Last year, I read a good book.The Diary of Tang ZongI made a lot of notes back then, and I organized them today.

I. Tang Zong as a Person

Tang Zong (1905–1981), from Ling County (now Yaling County, Zhuzhou City) in Hunan Province, graduated from the Sixth Class of the Whampoa Military Academy. He was a close aide to Chiang Kai-shek and a confidant of Dai Li, the head of the Military Statistics Bureau.

After graduating from the Whampoa Military Academy, he worked in the intelligence department of the Kuomintang, becoming a key figure in the special operations agency.

In 1936, he was sent to Germany to serve as an assistant military attaché at the Chinese embassy in Germany. After returning to China, he joined Chiang Kai-shek's secretariat, the "Staff Office," becoming the head of the sixth group, responsible for intelligence affairs. Every day, he selected important intelligence and attached his personal insights to report to Chiang Kai-shek.

After the victory in the War of Resistance, he served as the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Deputy Director of the Secretariat, and Director of the General Police Bureau. In 1949, he moved to Taiwan and held positions such as Head of the Information Group in the office of the Kuomintang Party Chairman, Secretary-General of the Taiwan Provincial Government, and Secretary-General of the Kuomintang Central Committee. He passed away on October 26, 1981, in Taipei.

During his time in mainland China, Tang Zong had the habit of keeping a diary, which he maintained for 20 years without interruption. His diary was very secretive, and he even didn't let his wife see it.

When he fled mainland China in 1949, he didn't have time to take his diary with him, and it was confiscated by the People's Liberation Army. After the Cultural Revolution, mainland China compiled and published his diary (1936–1946).

II. Style of the Diary

Tang Zong's diary was not lengthy; he didn't have the time to write extensively, merely recording simple fragments each day and expressing his personal opinions candidly.

He rarely discussed his personal life, with only sparse records of his family. The main focus was on current affairs, high-level politics, diplomacy, and military matters, revealing many behind-the-scenes details and holding high reference value.

Since he had no intention of showing it to others, the credibility of the diary's content is very high.

III. Chongqing During the War of Resistance

For most of the War of Resistance, he stayed in Chongqing, documenting some of the social conditions there.

People's lives are extremely difficult, prices are soaring, and there is a shortage of goods.

The wholesale price index in Chongqing, for hardware and electrical supplies, has risen 24 times compared to pre-war levels, for textiles 16 times, for food 6 times, and for fuel 15 times (December 10, 1940).

Recently, prices have soared, and people are restless. It is said that only by punishing hoarders can market prices be stabilized. It is heard that there are many hoarders in Chongqing, and the commander-in-chief ordered their arrest. After being arrested, they were released by Kong Xiangxi. Those who heard about it couldn't help but sigh! (August 7, 1940)

Although the Japanese did not attack Chongqing, they frequently bombed it, causing heavy casualties.

Yesterday, a public air raid shelter at Shenxian Cave No. 180 was bombed. One bomb hit the entrance, and another hit another entrance. What a coincidence! A total of 177 people were killed, 167 seriously injured, and 172 lightly injured. Due to many families being wiped out there, few survivors applied for compensation. (August 8, 1941)

The famous Great Tunnel Tragedyis also mentioned.

(Japanese aircraft) night raided, the tunnel suffocated, resulting in a major tragedy. (At night) around seven o'clock people entered the air raid shelter, and it wasn't until midnight that it was lifted.

The Jiaochangkou Tunnel because of too many people, too long a time, and the defense group not allowing people to go out for air, locked the doors from the outside, leading to thousands of people suffocating to death.

This tragedy, it was heard that it had already occurred by eight o'clock. At that time, the defense group members maintained order, not allowing the people to go out, causing people inside the tunnel to crowd towards the outside, unable to go out, all dying from suffocation at the entrance. The dead were in great distress, tearing their clothes themselves, and some even pulled their hair with force after death, still holding it. The scene was truly indescribable. (June 5, 1941)

IV. Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek

Tang Zong was loyal to Chiang Kai-shek throughout his life, and in his diary, every mention of Chiang Kai-shek was positive. Chiang Kai-shek also valued and trusted him highly.

The Commander-in-Chief regarded me as quite important, moving me three times in a week. How can I work hard to repay the leader's favor! (May 17, 1939)

Tang Zong believed that the various serious problems within the Kuomintang were not the fault of Chiang Kai-shek, but rather the excessive corruption of the bureaucratic landlord group beneath him.

After three years of resisting the Japanese, the wealthy had not diminished, and their wealth had even expanded due to the national crisis. The middle class, consisting of officials and scholars who relied on salaries for their livelihood, were increasingly feeling the hardships of rising prices. Their thoughts and sentiments gradually leaned leftward. Adding to this, the incompetence of our politics and the persistence of corruption, coupled with a lack of achievements, were all objectively favorable to the Communists. If another year or two passed, even if the enemy army did not advance into Kuimen Pass, society would still experience significant changes!

Thinking of this, he could not sleep all night. He wanted to write a letter to express his pain, but then he thought that with the intelligence and talent of Comrade Cui, how could he still not know? With Comrade Cui's ability to adapt, how could he still have no strategies? Why should we overworry? (August 14, 1940)

Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of the problems within the Kuomintang, but he was helpless due to objective constraints and the entanglement of interests, unable to carry out thorough reforms.

The current situation was already critically ill, and local reforms would not be effective. It was necessary for the leader to make a decisive decision, establish a clear direction, adjust the organization, and renew personnel to have a chance for revival!

Minister Zhang asked how to make the General-in-Chief come to this decision! I said, judging from the current situation, the General-in-Chief is reluctant to make too many changes, and there will be some reforms after the war, but it will not be a thorough reform! Moreover, the timing is too late, and whether it will be effective is quite questionable! (September 14, 1944)

V. Corruption of the Kuomintang

Tang Zong had a clear understanding of the corruption issue within the Kuomintang.

The national civil servants, teachers, and most of the common people can't afford to live. Natural disasters and human misfortunes, rising prices, everyone is struggling on the brink of death. At this timeThe strong take risks, the weak die in ditches.

The government tries to do everything but fails in everything, with scattered human and financial resources, showing weakness and danger everywhere. The public officials in office are all in a hurry, with their energy scattered. The lower-level officials are busy with daily necessities, while the higher-ups are preoccupied with family wealth and children, their energy diverted elsewhere, thus handling official matters perfunctorily and failing to resolve any issue. (May 17, 1946)

He detested it deeply, yet felt powerless to change it, able to do nothing but sigh.

Several suggestions were adopted by the leader, but when it came to implementation, they vanished without a trace. Sitting in the attendants' room, he witnessed this and felt genuinely heartbroken. (October 6, 1938)

Now, when capitalists and bureaucratic officials hold sway, any proposal or opinion that contradicts their interests cannot be implemented. Thus, even though the leader pleaded earnestly and wept bitterly, it ultimately yielded no results. (January 7, 1941)

In the current official circles, he neither takes action himself nor wishes others to do so, leading to the mishandling of affairs and the country. Speaking of it, he feels deeply distressed. Such politics can only be resolved through revolution, but where to begin is a matter of widespread debate. Even if he disengages himself from the matter, there is nowhere to survive. Grand corruption goes unnoticed, while minor offenses result in scapegoats. (September 9, 1941)

Those involved in smuggling for profit are either government or military agencies, and it's already difficult enough for ordinary merchants to engage in such activities. Today, those who commit crimes and engage in wrongdoing are people with power. The corruption of politics starts from the top and trickles down, affecting all aspects of the economy, politics, and military. To save the situation, it still requires a top-down approach. If thorough reforms are not carried out, society is truly beyond saving. (June 29, 1944)

Our party has completely acted as a conservative party rather than a revolutionary one in this meeting. The reason is that most members of the Kuomintang are civil servants. Over the long period of one-party rule in the past ten years, their status has improved, their wealth has increased, and their lives have become more comfortable. They all hope to maintain their original lives and status, so they do not wish for reforms that might shake their own positions. (May 31, 1945)

The corruption of our party's politics has not only caused resentment outside the party but also lost sympathy within the party. Without significant reforms, the hearts and minds of the nation will be beyond saving. (June 30, 1945)

The sluggish state of the Kuomintang government and army during the War of Resistance, is almost unimaginable.

In the morning, the commander-in-chief called for a meeting with employees below the level of ministers and above that of section chiefs, scolding them for their lack of morale and spirit, prohibiting gambling, prostitution, and dancing in teahouses and taverns, and wasting time idly, warning that anyone found doing so would be severely punished. (December 18, 1938)

Now, soldiers cannot eat their fill every day and often think of running away. Officers, however, are always focused on preventing soldiers from escaping, because otherwise, the losses they would have to bear would be unbearable. Leading troops is already extremely difficult; how can we even talk about training them? Without training, how can they fight? Therefore, every battle they lose is not without reason. A sigh! (September 20, 1940)

Some say that the front is tight, and the rear is tight on eating. What the front has, the rear has. What the front lacks, the rear lacks. The front bleeds, while the rear drips with oil. (March 31, 1941)

Higher-ranking cadres are chasing power and position, while lower-ranking comrades are chasing a better life. Ideology, politics, and revolution have all been forgotten and disappeared! (April 28, 1943)

Tang Zong believed that the fundamental reason why the Kuomintang was unable to reform was that it was a party of the landlord class, which first protected its own interests rather than the interests of the people.

To save the country, one must first save the party. If the party is not sound, it cannot lead politics onto the right track. How can the party be made sound? It must be cleaned up. Statistics show that 85 percent of the members of the Youth League are civil servants. Most members of the Kuomintang are landlords, capitalists, and petty bourgeoisie, which is contrary to the spirit of the Three Principles of the People. How can they be expected to implement the policies of the Three Principles of the People? (November 8, 1940)

VI. Views on the Communist Party

Tang Zong also had a clear view of the Communist Party, believing that the corruption of the Kuomintang led to the rise of the Communist Party.

Public order is poor in many places. Whenever there is chaos, it is blamed on the instigation of the Communist Party. In reality, given the current political and economic situation, chaos would have occurred even without the Communist Party. Before the Republic of China, there was no Communist Party, yet historical records frequently mention peasant uprisings. Attributing all causes of unrest to the instigation of the Communist Party is a way of evading responsibility. (April 24, 1941)

The price of rice in the Dongjiang River area of Guangdong reached over 4,000 yuan per stone, and people's livelihoods were extremely difficult, all of which created opportunities for the Communist Party. (May 6, 1944)

VII. Experiences in Dealing with People and Matters

There were also many observations and reflections on officialdom in his diary.

In history, those who were upright and solitary were never successful. Those who thrived in officialdom were mostly smooth-tongued. The stones on the riverbank were none square or pointed; the square ones had all been worn down by the water. Mountains were rounded too; the square ones were all worn down by wind and rain. The trunks of trees were also rounded—this is the law of survival of the fittest. Humanity could not escape this example. In history, those who could use upright and solitary people were the most successful, but upright and solitary people were not easily encountered by superiors. (May 29, 1944)

He also had an extremely interesting diary entry, a long summary of the art of survival in officialdom.

I. Those with high moral character are praised, but those who seize power and gain influence are often mediocre in talent, kowtow to the powerful, and are appreciated and promoted by them.

II. Those with extensive knowledge are admired, but those who hold high positions are often skilled in tactics, clever, good at adapting, and smooth in handling affairs.

III. When dealing with superiors, one must skillfully follow their intentions and never act on one's own initiative. Concentrate all efforts on what the superior desires and avoid what they dislike. Right or wrong need not be considered; trust is paramount, and right or wrong are secondary.

Fourth, dealing with colleagues can earn sympathy, and sympathy is the guarantee of friendship. All past mistakes can be resolved.

Fifth, when dealing with subordinates, having control and using it effectively can be the pride of those in power. Severity and harshness are only talk for Confucian scholars.

Sixth, in the beginning, one must seize opportunities, borrow names, elevate oneself, and blow one's own horn loudly to advance. Those who work hard may not necessarily succeed.

Seventh, once in a position of power, doing more brings more troubles, while doing nothing brings peace. Stay in power for a year, and you gain seniority; stay for two years, and your position is secure.

Eighth, to keep oneself clean and upright is to be a good person. Being a good person is just an empty reputation. Sincerity and honesty are synonyms for uselessness. Honest people can only enjoy simple food and clothing; don't dream of riding fine horses or wearing luxurious robes. Daydreaming will bring more disasters. It's better to settle down peacefully. (August 1942)

(End)