Federated Recommender Systems (FedRecs) are considered privacy-preserving techniques to collaboratively learn a recommendation model without sharing user data. Since all participants can directly influence the systems by uploading gradients, FedRecs are vulnerable to poisoning attacks of malicious clients. However, most existing poisoning attacks on FedRecs are either based on some prior knowledge or with less effectiveness. To reveal the real vulnerability of FedRecs, in this paper, we present a new poisoning attack method to manipulate target items' ranks and exposure rates effectively in the top-$K$ recommendation without relying on any prior knowledge. Specifically, our attack manipulates target items' exposure rate by a group of synthetic malicious users who upload poisoned gradients considering target items' alternative products. We conduct extensive experiments with two widely used FedRecs (Fed-NCF and Fed-LightGCN) on two real-world recommendation datasets. The experimental results show that our attack can significantly improve the exposure rate of unpopular target items with extremely fewer malicious users and fewer global epochs than state-of-the-art attacks. In addition to disclosing the security hole, we design a novel countermeasure for poisoning attacks on FedRecs. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical gradient clipping with sparsified updating to defend against existing poisoning attacks. The empirical results demonstrate that the proposed defending mechanism improves the robustness of FedRecs.