惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

W
WeLiveSecurity
Jina AI
Jina AI
博客园 - 司徒正美
雷峰网
雷峰网
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
博客园_首页
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
Google DeepMind News
Google DeepMind News
GbyAI
GbyAI
MyScale Blog
MyScale Blog
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
美团技术团队
I
InfoQ
博客园 - Franky
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
博客园 - 叶小钗
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志
Cyberwarzone
Cyberwarzone
C
CXSECURITY Database RSS Feed - CXSecurity.com
S
Schneier on Security
P
Privacy & Cybersecurity Law Blog
T
Threatpost
Cloudbric
Cloudbric
D
Docker
M
MIT News - Artificial intelligence
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
Vercel News
Vercel News
Martin Fowler
Martin Fowler
J
Java Code Geeks
AWS News Blog
AWS News Blog
The Cloudflare Blog
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
L
Lohrmann on Cybersecurity
Hacker News: Ask HN
Hacker News: Ask HN
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
S
Security @ Cisco Blogs
Help Net Security
Help Net Security
C
Cisco Blogs
V
V2EX
博客园 - 【当耐特】
I
Intezer
爱范儿
爱范儿
F
Fortinet All Blogs
cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
P
Privacy International News Feed
IT之家
IT之家
L
LINUX DO - 最新话题
B
Blog RSS Feed
K
KPMG report finds enterprise disconnect between AI and its ROI | CIO

Securelist

New BitLocker extortion activity: RDP, MSSQL, RMM Abuse New Project CAV3RN .NET Native AOT communication module HelloNet campaign: a threat via the ViPNet update system GoSerpent backdoor attacks in Southeast Asia OkoBot framework infection chain Threat landscape for industrial automation systems. Q1 2026 When checking the URL isn't enough: phishing via the Microsoft identity platform Armored Likho's new weapon: BusySnake Stealer How to improve your organization's security based on compromise assessment findings How a single ScreenConnect incident exposed a massive campaign How the ToddyCat APT group gains access to Gmail accounts The Gentlemen RaaS: rapid growth and a new ransomware variant CVE-2024-2658 vulnerability in Schneider Electric software: risks to industrial control systems Threat landscape for SMBs in 2026: fake AI tools, phishing and more StrikeShark: a new campaign involving a custom SharkLoader and Cobalt Strike Beacon An unknown actor distributes malicious VBS scripts via WhatsApp Gamers beware: malicious wallpapers on Steam found stealing accounts Hacktivists are broadening their scope beyond political motivation Argamal: Malware hidden in hentai games Wardriving assessment across Mexico: Preparing for the 2026 World Cup Containers on fire: from container escapes to supply chain attacks What’s in the container? Analyzing vulnerabilities, risks and protection with Kaspersky Container Security and Pirates in the crosshairs: how one cybercrime gang has been infecting book, movie, and TV show fans for years Cloud Atlas activity in the second half of 2025 and early 2026: new tools and a new payload How an image could compromise your Mac: understanding an ExifTool vulnerability (CVE-2026-3102) IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics Kimsuky targets organizations with PebbleDash-based tools State of ransomware in 2026 CVE-2025-68670: an RCE vulnerability in the xrdp server The vulnerability landscape in Q1 2026 OceanLotus suspected of distributing ZiChatBot malware via wheel packages in PyPI How to spot a suspicious website “Legitimate” phishing: how attackers weaponize Amazon SES to bypass email security PhantomRPC: A new privilege escalation technique in Windows RPC Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q4 2025 JanelaRAT: a financial threat targeting users in Latin America The long road to your crypto: ClipBanker and its marathon infection chain Financial cyberthreats in 2025 and the outlook for 2026 A laughing RAT: CrystalX combines spyware, stealer, and prankware features An AI gateway designed to steal your data Coruna: the framework used in Operation Triangulation Anatomy of a Cyber World Global Report 2026 The SOC Files: Time to “Sapecar”. Unpacking a new Horabot campaign in Mexico Free real estate: GoPix, the banking Trojan living off your memory BeatBanker: A dual‑mode Android Trojan Exploits and vulnerabilities in Q4 2025
Security risks for OpenClaw users and how to mitigate them
Kaspersky · 2026-06-01 · via Securelist

OpenClaw, which was previously known as Clawdbot and Moltbot, is today one of the most successful and fast‑growing ecosystems for AI agents, recognized worldwide. The project quickly became popular with users because of its flexibility and ability to solve fairly complex tasks that previously required a lot of time for automation and execution. A dedicated marketplace appeared quickly after the project started gaining traction, where developers and users began publishing tools for working with it. Currently, employees all over the world use OpenClaw to automate their tasks, often unaware of risks this practice introduces to them and their employers.

In this article we will examine several security aspects of OpenClaw, look at how attackers can target this system, which vulnerabilities are already known, and how to protect against all of the listed issues.

OpenClaw skills

The project’s success was ensured by the fact that the agent accepts natural language instructions, does not require knowledge of programming languages, and allows the use of skills, which expand its capabilities. The overall architecture of OpenClaw can be seen below:

The OpenClaw overall architecture

The OpenClaw overall architecture

As shown in the scheme, the system is designed to be used along with agent skills. These skills can reside locally on a system where the agent is installed or can be obtained from external sources. At the time of writing this article, a dedicated hub named ClawHub is used for sharing skills among users.

One of the key features of OpenClaw skills is that they are easy to create and do not require coding. A skill is in essence a set of commands written in natural language, although it can contain code. Currently, there is a general description of the skill format: it is usually a text file named SKILL.md, although more complex variants can exist. The primary requirement for these files is that they use plain‑text formats. To illustrate what this looks like, here is a fragment of a skill:

Openclaw skill example

Openclaw skill example

The application areas for the OpenClaw skills are quite broad and can include everyday tasks such as checking email, performing routine operations and calculations on a computer, as well as more complex pipelines that handle testing, research, or software development. For most actions, the agent requires access to the operating system’s file system, as well as to the tokens and keys of the systems it will interact with. All necessary data are usually provided by users either through environment variables or in plain‑text files located alongside the agent.

Since many skills enable automation of work processes, employees worldwide actively use them. This fact, combined with the widespread adoption of the system and the overall popularity of artificial‑intelligence technologies, has attracted attackers to the project.

OpenClaw vulnerabilities

In less than two years, around 530 vulnerabilities have been discovered both in OpenClaw itself and in the underlying technologies. That said, the publication of OpenClaw vulnerabilities in the CVE database began only in February 2026. Below is a breakdown of these vulnerabilities by severity.

Registered vulnerabilities (download)

As shown in the chart, the number of high-severity vulnerabilities is quite large. Most of these vulnerabilities fundamentally involve issues with storing sensitive data and operating with excessively high privileges. Each of them can be exploited to hijack the agent or inject commands that it will execute.

Malicious skills

Besides exploiting vulnerabilities and deceiving users, there are more specific attack vectors against OpenClaw, namely, the skills.

Research logically draws a parallel between supply‑chain attacks and the distribution of malicious skills. However, unlike usual supply-chain attacks, creating malicious skills is trivial because there is no longer a need to develop custom malware.Despite this, until February 7, 2026, no skills underwent even a basic security check, which allowed malicious skills to appear immediately. Our scan of the skill hub in April, identified 24 accounts that were distributing more than 600 malicious skills. Overall, open‑source intelligence indicates that over 1,100 malicious accounts have been created since January.

Following the investigations and a lengthy effort to clean the skill repository of malicious entries, it was announced that files would undergo preliminary scanning with VirusTotal (VT) and NVIDIA’s SkillSpector. On the one hand, this is a more responsible approach to publishing skills; on the other, because OpenClaw is primarily an agent that executes a set of instructions, detecting malicious activity moves to a different level. Now it is necessary not only to analyze a file for dangerous commands that should be blocked, but also to examine all possible malicious behaviors that could be triggered by a harmful instruction within a skill. An example of a malicious command in natural language:

Example of a malicious command within a skill action

Example of a malicious command within a skill action

An example of a malicious command using a part of a bash command:

Malicious command inside a skill

Malicious command inside a skill

The example in the image and similar malicious skills are detected by Kaspersky products as HEUR:Trojan.ANSI.MalClaw.gen.

In addition, Kaspersky products monitor malicious OpenClaw skill activity on the system. Below are detection statistics from our systems that identified malicious OpenClaw client behavior. The data for June cover the first half of the month.

Statistics on Kaspersky product detections of OpenClaw malware (download)

As shown in the chart, even despite the measures taken to counter the publication of malicious skills, attacks continue. Therefore, it is important to employ layered protection that isolates the OpenClaw agent from critical data and infrastructure systems. We also recommend checking all skills that enter the organization’s perimeter. For this purpose, Kaspersky Scan Engine is suitable. This solution is designed to protect web applications, proxy servers, network attached storage and mail gateways. It can be integrated into almost any application, is easy to deploy and manage.

Malicious skill detected by Scan Engine

Malicious skill detected by Scan Engine

Additionally, monitor network accesses used by the agent. For this purpose, the project already provides a sandboxing subsystem and various wrappers for working with APIs and services. Last but not least, develop a comprehensive AI policy and make sure your employees never use third-party tools that are not explicitly allowed to use.