In this paper, we ask the question of why the quality of commercial software, in terms of security and safety, does not measure up to that of other (durable) consumer goods we have come to expect. We examine this question through the lens of incentives. We argue that the challenge around better quality software is due in no small part to a sequence of misaligned incentives, the most critical of which being that the harm caused by software problems is by and large shouldered by consumers, not developers. This lack of liability means software vendors have every incentive to rush low-quality software onto the market and no incentive to enhance quality control. Within this context, this paper outlines a holistic technical and policy framework we believe is needed to incentivize better and more secure software development. At the heart of the incentive realignment is the concept of software liability. This framework touches on various components, including legal, technical, and financial, that are needed for software liability to work in practice; some currently exist, some will need to be re-imagined or established. This is primarily a market-driven approach that emphasizes voluntary participation but highlights the role appropriate regulation can play. We connect and contrast this with the EU legal environment and discuss what this framework means for open-source software (OSS) development and emerging AI risks. Moreover, we present a CrowdStrike case study complete with a what-if analysis had our proposed framework been in effect. Our intention is very much to stimulate a robust conversation among both researchers and practitioners.