In an interview with News.Az, Kohán Mátyás, Deputy Editor at Mandiner.hu and a prominent Hungarian expert, discusses how Péter Magyar’s rise to power could reshape Hungary’s domestic and foreign policy after 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s rule. He examines whether the change in leadership represents a full political turnaround or a more cautious shift, how Budapest may seek to rebuild trust with Brussels, and what Hungary’s position on Ukraine, EU funds, sanctions against Russia, and internal reforms could look like under a new government.

- How does Péter Magyar’s rise to the post of prime minister change Hungary’s political course after 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s rule? Can we speak of a complete turnaround, or will it be a more cautious transformation?

- We can speak of a complete turnaround on a number of domestic policy issues, but when it comes to foreign policy, I expect a more cautious transformation. The main change concerns Hungary’s approach to European politics. Viktor Orbán behaved in Brussels more like a leading opposition politician, as the strongest advocate of fundamental change, rather than as the prime minister of a medium-sized European country that, on its own, is unable to become the driving force behind a major European transformation.

This is now changing. Hungary will likely remain opposed to illegal immigration, the Green Deal, a trade war with China, and the supply of military equipment to Ukraine. However, it will promote these positions within the framework of a European consensus, rather than by confronting its own allies.

Source: AFP

- Will Hungary’s new government be able to restore trust with the European Union and unblock frozen EU funds? What concessions will Brussels have to make, and what concessions will Budapest have to make?

- Yes. A political agreement on unfreezing EU funds was already reached in late May between the European Commission and the Hungarian government. It is expected that the Hungarian authorities will fulfil its conditions.

However, it is important to emphasise that this is not only about anti-corruption measures. Hungary’s broader relationship with the European Commission is also changing. Orbán’s government had no intention of fulfilling any Commission requirements that it considered not justified by the EU’s founding treaties. Moreover, Budapest often refused to implement even EU-level legislation if it deemed it contrary to Hungary’s interests.

The new government appears ready to implement provisions of the new pact on migration and asylum, refrain from blocking the opening of accession talks with Ukraine, and stop obstructing payments for weapons supplied to Kyiv under the European Peace Facility. In addition, it has promised reforms to Hungary’s tax, pension, and energy systems in response to long-standing European Commission and allied-state demands.

Hungary will receive EU funds, but in return it will have to return to the European mainstream.

- How will Hungary’s position on Ukraine change, especially regarding military aid, sanctions against Russia, and negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU?

- Hungary will no longer block sanctions, either at the tactical or strategic level. However, the new government’s position on the most important issue for Hungary — access to Russian energy resources — is not yet fully clear.

At the same time, the new government, like its predecessor, does not intend to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

- Despite his defeat, Viktor Orbán remains an influential figure in Hungarian and European politics. How strong will the Fidesz opposition be, and could Orbán attempt to return to power?

- Fidesz is facing a deep credibility crisis not only among its opponents, but also among its own supporters, whose numbers are now significantly lower than on election day. Its future will depend on whether it can overcome this crisis.

The governing party will, for its part, try to prolong this crisis as much as possible. If it turns out — and there is a possibility of this — that Viktor Orbán’s main theses about Europe’s future and Hungary’s place in the current geopolitical environment were correct, and if allegations of mass corruption against his party are not substantiated, then Fidesz could recover and become a strong opposition force as early as this autumn.

If, however, the crisis of confidence cannot be overcome, Viktor Orbán and his party may gradually disappear from the political scene.

Source: Getty Images

- What domestic challenges will be most important for the new cabinet — inflation, fuel prices, the state of the economy, media control, or judicial reform? Which issue could become the first serious test for Péter Magyar?

- For many years, Viktor Orbán’s opposition argued that Hungary’s economic problems were caused solely by corruption under Orbán. However, this is not entirely accurate. Corruption did exist in Hungary, but the causes of the country’s economic difficulties are much broader.

There is a general economic stagnation across Europe, a structural crisis in Hungary’s education system and human capital development, and deeply rooted rent-seeking behaviour among domestic enterprises.

These problems can be addressed, but only at a high political cost. Reforms of the tax and education systems, as well as the dismantling of the long-standing system of preferential loans, are all unpopular measures among Hungarian voters, who were previously told that all their problems stemmed from Orbán’s corruption and the lack of EU funds.

The most serious test for Péter Magyar may be a failure to deliver on his economic campaign promises, as well as the risk that Viktor Orbán could ultimately be proven correct in his forecasts about Europe’s future and the position of a pro-European Hungary within it.

News.Az