cyber-crime
Developer-targeted, supply-chain attacks all the rage these days
CrowdStrike, working with Google and the Shadowserver Foundation, said it has taken down the Glassworm botnet, a self-propagating, credential-stealing worm that has targeted developers and spread through poisoned software packages since early 2025.
The endpoint security giant’s Counter Adversary Operations team and partners hit all four Glassworm command-and-control channels simultaneously at 1400 UTC on Tuesday, “severing the operators from their infected machines and their ability to deliver new malicious payloads,” according to CrowdStrike’s blog.
Google Threat Intelligence Group chief analyst John Hultquist confirmed his company’s involvement in a social media post. “As part of our disruption efforts, we are working with partners to bring more pain to attackers, especially when we see them abusing our products or targeting our users,” Hultquist wrote.
A spokesperson declined to provide additional details to The Register about Google’s role in the takedown.
The disruption comes as another self-replicating worm, Mini Shai-Hulud, rips through open source code and miscreants poison GitHub repositories and npm packages in similar supply-chain attacks also targeting developers’ environments.
“Glassworm marked a significant shift in the threat landscape that should serve as a wake-up call for every organization that ships or consumes software,” CrowdStrike wrote. “Adversaries are no longer just targeting products, they're targeting the developers who build them.”
We are working with partners to bring more pain to attackers, especially when we see them abusing our products or targeting our users
First spotted by endpoint security shop Koi in October 2025, Glassworm used invisible Unicode-based code injection, blockchain-based C2 infrastructure, and Google Calendar as a backup command server to turn infected developers’ machines into criminal proxy nodes. This self-replicating worm initially targeted VS Code extensions on the OpenVSX marketplace before moving on to npm and Python packages, and later poisoned more than 300 GitHub repos using stolen credentials harvested in earlier Glassworm infections.
This worm appeared about a month after another self-propagating malware strain, Shai Hulud, first wormed through npm packages including those maintained by CrowdStrike. Glassworm infected all platforms - including Windows, macOS, and Linux systems - stealing credentials and other sensitive information, and also spawning its own Node.js remote access tool called GlasswormRAT.
C2 architecture designed to withstand takedowns
Glassworm’s C2 infrastructure used four distinct channels to complicate takedown efforts. These included the Solana blockchain, with C2 server addresses encoded in the memo fields of blockchain transactions, ensuring the C2 couldn’t be taken offline through conventional means. It also used Google Calendar event titles as dead-drop locations for Base64-encoded C2 paths.
The GlasswormRAT used a decentralized BitTorrent Distributed Hash Table (DHT) for configuration data stored against hardcoded public keys.
And finally, Glassworm relied on traditional C2 servers, hosted on commercial VPS providers, as the final payload delivery mechanism.
Disrupting all four channels “required precision and timing,” according to CrowdStrike. “Taking down only one channel would have left the others operational, allowing the operators to quickly reconstitute.”
All Glassworm-infected machines now beacon to the benign CrowdStrike-operated IP address 164.92.88[.]210. The security shop urges organizations to review network logs and endpoint telemetry for connections to this address, which indicate a Glassworm infection. ®