Byzantine-robust distributed learning (BRDL), in which computing devices are likely to behave abnormally due to accidental failures or malicious attacks, has recently become a hot research topic. However, even in the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) case, existing BRDL methods will suffer from a significant drop on model accuracy due to the large variance of stochastic gradients. Increasing batch sizes is a simple yet effective way to reduce the variance. However, when the total number of gradient computation is fixed, a too-large batch size will lead to a too-small iteration number (update number), which may also degrade the model accuracy. In view of this challenge, we mainly study the optimal batch size when the total number of gradient computation is fixed in this work. In particular, we theoretically and empirically show that when the total number of gradient computation is fixed, the optimal batch size in BRDL increases with the fraction of Byzantine workers. Therefore, compared to the case without attacks, the batch size should be set larger when under Byzantine attacks. However, for existing BRDL methods, large batch sizes will lead to a drop on model accuracy, even if there is no Byzantine attack. To deal with this problem, we propose a novel BRDL method, called Byzantine-robust stochastic gradient descent with normalized momentum (ByzSGDnm), which can alleviate the drop on model accuracy in large-batch cases. Moreover, we theoretically prove the convergence of ByzSGDnm for general non-convex cases under Byzantine attacks. Empirical results show that ByzSGDnm has a comparable performance to existing BRDL methods under bit-flipping failure, but can outperform existing BRDL methods under deliberately crafted attacks.