Global coffee prices are no longer at their peak. According to data from the International Coffee Organization, ICO, the composite coffee index decreased in May 2026 by about 23.4% compared to May 2025, and in June 2026 data available until June 11, a decrease of about 19.8% was recorded compared to June 2025.

At the same time, however, in the consumer price sample conducted by the Institute for Retail Research, an opposite movement was recorded: The average observed price on the Israeli shelf skyrocketed with an average increase of 14.4%. This is precisely the gap that troubles the Israeli consumer: When the raw material rises, the explanation quickly reaches the shelf. When the raw material drops, the price reduction gets stuck along the way.

In May 2025, the ICO composite coffee index stood at 334.41 US cents per pound. In May 2026, it dropped to 256.05 cents, a decrease of 78.36 cents per pound, which is about 23.4%. A decrease was also recorded in the core categories: Robusta dropped by about 30%, Brazilian Naturals dropped by about 22.7%, Other Milds dropped by about 20.7%, and Colombian Milds dropped by about 18.2%.

June data also present the same trend. In June 2025, the composite ICO index stood at 295.06 cents per pound, and in June 2026, according to the data available until June 11, it dropped to 236.52 cents per pound, a decrease of about 19.8%. Here too, the decreases are not marginal: Brazilian Naturals dropped by about 22.9%, Other Milds by about 20%, Robusta by about 17.8%, and Colombian Milds by about 15.4%.

However, the Israeli consumer does not buy a pound of coffee beans on the stock exchange. They buy a jar of Taster's Choice, Elite instant coffee, Turkish coffee, capsules, black coffee, or a private label. On this shelf, the picture is completely different.

The sample price survey by the Institute for Retail Research examined 35 observations of coffee products in food chains in Israel, June 2025 versus June 2026, including promotions. The sample does not claim to be a uniform basket in every chain, but rather a collection of product and chain observations that makes it possible to identify a price direction and the intensity of the price hike.

The central finding is sharp: The average price in the sample rose from NIS 19.85 to NIS 22.71, an average addition of NIS 2.86 per item and an increase of 14.4%. At the chain level, according to the observations examined, the sharpest increase was recorded at Yesh Chesed, where the average price rose from NIS 17.53 to NIS 22.46, an increase of 27.7%. At Shufersal Deal, an average increase of 18.1% was recorded, at Osher Ad 15.8%, at Yohananof 14.6%, at Carrefour Hyper 14.1%, at Victory 12.4%, and at Rami Levy 11.6%.

In other words, both in chains perceived by the public as price chains, both in discount chains and in chains where frequent promotions take place, the coffee market is moving in one direction: Upward.

The price hike is not limited to luxury coffee or to products perceived as indulgent. The sample also found sharp increases in black coffee, Turkish coffee, instant coffee, and capsules.

Elite Turkish coffee with cardamom at Osher Ad rose from NIS 6.10 in June 2025 to NIS 8.90 in June 2026, an increase of 45.9%. Landwer house blend capsules at Shufersal Deal rose from NIS 13.49 to NIS 18.73, an increase of 38.8%. Landwer Ristretto capsules at Shufersal Deal rose from NIS 13.51 to NIS 18.73, an increase of 38.6%. Elite Brazilian coffee at Yesh Chesed rose from NIS 24.07 to NIS 31.90, an increase of 32.5%, and Elite Platinum Classic coffee at the same chain rose by an almost identical rate.

This is an important finding because coffee is not a seasonal product or a product purchased once a year. It is a daily, recurring, emotional, and habitual product. The public does not just buy coffee, it clings to it. For many consumers, replacing a coffee brand is not similar to replacing a brand of toilet paper or tomato sauce. There is a familiar taste here, a familiar smell, a morning ritual, a family habit, and sometimes also a consumer identity. And when a product has rigid demand, the market knows it.

The coffee market in Israel is largely controlled by two central suppliers: Strauss Elite and Osem Nestle. Each of them has different power centers, but together they largely dictate the price language, the perception of value, and the structure of the shelf.

Strauss Elite is particularly strong in black coffee, Turkish coffee, powdered instant coffee, and the field of capsules. Elite Turkish coffee has long since become an almost generic term in Israel. The consumer does not always ask for "black coffee", they ask for "Turkish coffee", and in many cases, the practical intention is to Elite. This is a tremendous brand asset, because when the brand name becomes the name of the category, competition weakens even before the consumer reaches the shelf.

Osem Nestle, on the other hand, holds strong power over the freeze–dried instant coffee market through Taster's Choice. On the Nescafé Israel website itself, Taster's Choice is presented as the leading brand in the instant coffee market in Israel. This is a significant marketing statistic, because it explains why even when the price approaches NIS 40 for a 200–gram jar, the consumer finds it difficult to switch to another brand.

Here lies one of the most interesting questions in the Israeli coffee market: How a brand presenting such strong control in Israel is not translated to the same extent into broad and clear global control, at least not in a way that allows parallel import to generate a cheap and accessible shelf alternative. This must be phrased cautiously, as I do not have an official statistic here proving a lack of activity in other countries or global market shares of Taster's Choice by country. But at the consumer and retail level in Israel, the result is clear: when there is no strong, familiar, and cheap parallel alternative to the same product that the Israeli consumer is used to, the pricing power remains with the local supplier and the official importer.

In many categories, parallel import can break a price. We have seen this in toiletries, chocolate, breakfast cereals, perfumes, beverages, and pharma products. But in coffee, and especially in freeze–dried instant coffee, this capability is more limited.

The first reason is taste loyalty. Coffee is a sensory product. Even when "100% coffee" is written on the packaging, the consumer notices differences in aroma, strength, bitterness, acidity, texture, and the way the coffee dissolves in the cup. An alternative brand can be cheaper, but if it does not provide the same familiar taste, it will remain on the shelf.

The second reason is brand structure. Taster's Choice, Elite, and Nescafé are not just commercial names. They are consumer anchors. When a consumer buys the same coffee for years, sometimes decades, price is not the only parameter. They are angry about the price, but continue to buy.

The third reason is the lack of an identical alternative in parallel import. If a certain product is sold in Israel in a format, recipe, branding, or positioning that is not common in the same way in other countries, it is difficult to import it at a market–breaking price. In simple words, it is impossible to break a price through parallel import when there is not enough of a parallel product that the consumer recognizes as an identical product.

The coffee market is not empty of competitors. Nescafé Red Mug is on the shelf, Jacobs tries to constitute an alternative in instant coffee and capsules, Landwer has grown particularly in capsules and black coffee, and there are also private labels that are strengthening. But this competition is not always translated into a broad price reduction.

In the sample, Nescafé Red Mug instant coffee rose on average from NIS 24.59 to NIS 27.02, an increase of 10.4%. Jacobs freeze–dried Gold instant coffee at Rami Levy rose from NIS 24.94 to NIS 28.90, an increase of 15.9%. Jacobs Classico capsules rose on average by about 15%. Landwer, which manages to grow in the capsule and black coffee category, presented some of the highest price hikes in the sample: Landwer house blend capsules rose on average by about 31.9%, and Landwer Ristretto capsules by about 31.8%.

This is a critical point: Competition does not exist merely by the very existence of several brands. Real competition exists when one brand forces the other to lower prices, improve terms, or change the value structure for the consumer. In the Israeli coffee market, at least according to the current sample, some of the brands do not break the price but rather align themselves around the high price environment.

Instead of the mid–tier brands challenging the leaders, they sometimes use the high price of the leaders as a reference ceiling that allows them to raise prices as well. Thus, a market is created where everyone leaves a certain distance from the leading brand, but almost no one truly breaks downward.

The capsule market was supposed to be a more competitive market. The entry of many brands, compatibility with common machines, the transition to high–quality home consumption, and the expansion of the shelf were supposed to create price pressure. In practice, capsules became a new premium arena, where the consumer got used to paying more in order to get a home experience perceived as close to a coffee shop.

The Starbucks brand by Nestle Osem in food chains adds a premium dimension to the market, but does not necessarily break prices. It reinforces the perception of coffee as an experience product, not just a consumption product. When the consumer compares a capsule to the price of a cup of coffee in a coffee shop, and not to the price of a gram of coffee on the shelf, price sensitivity changes. This is a profound consumer change: Home coffee turned from a basic product into an experiential product, and manufacturers know how to price the experience.

One of the most important details in this story is Carrefour. According to the research note, within the framework of "the national basket," discounted prices exist at Carrefour for leading products, including Elite instant coffee, Taster's Choice, and Elite Turkish coffee. These lines are not part of the numerical sample calculation, but they are very significant as consumer context.

Why? Because they prove that when a public, tender–based, or competitive commitment exists, the price can drop even for strong brands. That is, these are not products that cannot be discounted. They can be discounted when the market is required to do so.

But this is exactly where the problem sharpens: If the same products can be discounted within the framework of a defined basket in one chain, why does the discount not spread to the rest of the market? Why do other chains not use Carrefour's prices as a competitive pressure point? Why are suppliers not required to explain to the public why the same product can be sold at one price within a public commitment and at a higher price on a regular shelf? The answer is unpleasant but simple: The coffee market in Israel is rigid. When the consumer continues to buy, competition is not required to exert effort.

In the past year, a certain movement can be seen on the part of private labels, mainly by Shufersal and Rami Levy. Shufersal is increasingly succeeding in educating its consumer to switch to the house brand at the expense of leading brands, even in categories where in the past this was almost inconceivable. Rami Levy operates in the private label arena as well, mainly through offering a lower price and creating a discount alternative.

But in coffee, the transition is slower. The Israeli consumer might be willing to try a private label in canned goods, pasta, baking paper, or cleaning products, but in coffee they are more cautious. A private label in coffee needs to win not only on price, but also on taste, habit, trust, and the feeling of quality.

This is the reason that the private label in coffee can grow, but still finds it difficult to break the rigid structure of the market. It manages to take a share, but not necessarily to cause the leading brands to lower prices. In other words, it creates an alternative for those who are willing to switch, but still does not change the rules of the game for those who remain loyal to Elite or Taster's Choice.

In any market where the consumer is loyal to a brand, power shifts from the buyer to the supplier. When the consumer does not easily switch to a competing brand, the price increase becomes less risky from the manufacturer's perspective. When the chain knows that the leading coffee will sell even at a higher price, it too does not always have a deep incentive to break prices. It can offer a localized promotion, highlight another product, or use coffee as an anchor product, but not necessarily change the price structure.

And here lies the heart of the consumer problem in Israel: The public complains about the cost of living, but does not always alter purchasing patterns in a way that punishes the market. As long as the consumer continues to buy the same product, in the same chain, with the same habit, and with the same loyalty, the market receives a clear signal: The price hurts, but not enough to change behavior.

The coffee market in Israel presents an almost classic consumer picture of local cost of living: The raw material globally has dropped, but the shelf price in Israel has risen. Suppliers and chains will be able to explain part of the gap through inventories, logistics, exchange rates, and operational costs, but these explanations are insufficient when the global trend is declining and the consumer continues to pay more.

The big story is not just the price of coffee. The story is the power of a brand in a rigid market. Strauss Elite and Osem Nestle do not just sell coffee, they manage habits. Elite holds the local language of black and Turkish coffee, Nestle strongly holds freeze–dried instant coffee, and the Israeli consumer finds it difficult to part with the brands that have become part of their routine.