If you installed a ShapedPlugin Pro plugin between April and June 2026 and kept it updated, your site may be compromised. Not because you did something wrong, but because the vendor’s own build and distribution pipeline was breached. Cybersecurity firm Wordfence confirmed the attack on June 12th after obtaining a backdoored copy of Real Testimonials Pro 3.2.5 directly from ShapedPlugin’s official update endpoint.
ShapedPlugin is a WordPress software company that develops premium and free plugins for WordPress and WooCommerce websites. Founded in 2015, it offers plugins for carousels, galleries, testimonials, weather widgets, accordions, product displays, team showcases, and other website functions. Its products are used by hundreds of thousands of websites worldwide.
The WordPress plugin vendor has over 400,000 active free plugin installations
“During our investigation, we discovered that attackers compromised the vendor’s build and distribution pipeline, injecting backdoor code into Pro plugin releases distributed through official licensed update channels.” reads the report published by Wordfence. “As with all supply chain compromises, this attack is particularly insidious because affected site owners followed security best practices: they purchased legitimate licenses and installed updates directly from the vendor’s official update system. Supply chain compromises are becoming significantly more common in all software, including WordPress software.”
The researchers confirmed that at least three Pro plugins were compromised: Product Slider Pro for WooCommerce, Real Testimonials Pro, and Smart Post Show Pro. Free plugins on WordPress.org were left clean, which was almost certainly deliberate.
The infection runs in two stages. The first is a loader file called LicenseLoader.php that downloads a payload from an attacker-controlled server, installs it as a fake plugin, reports the victim domain back to the attacker, and then deletes itself.
“This self-deleting behavior means the initial infection vector disappears after first execution, complicating forensic analysis for site owners who notice the infection later.” continues the report.
The dropped payload disguises itself as WooCommerce-related plugins, using names like “woocommerce-subscription” in the singular form, one letter away from the legitimate plugin name.
What that payload does once installed is extensive. It hides itself from the WordPress admin plugin list, registers a REST API backdoor that accepts arbitrary file writes, bundles Tiny File Manager and Adminer for direct GUI access to files and databases, and installs a webshell that accepts commands via URL parameters. There’s also a hardcoded login bypass: a single MD5 hash lets the attacker authenticate as any administrator without knowing their password. That’s not a subtle intrusion; that’s a full set of keys.
The malware steals credentials in a more sophisticated way than typical threats.
“What makes this variant particularly concerning is its targeted exfiltration of two-factor authentication secrets. The malware specifically searches for TOTP seeds from multiple 2FA plugins.” continues the report.
Attackers send the stolen passwords and 2FA to generate.2faplugin.org, a domain that blends in with legitimate two-factor traffic. If an attacker has your password and your TOTP seed, changing your password after discovery doesn’t help.
The forensic evidence points to a CI/CD pipeline compromise rather than someone manually tampering with ZIP files. Only four files were modified on May 21st within a two-hour window, consistent with an automated build step. The compromised package also contains git SHA references confirming it was built from a private repository. The attacker had access to deploy updates to both WordPress.org and the Pro distribution system, but only injected malware into some Pro builds — either because WordPress.org scans for malware or because paying customers are higher-value targets. Possibly both.
The C2 infrastructure is registered to AEZA GROUP LLC, tied to Russian-based entities. The exfiltration domain 2faplugin.org was updated on May 10th, about eleven days before the backdoor was injected into Pro builds. Anyone who installed any ShapedPlugin Pro product between April and June 2026 should scan immediately, check for fake plugins under wp-content/plugins/woocommerce-subscription/ or woocommerce-notification/, rotate all WordPress admin passwords, database credentials, and API keys, and, critically, revoke and regenerate 2FA secrets for every user on the site, since existing TOTP seeds should be considered stolen.
“This supply chain attack demonstrates the evolving threat landscape facing WordPress site owners. The attackers did not exploit a vulnerability in the plugin code itself: they compromised the vendor’s build and distribution infrastructure, turning legitimate licensed updates into malware delivery vehicles.” concludes the report. “The inclusion of 2FA secret exfiltration marks a concerning evolution in WordPress-targeted malware.”
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