Ransomware recovery in critical manufacturing infrastructure is not only a backup-restoration problem. Production capability depends on coupled information-technology, operational-technology, physical-process, quality, logistics, identity, and supplier systems. After ransomware, a plant may rebuild servers yet remain unable to schedule work, authenticate operators, trust engineering workstations, release product, reconnect OT assets, or coordinate suppliers. This paper reframes manufacturing ransomware recovery as a critical-infrastructure continuity and interdependency problem. We conduct a PRISMA-guided multivocal review of academic literature, standards and government guidance, threat frameworks, public incident material, and verified full-text/source-page evidence anchors. The review identifies nine evidence-backed recovery failure modes: dependency blindness, untrusted restore point and backup over-trust, identity trust collapse, lack of proof-of-recovery, unsafe OT reconnection, segmentation assumption failure, capability mismatch, unmanaged degraded operation, and supplier dependency failure. We then introduce Minimum Viable Factory Recovery (MVF Recovery): the smallest safe, trusted, and operationally meaningful production capability that can be resumed under current dependency, evidence, identity, data, network, OT, and supplier constraints. MVF Recovery is an analytical objective rather than a claim of full recovery, implementation, or safety certification. The paper derives a recovery lifecycle and benchmarking directions as secondary outputs. The contribution is an evidence-calibrated foundation for capability-centric ransomware recovery in critical manufacturing infrastructure.