Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here we propose an information-theoretic formalization of bounded rational decision-making where decision-makers trade off expected utility and information processing costs. Such bounded rational decision-makers can be thought of as thermodynamic machines that undergo physical state changes when they compute. Their behavior is governed by a free energy functional that trades off changes in internal energy-as a proxy for utility-and entropic changes representing computational costs induced by changing states. As a result, the bounded rational decision-making problem can be rephrased in terms of well-known concepts from statistical physics. In the limit when computational costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered. We discuss the relation to satisficing decision-making procedures as well as links to existing theoretical frameworks and human decision-making experiments that describe deviations from expected utility theory. Since most of the mathematical machinery can be borrowed from statistical physics, the main contribution is to axiomatically derive and interpret the thermodynamic free energy as a model of bounded rational decision-making.