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What is happening today strongly resembles those earlier situations, which is why many people doubt that the signing will actually take place. Axios reports that the memorandum was signed electronically by Trump, Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Qalibaf. But few take such reports seriously. At the moment, two parallel realities exist around this document.
The first is the version actively promoted by Iranian state and semi-official media. The second is what US sources and mediators are cautiously confirming. This is precisely why it appears that the sides are speaking about different documents. In reality, they are referring to the same draft agreement, but each side is trying to present it to its own audience as a victory.
What happened?
On June 14, US President Donald Trump announced that a framework agreement with Iran had been reached and that the official signing was expected to take place on June 19 in Switzerland. Similar statements were made by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and other mediators. After that, Mehr and IRNA began publishing the contents of what they described as a “14-point memorandum.”
In the Iranian version of the document, the United States undertakes very broad commitments, while Iran’s obligations are entirely absent. According to Iranian sources, the Americans are supposed to unblock around $24–25 billion in Iranian assets, significantly ease sanctions, halt military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, withdraw US forces from areas near Iran, refrain from imposing new restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme, provide a multibillion-dollar fund for the recovery of Iran’s economy, and so on.
At the same time, it should be stressed once again that Iran’s obligations are not specified in any way.
As in all previous cases, the US side has already begun denying the extraordinary list leaked by Iranian media.
Vice President JD Vance has already said that Iran will receive money only if it fulfils its obligations. The United States is ready to provide significant sanctions relief if the Iranians undertake long-term commitments to renounce nuclear weapons and stop financing groups in the Middle East, the vice president said during a television appearance.
The denials from the US side were expected. Many of the points published by Iranian sources look not like an agreed text, but rather like Tehran’s maximalist negotiating position — what it would like to see in the final version of the document. Meanwhile, US sources have from the outset spoken of a much more modest document — essentially a one-page framework memorandum that merely ends the war and launches a 60-day negotiation process on the nuclear issue and sanctions, according to Axios.

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The differences are particularly noticeable on several points.
First and foremost, there is the nuclear programme, which in the Iranian version is presented as a secondary issue that is not even being discussed at this stage and is supposedly being left for later. Iran claims that it is accepting no new restrictions and that the issue will be discussed later. The US side, by contrast, believes that the memorandum already implies a freeze on the further expansion of the nuclear programme and a halt to new uranium enrichment until a final agreement is reached. This is precisely what Vance pointed to.
Then there are the sanctions. Iranian media are speaking almost of a guaranteed lifting of sanctions, as an initial step on which everything else will depend. US leaks, however, as can be seen from Reuters reporting, refer only to temporary relief and discussions about a future mechanism for lifting sanctions.
The third questionable point concerns the Strait of Hormuz. While Washington is speaking about freedom of navigation, Iran continues to insist on its own control and has not abandoned the idea of charging fees from vessels passing through the strait.
The point concerning the cessation of Israeli actions in Lebanon also raises doubts. Tehran presents the situation as if Washington is committing itself to forcing Tel Aviv to halt all operations in Lebanon. No such commitments can be seen in US statements. Moreover, Israel has already expressed its view in the spirit of: “Were we even asked?”
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir told Israeli media that a sovereign state is not a subcontractor of any superpower. It is not obliged to implement agreements that deprive it of the ability to protect its people in the face of existential threats.
This should be understood as follows: Israel is not interested in any commitments that the United States may undertake as part of an agreement with Iran. It will act as it sees fit. This means that either Iran, as usual, has presented wishful thinking as reality, or Trump promised to stop the shelling of Lebanon without consulting Netanyahu.
Nevertheless, the likelihood that some kind of document will be signed between the United States and Iran this Friday remains fairly high. Experts estimate it at around 70–80 per cent. Such a high level of confidence is being expressed for the first time. On previous occasions, almost no one expected Washington and Tehran to actually reach any kind of agreement. What has changed today? It has now become quite clear that both sides are tired of the war and that neither wants to continue it. Many analysts tend to believe that Donald Trump now regrets having been drawn into Netanyahu’s “adventure” and becoming involved in this conflict.
In a situation where both sides do not want war but do not know how to exit it on terms favourable to themselves, Trump needs to bring this conflict to an end, as it is negatively affecting the economy and the oil market. For Iran, it is important to use the opportunity to secure the easing of some pressure and avoid a new escalation. Nevertheless, whatever is signed in Geneva, it will not be a peace treaty in the classical sense.
Most likely, it will be limited to a ceasefire, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the launch of 60-day negotiations on the nuclear programme, sanctions and frozen assets.
Still, there is a sense that the sides have already agreed to end the war, but have not yet agreed on the terms. What is true and what is not will become clear in just a few days.
By Tural Heybatov
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