We study binary coordination games over graphs under log-linear learning when neighbor actions are conveyed through explicit noisy communication links. Each edge is modeled as either a binary symmetric channel (BSC) or a binary erasure channel (BEC). We analyze two operational regimes. For binary symmetric and binary erasure channels, we provide a structural characterization of the induced learning dynamics. In a fast-communication regime, agents update using channel-averaged payoffs; the resulting learning dynamics coincide with a Gibbs sampler for a scaled coordination potential, where channel reliability enters only through a scalar attenuation coefficient. In a snapshot regime, agents update from a single noisy realization and ignore channel statistics; the induced Markov chain is generally nonreversible, but admits a high-temperature expansion whose drift matches that of the fast Gibbs sampler with the same attenuation. We further formalize a finite-$K$ communication budget, which interpolates between snapshot and fast behavior as the number of channel uses per update grows. This viewpoint yields a communication-theoretic interpretation in terms of retransmissions and repetition coding, and extends naturally to heterogeneous link reliabilities via effective edge weights. Numerical experiments illustrate the theory and quantify the tradeoff between communication resources and steady-state coordination quality.