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University of Cambridge - Cybersecurity

AI art protection tools still leave creators at risk, researchers say Whistleblowing tech based on Cambridge research launched by the Guardian Researchers demonstrate the UK’s first long-distance ultra-secure communication over a quantum network Building business partnerships Architecting the future Honour among thieves: the study of a cybercrime marketplace in action Lockdown 'helps fuel rise in cybercrime' Prevention better than cure at keeping young users from getting involved in cybercrime Most laptops vulnerable to attack via peripheral devices, say researchers
Price of a bot army revealed across hundreds of online pl...
Published: 11 December 2025Story: Fred Lewsey · 2025-12-12 · via University of Cambridge - Cybersecurity

Pre-election prices

To investigate if political influence operations can be seen in these markets, the team analysed price and availability of SMS verifications for eight major social media platforms in the 30 days leading up to 61 national elections held around the world between summer 2024 and the following summer.****

They found that fake account prices shot up for direct messaging apps Telegram and WhatsApp during election run-ups the world over, likely driven by demand. An account on Telegram increased in price by an average of 12%, and by 15% on WhatsApp.

Accounts on these apps are tied to visible phone numbers, making it easy to see the country of origin. As such, those behind influence operations must register fake accounts locally, say researchers, increasing demand for SMS verifications in targeted nations.

However, on social media platforms like Facebook or Instagram, where no link between price and elections was found, fake accounts can be registered in one country and used in another. They also have greater reach which keeps demand high.

“A fake Facebook account registered in Russia can post about the US elections and most users will be none the wiser. This isn’t true of apps like Telegram and WhatsApp,” said Roozenbeek.

“Telegram is widely used for influence operations, particularly by state actors such as Russia, who invested heavily in information warfare on the channel.” WhatsApp and Telegram are among platforms with consistently expensive fake accounts, averaging $1.02 and $0.89 respectively.

‘Shadow economy’

The manipulation market’s big players have major customer bases in China and the Russian Federation, say the research team, who point out that Russian and Chinese payment systems are often used, and the grammar on many sites suggests Russian authorship. These vendors sell accounts registered in countries around the world.*****

“It is hard to see state-level political actors at work, as they often rely on closed-loop infrastructure. However, we suspect some of this is still outsourced to smaller players in the manipulation market,” said Dek.

Small vendors resell and broker existing accounts, or manually create and “farm” accounts. The larger players will provide a one-stop shop and offer bulk order services for follower numbers or fake accounts, and even have customer support.

A 2022 study co-authored by Dek showed that around ten Euros on average (just over ten US dollars) can buy some 90,000 fake views or 200 fake comments for a typical social media post.

“The COTSI shines a light on the shadow economy of online manipulation by turning a hidden market into measurable data,” added co-author of the new Science paper Prof Sander van der Linden.

“Understanding the cost of online manipulation is the first step to dismantling the business model behind misinformation.”

*The data used in the study published in Science, as well as the additional analyses, was collected between 25 July 2024 and 27 July 2025.

** In April 2025, the UK became the first country in Europe to pass legislation making SIM farms illegal. Researchers say that COTSI can be used to track the effects of this law once it is implemented.

*** Lead author Anton Dek explains: “By virtual SIM, we mean virtual phone numbers typically provided by Communications Platform as a Service (CPaaS) or Internet-of-Things connectivity providers.”

“These services make it easy to purchase thousands of numbers for business purposes. Such numbers are usually inexpensive per unit, but they often carry metadata indicating that they belong to a CPaaS provider, and many platforms have learned to block verifications coming from them. On the other hand, when a physical SIM card (or eSIM) from a conventional carrier is used, it is much harder to distinguish from a normal consumer’s number.”

**** The platforms used were Google/YouTube/Gmail; Facebook; Instagram; Twitter/X; WhatsApp; TikTok; LinkedIn; Telegram.

***** A recent law passed by the Russian Federation banned third-party account registrations, which saw vendors suspend SMS verification registered in Russia alone as of September 2025. However, this has not stopped vendors operating from Russia offering services linked to other nations.