for the political center — for those who want neither a radical continuation of Petro’s course nor an overly abrupt right-wing turn.

The economic agenda will also play an important role. Colombia remains a country marked by deep social inequality, dependence on commodity revenues, and complex relations between the state, business, and the regions. Petro sought to advance a stronger role for the state in the economy, social reforms, and an environmental agenda, including restrictions on new oil projects. Right-wing forces criticize this approach, arguing that it creates risks for investment, business, and the energy sector. De la Espriella is likely to promise more favorable conditions for the private sector and the restoration of investor confidence.

A possible turn to the right could also have serious implications for Colombia’s foreign policy. Under Petro, Bogotá adopted a more independent and often critical stance toward the United States and traditional Western partners, while emphasizing regional diplomacy and a social agenda. A de la Espriella victory could mean closer ties with Washington, a tougher security line, and a different approach to combating drug trafficking. In this sense, the runoff matters not only for Colombia, but for Latin America as a whole.

The regional context also works in favor of the right-wing candidate. Across Latin America in recent years, demand has grown for politicians who promise order, security, and quick solutions. The example of El Salvador, where Bukele built his popularity on a tough anti-crime strategy, has become an important reference point for parts of the regional right. De la Espriella is trying to ride this wave by presenting himself not as a representative of the old elite, but as a decisive leader capable of breaking the usual system.

Cepeda, by contrast, will appeal to fears of authoritarian drift and excessive concentration of power. His campaign is likely to warn that tough rhetoric could lead to restrictions on civil liberties, stronger repressive mechanisms, and the abandonment of difficult but necessary negotiation processes. For the left, it will be important to show that security and human rights should not be placed in opposition to each other.

Another issue has been the claims made by Cepeda and Petro about possible irregularities in the vote count. Cepeda called for a review of alleged irregularities, while Petro also expressed doubts about some aspects of the process. However, according to media reports, electoral officials and experts have treated these claims with skepticism, pointing to the lack of convincing evidence of large-scale violations. This issue could increase tensions ahead of the runoff, especially if the gap between the candidates in polls remains narrow.

Low turnout in the first round adds another layer of uncertainty. According to Reuters, turnout stood at around 58%, meaning there is a significant pool of voters who could still influence the final outcome. For de la Espriella, the task is to mobilize right-wing, conservative, and anti-Petro voters. For Cepeda, the challenge is to bring back to the polls those who support the social agenda but may have become disappointed or passive in the first round.

Thus, Colombia’s runoff will not be a routine final stage of a presidential campaign, but a clash between two models of the country’s future. The first model is a right-wing turn, hardline security, stronger state action against armed groups, a more market-oriented economy, and closer ties with traditional partners. The second is the continuation of the left-wing project, with an emphasis on social reforms, negotiations with armed groups, and an attempt to address the structural causes of violence.

The first round showed that Petro’s political legacy is now under serious pressure. The left-wing project that four years ago looked like a historic breakthrough is now on the defensive. The right, by contrast, has been given a chance not simply to return to power, but to present itself as an answer to society’s anxieties. Still, the narrow gap between de la Espriella and Cepeda means that the final choice has not yet been made.

Until June 21, Colombia will live through a period of intense political confrontation. Each candidate will try to define the runoff on his own terms. De la Espriella will speak about order, security, and the need to end the Petro era. Cepeda will speak about peace, social guarantees, and the danger of returning to the coercive logic of the past. That is why the upcoming second round will be one of Colombia’s most important political tests in recent years: the country will be choosing not only a new president, but also the direction of its development after the first left-wing presidency in its history.

News.Az